Bonds And Stocks Diverge Terminally As Steepeners Capitulate

The attempt to gun stocks despite a battery of bad news is so far succeeding, as risk is now diverging completely from yields and no correlations hold any longer. Those tempted to test whether any human correlation traders remain may play the convergence trade, but with this unprecedented amount of central planning in the market now, it would appear unduly risky. Yet one place where there is most certainly risk, is for job prospects of all those on the steepener bandwagon: the 2s10s has just hit 208 bps, as the steepener trade and the thousands of lemmings behind it are getting slaughtered. We eagerly anticipate the latest life support note from Jim Caron.

Morning Gold Fix: August 16

Deflation talk has the markets spooked during these last couple weeks. Since Bullard's comments (preparing the ground for QE2) and Bernanke's promises to combat deflation through treasury purchases, even the CNBC talking heads are discussing it. Editor's Contrarian note: Probably time to consider unwinding your bond longs if T.V.'s equivalent of your shoe shine boy is telling you deflation is coming. In deflation, Gold should be the tallest pygmy. Even If it drops 40% in a deflationary depression, it will still stand tall among the financial wreckage that is defaulted debt and worthless equity. But, if the Fed succeeds in combating this event (preemptively or after the fact), Hyperinflation becomes a high risk and we know what that portends for fiat currency.

Frontrunning: August 16

• China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-Biggest Economy (Bloomberg)
• US banks get securities buy-back window - $118bn of high-cost ‘Trups’ can be redeemed over 90 days (FT)
• Yield Curve as Harbinger (WSJ)
• It Takes a Tea Party to Start a Tax Revolution (Bloomberg)
• Evans-Pritchard: Ireland can withstand the euro's ordeal by fire, but can Southern Europe? (Telegraph)
• Workers Let Go by China’s Banks Putting Up Fight (NYT)
• Goldman Undercuts Rivals in GM IPO as It Loses Top Role (Bloomberg)
• Is This Normal? The uncertainty of our economic uncertainty (NYMag)
• Mark Zandi oped: The Tax Cut We Can Afford (NYT)

Here We Go Again: European Peripheral Spreads Explode As Safe Havens Collapse

It's starting again. Japan 10 year JGBs just dropped to fresh 7 year lows of 0.95%, as UST 10 years are down at 16 month lows of 2.65% and German 30 Year yields are down to record lows of 3.09%. Maybe the Fed should just let deflation run its course to get ever closer to the target UST curve which we noted before. And while Japan is ravaged by a fresh bout of deflation, Europe is starting to crumble once again now that (lack of) vacations are generally over: the Greek/Bund spread has just hit the widest level since May 10, at 811 bps, while the Irish/German spread is at its widest ever of 303 bps, a move of 10 bps on the day. European weakness is resuming now that CPI came in at expectations (as opposed to beating them as has been the tradition for the past month) at 1.7%. The export-driven golden age, as we noted, is over. Elsewhere, the Telegraph posted rumors that the BoE is preparing to join the Fed and is about to commence a fresh round of QE as a new wave of global monetary easing is about to hit.

Willem Buiter's Game Theoretical Explanation Of The Interaction Between Central Banks And Treasuries

Despite missing this most recent paper by Buiter at its first publication three weeks ago, it represents the bedtime reading for this evening as it is just as relevant now as it was then. In it, the Citi strategist asks "who will control the deep pockets of the central bank?" and does so from the perspective of a game of "chicken" in a prisoner dilemma context. Buiter summarizes the problem as follows: "As long as neither the monetary authority nor the fiscal authority gives in, the deficit is financed by public debt issuance. With the public-debt to GDP ratio rising without bound, an eventual catastrophe occurs: the sovereign defaults and banks holding large amounts of sovereign debt may collapse, triggering a financial crisis and a deep slump. Following default, the fiscal authority loses access to the government debt markets, at least for a while. The resulting need to instantaneously balance the government’s primary budget means sharp public  spending cuts and tax increases. This would be the "collision" outcome. The outcome where the monetary authority gives in and monetises public debt and deficits is called Fiscal Dominance. Monetary dominance is the outcome where the fiscal authority gives in and cuts public spending and/or  raises taxes to stabilise or reduce the public debt to GDP ratio to prevent a sovereign default." Buiter does a dramatic deconstruction of this theoretical principal to the practicality of Europe, in a truly fascinating and must read analysis. His conclusion is that the "analysis emphasises that the Eurosystem can absorb much larger losses without risking its solvency or undermining the effective pursuit of its price stability target. We don’t, however, argue that the resources of the Eurosystem should be used in this quasi-fiscal manner. Openness, transparency and accountability suffer when the central bank is used/abused for quasi-fiscal purposes, and the legitimacy of the institution can be undermined." Alas, this only means that fiscal stimulus fundamentalists like Krugman will now start pushing for monetary replacements to traditional policy. And with that QE2 (and its myriad of imminent associated alphabet soup programs) is even more of a certainty.

A Couple Of Pointers For TheStreet.com On Blogging Etiquette

Our religulous readers at theStreet.com decided to take a stab at Zero Hedge over the weekend due to our discovery, first among all media, that the Hindenburg Omen had struck this past Thursday. We take this opportunity to teach theStreet a few of the key rules of blogging etiquette.

Visualizing The Past Of The Treasury Yield Curve, And Deconstructing The Great Confusion Surrounding Its Future

The chart below shows the UST yield curve over the past 20 years: as is more than obvious, every single point left of the 10 Year is at record tights. The only question on everyone's lips is where do we go from here. And that is where the confusion really hits. The confusion is further intensified by the sudden collapse in the 2s10s and the 2s10s30s butterfly. The odd thing here is that a flattening move as violent as recently seen in these two curves, has historically preceded a rise in the Federal Funds rate as can be seen in the chart to the right, before the Fed began tightening in 1999 and in 2004. In other words a flattening has traditionally been a leading indicator to an economic improvement (as liquidity extraction tends to go side by side with a pick up in inflation and thus economic growth). Alas, this time around, a tight monetary policy is the last thing on the Fed's mind, and the economy is only starting to demonstrate it is rolling over into a second and more violent recessionary round. In essence, the Fed's interventionist intention of purchasing the entire curve (including the long-end), as recently announced by the FRBNY, has completely dislocated all leading signaling by the curve itself. As a result, speculation is now rampant as to what may or may not happen. A case in point are the divergent opinions of Bank of America and Morgan Stanley. While the former Merrill Lynch is advocating an outright 10s30s flattener, Morgan Stanley is sticking to its guns and continues to push for a steeper curve: this in spite of the collapse in the 2s10s from a records steepeness of almost 290 bps in May, to under 220 bps as of Friday's close: the over 25% collapse is enough to blow up most of the funds who had positioned themselves for further steepness. At least Morgan Stanley is consistent. Yet both banks urge clients to hedge their trades and provide creative ways to do so, as both realize the likelihood of being wrong, now that the Fed is openly the biggest market participant, is probably higher than the inverse.