Archive - Jan 13, 2012 - Story

One chart is enough to show not only why the JPM stock is and should be down, but why the entire financial stock levitation in the past few weeks has been on nothing but vapors - as can be seen too well, the ongoing collapse in equity and credit trading volumes, not to mention actual investment banking deals, is crunching the firm's primary driver of earnings - its investment banking division, which just came at year lows in virtually all categories.

If JPM, which just launched the financials earnings onslaught by first reporting Q4 results, is any indication, it will not be pretty for the financial sector which has seen dramatic moves higher in the past several weeks, because as Jamie Dimon says, Q4 was "Modestly Disappointing." The reason: a top line miss, and a continuing contraction in capital markets leading to yet another decline in Investment Banking results. Also, what DVA giveth, DVA taketh away, and with CDS tightening in the quarter, DVA resulted in a $567 million loss in the quarter. Yet even with the DVA impact exclusion, revenue, which was reported at $21.47 billion would still have missed estimates of $22.56 billion. Finally, what would a quarter be if a bank did not reduce its loan loss allowance and release even more reserves, no matter how the market is actually doing: JPM did just that in its mortgage banking division, lowering its net loan loss allowance by $230 million following a $1 billion allowance reduction in loan-losses offset by actual impairments of $770 million. Stock is down following the release.

Almost six months ago we discussed the dramatic shifts that were about to occur (and indeed did occur) the last time the New York Fed tried to unwind the toxic AIG sludge that is more prosaically known as Maiden Lane II. At the time, the failure of a previous auction as dealers were unwilling to take up even modest sizes of the morose mortgage portfolio was the green light for a realization that even a small unwind of the Fed's bloated balance sheet would not be tolerated by a deleveraging and unwilling-to-bear-risk-at-anything-like-a-supposed-market-rate trading community. Today, we saw the first glimmerings of the same concerns as chatter of Goldman's (and others) interest in some of the lurid loans sent credit reeling. As the WSJ reports, this meant the Fed had to quietly seek confirming bids (BWICs) from other market participants to judge whether Goldman's bid offered value. The discreteness of the enquiries sent ABX and CMBX (the credit derivative indices used to hedge many of these mortgage-backed securities) tumbling with ABX having its first down day since before Christmas and its largest drop in almost two months. The knock-on effect of the potential off-market (or perhaps more reality-based) pricing that Goldman is bidding this time can have (just as it did last time when the Fed halted the auction process as the market could not stand the supply) dramatic impacts as dealers seek efficient (and critically liquid) hedges for their worrisome inventories of junk. The underperformance (and heavy volume) in HYG (the high-yield bond ETF we spend so much time discussing) since the new-year suggests one such hedging program (well timed and hidden by record start-of-year fund inflows from a clueless public which one would have thought would raise prices of the increasingly important bond ETF) as the market's ramp of late is very reminiscent of the pre-auction-fail-and-crash we saw in late June, early July last year as credit markets awoke to the reality of their own balance sheet holes once again.

As volumes this year in stock markets remain significantly below last year's but high yield bond ETF inflows reach record highs, TrimTabs offers some context for the massive relative flows of real cash into checking and savings accounts versus stock and bond mutual fund and ETFs. Not-Charles-Biderman, otherwise known as David Santschi of the now-infamous Bay Area backdrop, explains the incredible statistic that in the first 11 months of last year investors poured more than eight times more money into checking and savings accounts than into Fed-inspired risk assets in general. Even with rates ultra-low, the Fed's efforts to drive speculative flows is dwarfed by investors' aggregate sense of the reality of our tenuous situation as a massive $889bn was poured carefully into mattresses while a measly $109bn went into risk-worthy assets (including bonds). As Santschi concludes, as long as most investors keep hiding most of their money away, the economy is unlikely to get off to the races anytime soon and while we agree from a consumptive demand perspective, any recovery will only be truly sustainable via savings which are being desperately drawn-down by a need to maintain standards of living that are perhaps too much to expect.