Archive - Feb 27, 2012

We have repeatedly voiced our views on Buffett's relentless bashing of the only asset that is a guaranteed protection against now exponential currency debasement and central planner, and other PhD economist, stupidity, most recently here. We are happy that other, more politically correct asset managers, have decided to share how they fell, and take the crony capitalist to task. The first (of many we are sure), are Lee Quaintance and Paul Brodsky of QBAMCO who have just penned "Golden Boy" or the much needed "high society" response to the old man from Omaha: "Buffett may be a sage, a wizard, and an oracle when it comes to nominal relative value pricing of financial assets, but it is well worth noting that Buffett’s proclamations are not necessarily worthy of being considered “fact” in matters unrelated to finance, just as the legendary Joe Paterno’s judgment seems to have been sorely lacking when it came to sorting out matters unrelated to a winning football program....We must assume his aggressive gold comments have been meant to force the price of gold lower. (We do not know why he is so interested in doing so though we do have a reasonable theory, for another time). We strongly disagree with Mr. Buffett’s views and we thought it would be best to explore his comments and provide our counter-arguments."

As the financials ETF, XLF, jumps from down 1.25% to up over 0.75% today, we note that credit markets for the major US banks are anything but exuberant. In the short-term, US bank credit remains significantly weaker, having broken its trend on February 9th, than the broad ETF or individual bank stocks would suggest. We have seen European credit spreads for banks come back off their worst levels - and at the same time, bank stock prices revert downwards to meet that depressed credit perspective. In the US, stocks remain euphoric and credit has not staged any comeback yet inferring a 5-6% drop in XLF (or rally in credit of course). Perhaps the USD-denominated nature of stocks is 'mispriced' relative to the risk-denominated nature of credit spreads as liquidity floats all risk assets on hope of LTRO2 et al.

Beverage Rules Apply...

As the title suggests, please name the latest bubble:

Credit markets are not priced for Greek PSI Nirvana. With the Greek government bonds (GGBs) and CDS basis package trading at its highest in six months (over 96% of Par) and GGBs trading below 20% of Par (compared to considerably higher 'expected' PSI-based valuations), it seems the market is much more convinced of an imminent credit trigger and no PSI deal than headlines are crowing about. Combining the new 30Y bond, 2Y EFSF add-on, and GDP warrant, BARCAP arrives at a price of around 26.6% of Par for PSI-able bonds - considerably above the current depressed price of GGBs and together with S&P's negative outlook change to the EFSF this morning, it would appear that market participants are not expecting a deal to get done by March 20th. Perhaps that is why hope is so high this morning for a quadrillion Euro LTRO2 to see them through? That should help oil prices!

But coincidentally, the ECB’s next Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) is set for February 29...

"It Is completely ironic that we would be experiencing one of the most powerful cyclical upswings in the stock market since the recession ended at a time when we are clearly coming off the poorest quarter for earnings... There is this pervasive view that the U.S. economy is in better shape because a 2.2% sliver of GDP called the housing market is showing nascent signs of recovery. What about the 70% called the consumer?...Let's keep in mind that the jump in crude prices has occurred even with the Saudis producing at its fastest clip in 30 years - underscoring how tight the backdrop is... Throw in rising gasoline prices and real incomes are in a squeeze, and there is precious little room for the personal savings rate to decline from current low levels." - David Rosenberg

Sorry, you can't blame dollar and gold for the surging oil and gasoline price.

Like sands through the hour-glass, these are the fears of our lives. Just as we noted last week, the focus of risk is shifting from Greece (where while 'tail-risk' has perhaps receded for now, it is all-but certain that the insolvency predicament will resurface as a source of political, policy, and market tension in the not-too-distant future) to other foot-holds on the growing wall-of-worry. As UBS' Larry Hatheway notes this week, several candidates may replace Greece in the risk headlines, among them rising bond yields, French elections, or a Chinese hard landing. But his sense, and ours, is that oil prices will become the next risk item for market participants. Partly this is because oil prices are already approaching levels where worries have occurred in the past (and the velocity of the move is also empirically troublesome) and partly as the remedy for all global-ills (that of central bank printing) is implicitly impacting this 'risk' in a vicious circle. With global growth expectations already low, the 0.2ppt drop in Global GDP for each $10/bbl rise in oil will do nothing for Europe and US hope - and leaves Central Banks in that dangerous position of reinflating their low core inflation data while all around them is inflating rapidly. With modest schadenfreude, we remind readers of our comments from last week: "Alas, as noted previously, the central bank tsunami is only just starting. Watch for inflation, and concerns thereof, to slowly seep into everything". Given oil's potential 'real' impact, as SocGen notes: "Perhaps Greece wasn't so bad after all."

As expected:

• GERMAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES SECOND GREEK BAILOUT - BBG
  
• GERMAN PARLIAMENT VOTE 496 IN FAVOR, 90 AGAINST, 5 ABSTAIN - BBG

And now, here come ze German tax collectors. The Greeks are ready.

When in doubt - buy. When in doubt what - everything. As the chart below shows starting with the open of the US market, literally everything has been bought: stocks, bonds, crude, gold, and 'logically', the VIX. It took the market virtually no time to remember that when trillions in liquidity are being injected into the market courtesy of central planners, a downtick is verboten. Next up: waiting for WTI $110. Should take a few minutes at most.

Will Germany go “all in” on the Euro experiment? I doubt it. In fact I’ve found the “smoking gun” the little known act that Germany has recently implemented that proves the country has a Plan B that involves leaving the Euro with minimal damage.

In the U.S. we now have the perfection of cloaked crony capitalism: corporate cartels use their vast concentrations of capital and revenue to buy the political leverage needed to write regulations specifically designed to eliminate competition. Recall that the most profitable business model is a monopoly or cartel protected from competition by the coercive Central State. Imposing complex regulations on small business competitors effectively cripples an entire class competitors, but does so in "stealth mode"--after all, more regulations are a "good thing" (especially to credulous Liberals) which "protect the public" (and every politico loves claiming his/her new raft of regulations will "protect the public.") This masks the key dynamic of crony capitalism: gaming the government is the most profitable business model. Where else can you "invest" a few hundred thousand dollars (to buy political "access" and lobbying) and "earn" a return in the millions of dollars, and eliminate potential competitors, too? No other "investment" even comes close.

Gaming out the impact of this week's LTRO2 demand on global risk assets is complicated by the ability of banks to mobilize collateral (how much can they pledge to the ECB and how much of that will be 'optimal' given the implicit subordination of senior unsecured debt holders), the use of those funds (carry trade economics are considerably lower and refinancing needs remain high), and the market's expectations (just how much more back-door QE is priced into European - and for that matter - US asset prices). Goldman Sachs surveyed its clients and found a gaping divide between banks and investors with the latter expecting considerably more than the banks - it seems someone will be disappointed - investors hope for more and banks expect to do less.