Archive - Apr 2011

A heuristic approach to determining the truth of a statement.

After dumping thousands of tons of radioactive water in the sea, Japan appears to have been stunned to find that the radioactive content of various fish has surged and is now above just imposed radiation safety thresholds. From Kyodo: "Japan hastily set a legal limit Tuesday for the permitted level of radioactive iodine in seafood as safety concerns spread overseas in the wake of continuing leaks contaminated water into the Pacific Ocean from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The limit of 2,000 bequerels per kilogram set by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for radioactive iodine in marine products such as fish and shellfish is the same as that already adopted for vegetables, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano told a press conference. The imposition of the limit followed the detection by Japanese authorities 4,080 bequerels per kilogram of radioactive iodine in young sand lance caught Friday off Kitaibaraki in Ibaraki Prefecture, which prompted the health ministry to consider setting a limit for fish and clams. Different young sand lance, also caught near Kitaibaraki, were found to be contaminated with 526 bequerels per kilogram of radioactive cesium, exceeding the legal limit of 500 bequerels already set by Japan." And now that Japan has another crisis scenario fall out to deal with, other countries no longer have faith that Japan has any control over the situation and are imposing complete bans on Japanese food imports: first India, and soon everyone else. Expect sushi prices to surge momentarily.

Only in Washington would this be hailed as good news...

A stock falling due to a cut in FY outlook is nothing new. However, a stock cutting its outlook due to its biggest customer refusing to accept contracted shipments "until it reduces inventory levels" is probably the first confirmation we have ever seen of the massive inventory overbuild in China. The plunge in AMSC stock afterhours by over 40% is not surprising considering its entire business model is now turned upside down. What also should not be a surprise is when ever more companies delivering into China commence with comparable announcements. And with China drowning in excess inventory of virtually everything, this certainty is just a matter of time.

Yesterday the Chairman said something about inflation being "transitory", and that he would be prepared to act by the time inflation becomes more then just "transitory", which we read as "permanent." So, in other words, by the time inflation is set in, Bernanke will be prepared to act, do we have that right?  We hope this is just another Transocean-esque vocabulary disaster, because while we all know how good the Fed is at predicting things, being incapable of sensing grammatical nuances is a Fed Chairman first... which is not surprising: nobody had any clue what Greenspan said most of the time. We just hope Benny's reference was not in the context of a "transition" to a permanently higher "new price normal." Which is maybe how the market interpreted his words: after enjoyed picking apart the irony in the Chairman's statement and once again calling his bluff, the net result is: gold and corn all time high, silver fresh 31 year high, brent 2.5 year high. At some point these prices may revert, and Bernanke will be right. We just hope that by then TEPCO is not in charge of cleaning up radiation ("it's only 1 nano sievert- we swear") from everywhere, not just Fukushima.

RANsquawk Market Wrap Up - Stocks, Bonds, FX etc. – 05/04/11

Looking through the Federal Reserve’s newly released Discount Window data fills in some missing pieces surrounding the credit crunch in 2008. We now know why Senator Chuck Schumer was so concerned about IndyMac. In the three business days after June 19, 2008, IndyMac had to double its discount window borrowings from $200 million to $400 million. Four short days later, Schumer’s leaked letter forced IndyMac to ask the Fed for $1 billion. Beyond some of these little details that end up providing granularity to the whole picture, there is still one piece of data that stands out as a singularity. Although it had become public knowledge over a year ago, the Lehman Brothers activity on September 15, 2008, still flashes a deepening warning as our economy and markets depend more and more on central banks. On the surface, Lehman’s use of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF, the investment banker’s discount window) seems to be insignificant. It was a momentous day, after all, with turmoil in every corner of the global marketplace. Why shouldn’t Lehman borrow $28 billion from the Fed on that Monday? It had filed for bankruptcy at about 1:30am that morning, so clearly it was in need of financing. A lot has been published already about that volatile week. However, I still believe there is a hole in the “official” story as it relates to overall monetary policy. What is truly striking is not that Lehman used the Fed that Monday; rather the significance was that it was Lehman’s first use of the PDCF since April 16, 2008. Lehman Brothers did not use the Fed’s liquidity until after it had declared bankruptcy.

Since it is now obvious to even the back office that Jan Hatzius makes monetary policy in the US (just note the spike in QE3 anticipating factors following his weak assessment of the weak Services ISM earlier), it probably makes sense to present his response to the policy that he through his predecessor Bill Dudley, helped enact. Below is the Goldman take on the FOMC minutes. Ignore the house of mirrors effect.

In other market-shaking news, The Bernank says the Fed WILL act if inflation is "more than transitory." Apparently, he finally had to pick up the check at a restaurant this week or perhaps he pumped his own gas over the weekend.

Just after dawn, hedge fund manager Michael Steinhardt appeared on CNBC as the token contrarian in the Titans of Groupthink series. After some pleasantries we hit the 6 minutes mark where the formerly trite narrative experienced a flash crash. In the most candid discussion of the truth in America, Steinhardt said that “we live in an inland sea of calm waters while surrounding us are turbulent, horrible places,” to which everyone nodded soberly in agreement, unaware of what was coming next. “America seems almost as insular as it has in times past,” He continued. “America is not the wonderful place it used to be... Look at the rest of the world compared to America, look what’s happening all over and then here the biggest thing we have to worry about is how long it will take Buffett to come down to earth…how long until people like you begin to realize his reality and get off some…cloud.” Yet the smackdown of the Becky Quick/Joe Kernen Buffett-sycophant brigade was the prime attraction by far.

The alleged scandal surrounding once-presumed Warren Buffett heir apparent David Sokol has quite predictably generated all manner of breathy headlines about a Teflon-coated Berkshire Hathaway suffering a besmirched reputation. As if often the case, the supposed ill deed in no way measures up to the hype.

Key Highlights:

• GDP revised modestly lower from January meeting on surging commodity prices
• FOMC sees stronger recovery, higher inflation
• Fed officials divided over tighter policy
• Almost all Fed officials saw no need to taper QE2 buying

"So Rick Ackerman posted a piece that I spotted on Zero Hedge—which surprised the hell out of me. Either Tyler and his gang of merry pranksters are losing their nerve about the downward trajectory they think the U.S. economy and monetary policy is headed in—or they ran the piece for shits and giggles. Ackerman’s piece said, in effect, that dollar hyperinflation was impossible. His post was titled “Big Gap in Logic Weakens Hyperinflation Argument”. The cause of hyperinflation is always the same: Spiralling prices that cannot be reigned in with traditional monetary policies of interest rate hikes. But Ackerman doesn’t see this: In his piece, it’s clear he doesn’t realize hyperinflation is an effect of rising prices. Eventually people realize the money itself is to blame—but only eventually, at the end. That’s why Ackerman’s first sentence sort-of makes sense, but not really. But although Ackerman is partly right in the first sentence, his second sentence? That it’s “highly unlikely that this will happen in the United States”? Brother, a panic in the dollar that leads people to exit it for commodities has happened already—and not that long ago: In 1979-’80, when inflation crossed the double digits but before Volcker slammed the brakes via interest rate hikes, people were beginning to get out of the dollar and into anything else, especially commodities, especially gold and silver." Gonzalo Lira

By now everybody knows that only a last ditch intervention by the G7 prevented the financial system from imploding three weeks ago, when the Yen carry trades blew up in the face of all those who had been short yen, long high yielding currencies. The result would have been a pervasive trading desk annihilation, possibly on par with that experienced after the Lehman collapse had the world's central banks not stepped in to sell Yen in droves. Yet what fewer know is that when it comes to funding cheap carry-type trades, the FX carry trade is merely one. A possibly far bigger one has been the one established courtesy of the Fed's generous Interest on Overnight Reserves (IOER) rate which being far higher than General Collateral (GC) Repo, presents banks with Fed deposit access, what was a sure way to earn guaranteed money on an interest rate arbitrage spread. For nearly two years banks collected the proverbial pennies in front of the rollercoaster... until last Friday, when the FDIC decided to spoil the party. What happened as a result of the FDIC's decision to establish an assessment rate which spoiled the arb, was a blow out for most institutions playing the IOER-GC carry trade leading to a major disruption in this funding market, possibly far more serious than the FX carry trade unwind, and a plunge in overnight GC repo rates on Monday (see chart) by over 75%! Does this mean banks have lost one key carry funding source? So it would appear. And it only means that the FX carry trade will be that much more a critical source of "risk-free" income for banks... At least until the next major earthquake above the ring of fire. In the meantime, as the Fed scrambles to restore normality to the repo market, will the Fed be forced to do Reverse Repos, which while fixing the carry trade, will withdraw far more liquidity form the market. Which as we all know is grounds for immediate incarceration in a Centrally Planned kleptocracy such as the USSA.

The man with the Midas touch...