Archive - Feb 2, 2010 - Blog entry

The new guy at FHFA Edward DeMarco has some moxie. I think he has dished up a tough question to the 'deciders'. His question begs an answer from Weak Tim. Silence.....

Senator Corker challenged Mr. Volcker's stance in today's congressional hearings on the Volker Rule by saying that no financial holding company that had a commercial bank failed while performing proprietary trading. It appears as if Mr. Corker may have received his information from the banking lobby, and did not do his own homework.
Let's reference the largest commercial bank/thrift failure of all...

In recent days, a spate of announcements on infrastructure deals have hit the wires. Cash strapped governments are increasingly looking to pensions to fund long-term infrastructure projects...and many are heeding the call.

Interest rates have to soar to unimaginable levels to attract recalcitrant investors, or the plunge in spending sends us into a postponed Great Depression II.
There will be no Prince Charming riding in on a white horse this time. Back out the Fed as the buyer of last resort, and where are we? The $3.8 trillion budget Obama budget isn’t encouraging me to back off from this ledge. Be a peach and bring me some MRE’s, a five gallon bottle of water, and a case of 9 mm ammo, will you?

Volcker is correct in that banks conflicts of interests need to be
stemmed. One would not have to worry about over regulation if one does
not attempt to regulate every single act or attempt to guess what might
go wrong. What needs to be done is to use regulation to dis-incentivize
banks from engaging in activities that engender systemic risks and/or
harm clients. By putting everybody on the same side of the table, you
don't have to worry about outsmarting the private sector.

A knowledgeable reader, who is currently a sell side analyst, questioned
me about using book value to value Goldman and investment banks in
general. He proposed using a formula that entails revenues as well due
to the fact that the main concern during the crisis was breakup value
while revenue visibility is clearer now that the crisis is over. While the crisis may be over, the root causes of the crisis have went nowhere, and the counter party risk concentration is actually much worse than before. In addition, not only is it political suicide to attempt to bailout another bank, I think it is poor economic policy as well. Combining these two assertions, it is not clear that we will not see anymore bank failures. The probability of such has dropped considerably though.