Archive - Jun 2009 - Story

Submitted by Terence Doherty, guest author (via Phil's Stock World)

Here’s some recent news about the real estate markets in China. I think it is fascinating watching how these things unfold. This proves once again that the lesson of history is that we don’t learn the lessons of history.

Submitted by Terence Doherty, guest author (via Phil's Stock World)

Here’s some recent news about the real estate markets in China. I think it is fascinating watching how these things unfold. This proves once again that the lesson of history is that we don’t learn the lessons of history.

Submitted by Terence Doherty, guest author (via Phil's Stock World)

Here’s some recent news about the real estate markets in China. I think it is fascinating watching how these things unfold. This proves once again that the lesson of history is that we don’t learn the lessons of history.

In the accompanying presentation, it is easy to see why Bill Gross' PIMCO is highly bullish on credit of any variety. As the table below demonstrates, taken straight out of the biggest bond fund's May 2009 presentation "Investing for the Journey and the Destination: What it means across the Capital Structure" PIMCO doesn't see any overvalued instruments in the credit realm: MBS, IG, EM and HY/Loans all have wonderfully green and positive metrics in the valuation column.

In the accompanying presentation, it is easy to see why Bill Gross' PIMCO is highly bullish on credit of any variety. As the table below demonstrates, taken straight out of the biggest bond fund's May 2009 presentation "Investing for the Journey and the Destination: What it means across the Capital Structure" PIMCO doesn't see any overvalued instruments in the credit realm: MBS, IG, EM and HY/Loans all have wonderfully green and positive metrics in the valuation column.

In the accompanying presentation, it is easy to see why Bill Gross' PIMCO is highly bullish on credit of any variety. As the table below demonstrates, taken straight out of the biggest bond fund's May 2009 presentation "Investing for the Journey and the Destination: What it means across the Capital Structure" PIMCO doesn't see any overvalued instruments in the credit realm: MBS, IG, EM and HY/Loans all have wonderfully green and positive metrics in the valuation column.

In the accompanying presentation, it is easy to see why Bill Gross' PIMCO is highly bullish on credit of any variety. As the table below demonstrates, taken straight out of the biggest bond fund's May 2009 presentation "Investing for the Journey and the Destination: What it means across the Capital Structure" PIMCO doesn't see any overvalued instruments in the credit realm: MBS, IG, EM and HY/Loans all have wonderfully green and positive metrics in the valuation column.

Most financial experts are aware that the only reason the economy has not yet collapsed entirely, is due to the trillions in governmental safeguards and industrial subsidies. Zero Hedge has written extensively on the topic, and it is nowhere more obvious than here, that virtually the entire financial system is backstopped by explicit and implicit guarantees.

Most financial experts are aware that the only reason the economy has not yet collapsed entirely, is due to the trillions in governmental safeguards and industrial subsidies. Zero Hedge has written extensively on the topic, and it is nowhere more obvious than here, that virtually the entire financial system is backstopped by explicit and implicit guarantees.

Most financial experts are aware that the only reason the economy has not yet collapsed entirely, is due to the trillions in governmental safeguards and industrial subsidies. Zero Hedge has written extensively on the topic, and it is nowhere more obvious than here, that virtually the entire financial system is backstopped by explicit and implicit guarantees.

Most financial experts are aware that the only reason the economy has not yet collapsed entirely, is due to the trillions in governmental safeguards and industrial subsidies. Zero Hedge has written extensively on the topic, and it is nowhere more obvious than here, that virtually the entire financial system is backstopped by explicit and implicit guarantees.

• What low bond recovery rates mean: 45-55% cumulative defaults (Vanguard, hat tip Richard) [HY12 at 81? haha]

• What low bond recovery rates mean: 45-55% cumulative defaults (Vanguard, hat tip Richard) [HY12 at 81? haha]

Creditors' rights at midnight. Absolute Priority Saturday on Radio Zero.

Exercise absolute priority and get your slot now (supplies are limited). Live from 12:00am on.

Priority claims, pre-petition requests, 363 sale objections, etc: AIM: marla@zerohedge.com

http://s4.viastreaming.net:7760/listen.pls

Lots of queries lately as to why 10 years (and other bonds on the curve) are still at markedly negative repo rates: i.e. the phenomenon of negative interest for lenders. This is an interesting topic which I will touch on again soon, especially with recently implemented 300 bps fees for delivery fails. Across The Curve has discussed this issue recently and I point to his post for a good primer.