Archive - May 11, 2012 - Story

We knew something was different about today. The following graphic neatly captures it. It shows the 15 minute average percentage of quotes considered excessive each minute (over 500 quotes per second per stock) between January 2010 and 11-May-2012 (plotted as thick red line). Note how this line was persistently high the entire day relative to trading days in the past. This probably explains the crazy high quote rates and prices shown in the charts below.

By now everyone knows that Chesapeake is a slow motion trainwreck: whether it is internal management issues, which eventually will culminate with the long overdue termination of the company's head (something the company had much control over and could avoid, but didn't, and should result in the sacking of the entire board for gross negligence), or plunging gas prices (something it had far less control over, but could have hedged properly, yet didn't), what is absolutely certain is that the firm's cash flow just isn't what it used to be. In fact, according to some, it is quite, quite negative. What, however, people do not know is that under ZIRP, when every basis point of debt return over 0% is praised, and an epic scramble ensues among hedge for any yielding paper no matter how worthless, the balance sheets of companies just do not matter. In other words, for companies that have massive leverage, high interest rates, negative cash flow, which all were corporate death knells as recently as 2008, the capitalization structure is completely irrelevant. We said this a month ago when we cautioned, precisely about Chesapeake, that "to all those scrambling to short the company: beware. CHK has a history of being able to fund itself with HY bonds and other unsecured debt come hell or high water. If and when the stock tanks, the short interest will surge on expectations of a funding shortfall. Alas, courtesy of the Fed's malevolent capital misallocation enabling, we are more than confident that the firm will be able to issue as much HY debt (unsustainably at 10%+, but that is irrelevant for the short-term) as it needs, crushing all short theses. What this means, simply, is that anyone who believes traditional fundamental analysis will and should work in the CHK case is likely to get burned." Sure enough, we were again proven right: Chesapeake just announced, following today's epic drubbing, that it is refinancing its secured debt facility (with its numerous restrictive covenants) with $3 billion in brand new Libor+7.00% unsecured paper (courtesy of Goldman and Jefferies). In doing so, CHK just got at least a one year reprieve.

From 1981 to 2007, the amount of debt required to produce $1 of GDP growth crept higher, and it ranged from a low of 3 cents in 2000 to a high of $2.25 in 1991.  In only eight of those years did it take more than $1 of debt to produce $1 of GDP growth—1982, 1986, 1990 to 1993, 2002, and 2003.  On average, it took 79 cents of debt to produce $1 of GDP growth.  In other words, the increase in GDP was nearly 1.3 times the increase in debt. Along came the Great Recession.  Since 2009, the traditional relationship between debt and GDP growth has been turned upside down.  Each $1 increase in GDP has been accompanied by, on average, a $2.50 increase in debt.  Before the recession, an increase in debt generally generated a greater increase in GDP, but now it takes an enormous increase in debt to eke out a small increase in GDP.  At some point, the amount of debt required to generate even modest GDP growth will suffocate the economy and trigger another financial shock.

Curious how the world's most important trading desk saw the action today? Here it is.

Update: now S&P is also one month behind Egan Jones: JPMorgan Chase & Co. Outlook to Negative From Stable by S&P. Only NRSRO in pristinely good standing is Moodys, and then the $2.1 billion margin call will be complete.

So it begins, even as it explains why the Dimon announcement was on Thursday - why to give the rating agencies the benefit of the Friday 5 o'clock bomb of course:

• JPMorgan Cut by Fitch to A+/F1; L-T IDR on Watch Negative

What was the one notch collateral call again? And when is the Morgan Stanley 3 notch cut coming? Ah yes:

So... another $2.1 billion just got Corzined? Little by little, these are adding up.

BTFD/STFR Deja-Vu - check. Credit underperforming - check. USD higher - check. Treasury Yields lower - check. Ask an equity guy how today was and you'll likely get a shrug of the shoulders (unless he owns JPM or CHK); ask a credit guy (if you can pull him away from the bar) and you'll get a very different response. Investment grade credit markets were crushed today on the back of pressure on JPM's hedge and unwind expectations - this was across pretty much all the indices that are out there (with over 90 names in the IG9 index also in the on-the-run IG18 index - the numbers simply reflect the series or portfolio that is being referred to). This was the worst week in IG credit of the year and lifted spreads to 4-month wides and at the same time (until late in the day) high-yield and high-beta credit did not follow suit (very unusual and very indicative of the dramatic positioning in the IG indices that JPM has basically blown up). Treasury yields have now fallen for the 8th week in a row - the longest streak since 1998! Away from pure equity and credit, risk assets remained wildly unimpressed by the incredible 8 sigma rip-fest this morning in stocks as commodities all close lower from yesterday day-session closes - though bounced to end around their European open levels on the day (except for underperforming Copper). The USD leaked higher all day with a small interruption thanks to CAD strength on their jobs data this morning (AUD, EUR, and GBP all close at the week's lows). A horrible end to an ugly week as S&P 500 e-mini futures ended very close to their 50DMA on above average volume though low average trade size (which we suspect was dominated by algos in the rip this morning). The losses JPM faces from today's index shifts are already large and with risk managers everywhere asking their traders if they hold any of that 'trash', we suspect more selling and unwinds are to come; and while JPM got all the press, Morgan Stanley is now down year-to-date.

In the span of 30 minutes CHK managed to crush both longs and shorts in the name.

Just in case you were wondering if there was any fall-out from the JPM/Iksil debacle. The investment grade credit indices are getting Corzined here from IG9 10Y to the latest and greatest IG18 5Y. Equity markets will not stand idly by as the investment grade credit market violently jerks wider.

I have to hand it to the Central Planners.  They are good.  Really, really good.  Of course, they are battling a crippled opponent considering so much of America consists of lobotomized sheeple, but nevertheless to be able to steal so much from many people with such blatant and simplistic methods and not be widely discovered is an act of devious brilliance.  The reason I say this now is because ever since last fall TPTB have changed tactics and totally taken over the markets and with it shoved many people into what is best described as a trance.  The people know something is very wrong.  They know they are getting poorer; that life is getting harder, yet the television and the markets have cloaked a blanket of sedation upon their minds.

Dump-'em, Pump-'em, Dump-'em - The New Normal 'buy-and-hold' model is stable this week. Equity market continued to follow the same path day-in and day-out this week as the distance between the 50DMA and Monday's morning gap becomes smaller and smaller. 

Below, ZH friend LongShortTrader submits his letter to the Green Mountain (GMCR) board of directors. In it, he expresses concern over various statements that former Chairman Robert Stiller, current CEO Larry Blanford, current CFO Frances Rathke, and others have made recently. Hey: if the Dan Loebs of the world can have a daily activist pulpit, who not others who, unlike the broader lemming herd, actually do their homework?

With the Greek tempest-in-a-teapot about to hit Whale-size, as Tsipras says he will not join the coalition and Venizelos says that Syriza's participation is a prerequisite (via Bloomberg), it seems now would be an opportune time to look forward (not backward at the GGB2s dropping below EUR17 for the first time ever!). As we were among the first to state that their would be a second (if not more) election in Greece, we look at the schedule of events in Europe over the next few weeks (including the payments due on the PSI holdout bonds), and discuss the scenarios and consequences of a Greek exit (for both Greece living without Euro support and the Euro-zone coping with a Lehman-event).

Former US Republican presidential candidate Michelle Bachmann receives the Sovereign Man dumbest person of the week award for obtaining… then almost immediately renouncing… Swiss citizenship. I’ll explain: Bachmann’s husband is a Swiss national; they’ve been married since 1978, and as a result, Bachmann eventually became qualified for Swiss citizenship as well. She recently received confirmation of her citizenship from the Swiss authorities, a fact that was reported in some mainstream media outlets. Bachmann was subsequently criticized by her political opponents for engaging in such ‘un-American’ activities.

It would seem, just as during the crisis in 2008/9, that now might be an opportune time to push for 'improvement' in how banks are regulated (and more importantly how the instruments they trade in colossal size are priced and marked-to-market). Rick Santelli believes now has never been a better time but as his guest Tim Backshall of Capital Context notes, regulation of the CDS market can be summed up in one sentence "Get Them On Exchange". Something we have been saying for years (and has been tried before) but with dealers holding all the keys (to market-making) and exchanges cowering for fear of losing clients, we remain less optimistic. Santelli and Backshall critically address the complicity of banks, regulators, analysts, and The Fed in giving 'banks the benefit of the doubt' with regard their use of the bottomless pit of capital they implicitly have but what is more important is for the hordes of sell-side analysts and buy-side sheeple to understand just what this JPM debacle exposes about bank risk (VaR is useless), bank transparency (mark-to-model or worse is widespread), and bank valuation (traditional Price/Book metrics have no merit anymore).