Archive - May 2012

Having listened to the conference call (I was roaring with laughter), Jamie Dimon sounded very defensive especially about one detail: that the CIO’s activities were solely in risk management, and that its bets were designed to hedge risk. Now, we all know very well that banks have been capable of turning “risk management” into a hugely risky business — that was the whole problem with the mid-00s securitisation bubble, which made a sport out of packaging up bad debt and spreading it around balance sheets via shadow banking intermediation, thus turning a small localised risk (of mortgage default) into a huge systemic risk (of a default cascade). But wait a minute? If you’re hedging risk then the bets you make will be cancelled against your existing balance sheet. In other words, if your hedges turn out to be worthless then your initial portfolio should have gained, and if your initial portfolio falls, then your hedges will activate, limiting your losses. That is how hedging risk works. If the loss on your hedges is not being cancelled-out by gains in your initial portfolio then by definition you are not hedging risk. You are speculating.

Jamie Dimon seems to have handed his head to Chairman Vocker and the advocates of regulation with this error.  

You know I saw this one coming 3 years ago, didn't you??? This ain't the end of the story either. You heard it hear first, again!

The pundits will have a field day with this...

You don't need to be an economist to understand the utter foolishness, the circular logic supported folly of "But after buying 325 billion pounds of government debt with newly created money, 50 billion pounds of which has been purchased in the last three months"

While we have heard a lot from Jim Grant recently - all pointedly correct and substantial - today marked the pinnacle of propaganda-brinksmanship. Explaining to Maria B just why the world in which she lives, Bernanke-lovers-all, is nothing but a hall of mirrors - a fake mirage - of the true reality thanks to central bank repression of all that we know about risk and return. "By changing interest rates, central banks change the perception of every asset class - so what seems cheap may not be cheap" as Grant notes that when you can fund investment at 0%, we are collectively being manipulated and moreover should try to realize - as an investing public - that we are Jim Carrey in The Truman Show. Of course the 75% of professional investors who believe Bernanke is doing a great job would prefer to stay inside the fake reality where their bonuses get paid and leveraged tranche losses get soaked up by some account transfer from the fed or loan loss provisioning adjustment - for the rest of us - wake up and smell the unreality. The money-honey pulls the blame and deflect card - noting the ECB are just as bad - but Grant brings her back to the reality that we are facing as he suggests being in the crowd who own Treasuries and Bunds when the next risk flare occurs will not end as well as many hope, preferring gold (and gold stocks) as a hedge as "The Gold move is not over".

"should only 2% of the Fed's assets go into default — or if there is a loss in value of 2% — the Fed becomes insolvent"

There are a lot of moving parts in the Dismal tale of Dimon's demise... Iksil' large size in the market left a mark that hedge funds tried to fix - that was his index trading was making the index extremely rich (expensive) relative to intrinsics (fair-value). That is where the media picked up the story and as we detail below leads us to today. Attempts to hedge his over-hedged positions and/or unwind them impacted the market too much and we suspect created the need for today's admission of guilt. And so, we find ourselves with - net CDS/CDO notionals remain huge (and implicitly on JPM's shoulders), his very recent lack of selling has left the credit index maybe 20bps rich to where it might trade given its rough correlation with the S&P 500 and this would imply at least $3bn of losses already in addition at fair-value. Of course, the situation is far worse because 1) any efforts to unwind such a huge position will lead to the market yawning wide and swallowing him in illiquid bid-ask spreads; and 2) the rest of the world knows their position - so why would the hedge funds not push their position. Note, it is not the instrument that caused this - it is the trader as "you don't hedge risk when you bet on momentum continuing you idiot!"

A reader sent me a link to a video of Slope mascot AJC. I didn't want to watch it, but I glanced at the text summary, which stated:

"Abby Joseph Cohen, Goldman Sachs' senior investment strategist, says shares are set to hold value for the long run but may cheapen over the summer."

OK, so this lady (it's a lady, right?) gets paid millions upon millions of dollars for observations like this. So let's disect this a bit. She (again - sorry to trouble you - we're talking about a she, correct?) says that shares are set to hold value for the long run butmay cheapen over the summer.

What summarizes the clip below best:

A) Hubris; B) Greed; C) Stupidity; D) Moral Hazard; E) All of the above?

A month ago we warned that JPM's CIO office is nothing short of the world's largest prop trading desk. Not only were we right, but what just transpired is just shy of our worst possible prediction. At the end of the day, the real question is why did JPM put in so much money at risk in a prop trade because we can dispense with the bullshit that his was a hedge, right? Simple: because it knew with 100% certainty that if things turn out very, very badly, that the taxpayer, via the Fed, would come to its rescue. Luckily, things turned out only 80% bad. Although it is not over yet: if credit spreads soar, assuming at $200 million DV01, and a 100 bps move, JPM could suffer a $20 billion loss when all is said and done. But hey: at least "net" is not "gross" and we know, just know, that the SEC will get involved and make sure something like this never happens again.

The last time a French trader delivered a bomb this big (Jerome Kerviel), the Fed cut the discount rate by 75 bps. As for this particular Frenchman, his best epitaph is his Bloomberg profile page. Recall:

"Chuck is french ; champion of 'kick it', walking over water and humble.. yes"

You can now add "fired." Oh, and it is all Egan Jones' fault of course, who downgraded JPM on April 13, while all the other rating agencies were posturing for the highest possible bribe to keep their mouths shut.

Out of nowehere, JPM announced 40 minutes ago that it would hold an unscheduled 5pm call to coincide with the release of its 10-Q. Rumors were swirling as to why. The reason is as follows:

• JPMORGAN SAYS CIO UNIT HAS SIGNIFICANT MARK-TO-MARKET LOSSES - "Fortress balance sheet" at least until Bruno Iskil gets done with it.
  
• JPMORGAN SAYS LOSSES ARE IN SYNTHETIC CREDIT PORTFOLIO - but, but, net is NEVER, EVER Gross.
• JPM WOULD NEED $971M ADDED COLLATERAL IF RATINGS CUT ONE-NOTCH
• JPM WOULD NEED $1.7B ADDED COLLATERAL IF RATINGS CUT 2 NOTCHES - how about three notches?
• JPMORGAN: MAY HOLD SOME SYNTHETIC CREDIT POSITIONS LONG TERM - "Level 3 CDS FTW"
• "As of March 31, 2012, the value of CIO's total AFS securities portfolio exceeded its cost by approximately $8 billion"

As a reminder, the CIO unit is where Bruno Iksil was making $200 billion-sized bets. Basically JPM has suffered massive losses at its CIO group most likely due to its IG/HY positions held by Iksil.