Archive - Sep 2012 - Story

AUDJPY is getting smacked hard in this evening's admittedly thin trading given the US holiday. China's double-whammies of PMI data (both official and HSBC versions - with the latter revised lower from Flash to its lowest level since March 2009) and some weak Aussie retail sales data is weighing very heavily on the critical carry trade pair. S&P 500 futures traded down in line with AUDJPY from Friday's close but once the China PMI came as weak as it was so the 'Good is Bad', the PBoC have to do something crowd started buying and dragged ES up a few points. Juxtaposing these dismal macro data was a better than expected China Services PMI and Aussie manufacturing index - as the Schrodinger 'economy is good and bad' headlines continue to confound. For the 'bad-is-good' crowd who see stimulus as the solution, we offer three words 'steel overcapacity' and 'malinvestment' and a must-read story from Reuters on the Chinese turning on themselves...

Over the past months (and particularly in the last weeks), we have increasingly read negative comments on the ongoing zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP) and in some instances, negative-interest rate policy (NIRP). Today, we want to examine the origins of the idea that ultra-low rates of interest can exist, how this idea came about, why it was flawed and how it leads to an informal economic system. It was a fallacy based on misunderstanding of the rate of interest and human action. Another way of examining this is the following: The zero interest rate indicates that time is free. And as anything that is free is wasted, time will also be wasted. It should be clear that there is an inconsistency in simultaneously believing that investment demand and savings are mainly driven by income but that it is necessary to lower the interest rate to boost investment, as the Fed does... and the Fed is Keynesian! Finally, we note one last thing: As productivity, employment and production decrease, even a steady and low rate of inflation has the potential to morph into hyperinflation.

The Summer of hope is over. Analysts return to their desks amid a grand-tour of conferences, industry gatherings, and company meetings, and - as has happened on average for the last twelve years - expectations are notched down from first-half-of-the-year 'hope' that this-time-is-different. Barclays' Barry Knapp notes that while macro risks seem more balanced than last spring, equity investors face a considerably higher risk in that of elevated earnings estimates. Since 2000, the worst month for analyst estimate revision momentum (net revisions) is also October, followed by September and December (tied). It stands to reason (though it’s tough to statistically ‘prove’) that equity investors and analysts return from vacation, attend conferences, and cut their earnings estimates. This, in turn, contributes to increased volatility and negative returns. While many will be focused on broader concerns – the ECB meeting, German Constitutional Court, presidential polls and macro data – equity investors are likely to hear a consistent message from the ~180 conferences: the global and domestic economic outlook is not robust enough to justify 11% y/y earnings growth in 4Q12 or 12% in 2013.

Two weeks ago we showed dramatic footage as striking miners at Lonmin's Marikana South Africa platinum mine were fired upon by local the local cops, killing dozens of protesters in the process. Aside from the implications of what happens when the establishment loses control and desperate  workers revolt with complete disregard for their own safety, the strike has crippled the world's third largest platinum maker, and has cut daily production of the precious metal by 2,500 ounces. Since then the Lonmin situation has remained critical, with just 6% of the South African company's workers turning up for work last week. In the meantime, the strike bug has gone airborne, and has now impacted Gold Fields, the world's fourth largest gold mine. From the FT: "Some 12,000 workers at a gold mine operated by Gold Fields have gone on strike, in the latest industrial strife to hit South Africa’s mining industry. Sven Lunsche, a spokesman for Gold Fields, said the wild-cat strike was not directly related to the crisis at the Marikana platinum complex, where 44 people have been killed in violence after rock drill operators downed their tools to demand higher wages on August 10. But he acknowledged that “the atmosphere in the mining industry is very volatile at the moment and this may have had an indirect impact on the situation". The bottom line: "The strike was costing the company 1,660 gold ounces of production a day, Mr Lunsche said." In other words in addition to the fear of a resumption in money printing by central bankers, the gold price will now have to deal with the added fear that supply disruptions just may hamper China's stealthy hording attempts to become the world's biggest holder of physical gold, or at least at sub $2000/oz prices.

With the US presidential election looming in just two months, there is hardly a state that is as critical to the outcome of who America’s next president will be, as Florida. As Bloomberg vividly summarizes, Florida - and specifically its five swing counties: Hillsborough, Orange, Pinellas, Seminole and Volusia - was the state that determined the president in all of the last 3 elections: set between the Republican-dominated North Florida and the more Democratic southern counties, these suburban communities of middle-class voters are known for their shifting allegiances. In 2008, Obama took four of the five counties to capture Florida. George W. Bush won three of the counties, and the state, in 2004. In 2000, Volusia’s vote count was disputed by Vice President Al Gore. Gore won the county yet lost Florida by 537 votes, giving Bush his first term as president. It is quite fitting then that these five counties are very much indicative of the primary malaise that has plagued the country for the past 4 years: the inability of the housing market to rebound no matter how many trillions in printed dollars are thrown at it. Which brings us to the key number that probably should (but most likely won’t in this age of ultra short-term attention spans and constant redirection and focus shifts): 11% - this is the foreclosure rate in these 5 critical counties, double what it was 4 years ago, and three times higher than the national foreclosure average rate of 3.4%. In other words, if there ever was a time and place when economics, through its sheer failure to restore “household wealth” in this most decisive region, was a key issue, now is the time.

At the end of December 2010, Philipp Bagus (he of the must watch/read 'Tragedy of the Euro') provided a clarifying and succinct rebuttal or Bernanke's belief in the extreme monetary policy path he has embarked upon. Bernanke's latest diatribe, or perhaps legacy-defining, self-aggrandizing CYA comment, reminded us that perhaps we need such clarification once again. Critically, Bagus highlights the real exit-strategy dangers and inflationary impacts of Quantitative Easing (a term he finds repulsive in its' smoke-and-mirrors-laden optics) adding that:

Money printing cannot make society richer; it does not produce more real goods. It has a redistributive effect in favor of those who receive the new money first and to the detriment of those who receive it last. The money injection in a specific part of the economy distorts production. Thus, QE does not bring ease to the economy. To the contrary, QE makes the recession longer and harsher.

Or we might name it after the intentions behind it: "Currency Debasement I," "Bank Bailout I," "Government Bailout II," or simply "Consumer Impoverishment."

Corporates are in relatively good financial shape and theory says should respond to high profits and cheap debt by investing more. However, while high 'profits' and low cost of debt are reasons for capex and opex to be rising more quickly than they are, these two critical drives of recovery show no signs of responding to these profit/debt incentives - and so as Citigroup notes "recovering is not booming". Top-down, compared to history, capex is low, following P/E's sentiment - especially in Europe (indicating a lack of confidence in the future). However, at the sector level this reverses: high capex has been given a low PE, while low capex has a high PE. The market is effectively encouraging companies to invest less and return more money. Longer term the consequences for economic growth, inflation and earnings growth are negative - as we trade (once again) short-term equity gain for long-term sustainable economic gain.

To use the analogy offered by Senor Cervantes we would say that Rodrigo, as representing Spain, is about to be devoured by the snakes. The central bank of Spain just released the net capital outflow numbers and they are disastrous. During the month of June alone $70.90 billion left the Spanish banks and in July it was worse at $92.88 billion which is 4.7% of total bank deposits in Spain. For the first seven months of the year the outflow adds up to $368.80 billion or 17.7% of the total bank deposits of Spain and the trajectory of the outflow is increasing dramatically. Reality is reality and Spain is experiencing a full-fledged run on its banks whether anyone in Europe wants to admit it or not. We are now at the virtual epicenter of the European Crisis where decisions will have to be made; avoidance is no longer possible. We have reached the end of the road where there is no more path left for can kicking.

The first pre-requisite of the establishment of a “society” of the rulers and the ruled has always been the same. The rulers must gain control over the medium of exchange. For obvious reasons, no nation can ever progress to a state of advanced economic activity until a medium of exchange is established. Once it is established, there is no going back. An advanced economy cannot operate by means of barter. The problem is that once the government or the rulers gain control of money, it progressively ceases to be a medium of exchange and becomes a medium of control. That impinges on the functioning of markets which in turn impinges on the maintenance of property rights. Thus, we come full circle from a free society to a command society. There has never been any shortage of those who want to rule. The problem has always been with the vast majority who are content to be ruled. Today’s global outcry for the manufacturing of more and more “money” out of thin air is an eloquent testimony. It shows that most people have no understanding of freedom, markets or money. Lacking such understanding - and having no desire to gain it - most people have accepted government as their masters.

The BOE's Andrew Haldane is shocked SHOCKED, that over the past 30 years banks have done nothing but baffle with bullshit; and he has something to say about it. Quite a bit to say about it in fact, in his latest missive entitled "The Dog and The Frisbee" which was presented at J-Hole today, as he looks at 'why less is more - except in finance where 'more is more'', 'ignorance is bliss', and most importantly, 'the costs of cognition'. His conclusion is the following very sensible statement... "Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex. Regulation of modern finance is complex, almost certainly too complex. That configuration spells trouble. As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity. Because complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded in simplicity, not complexity." ...and yet, coming from a central bank, we feel this statement may be a little disingenuous; because while fire and complexity apparently comply with logic and common sense (as far as not being able to fight it with itself), debt is in a category of its own.

September has arrived which means for Europe reality can, mercifully, return. First on the agenda: moments ago the French government suddenly announced the nationalization of troubled mortgage lender Credit Immobilier de France, which is also the country's second lagrest mortgage specialist after an attempt to find a buyer for the company failed. "To allow the CIF group to respect its overall commitments, the state decided to respond favourably to its request to grant it a guarantee," Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici said according to Reuters. What he really meant was that in order to avoid a bank run following the realization that the housing crisis has finally come home, his boss, socialist Hollande, has decided to renege on his core campaign promise, and bail out an "evil, evil" bank. Sadly, while the nationalization was predicted by us long ago, the reality is that the French government waited too long with the sale, which prompted the Moody's downgrade of CIF by 3 notches earlier this week, which in turn was the catalyst that made any delay in the nationalization inevitable. The alternative: fears that one of the key players in the French mortgage house of cards was effectively insolvent would spread like wildfire, leading to disastrous consequences for the banking system. End result: congratulations France: your Fannie/Freddie-Dexia moment has finally arrived, and the score, naturally: bankers 1 - taxpayers 0.

In the lead up weekend to the RNC convention, Tampa, Florida was awash in political electricity. The ideal of democratic participation, the feeling of rejuvenation and community, joining the ranks of one’s ideological brethren to charge into intellectual combat for the future of our nation. Unfortunately, some were well aware that the Republican convention was a farce, and knew full well what the end result would be for the Ron Paul campaign. It has become clear that Benton and others have been “handling” Ron Paul for a considerable portion of his campaign and attempting to divorce him from the elements of the movement which are seen as “extreme” or anti-establishment, even though these are the same elements that catapulted Ron Paul into the minds of average Americans. Sadly, this is the ultimate weakness of the political ideal. The cold hard fact is; some men are not men.  Some men are monsters, and reason is the last thing that will ever sway them… All in all, it is not a bad time to be a champion of the Constitutional philosophy, and the existence of such a movement gives me enduring optimism.  I do not “think” we will prevail; I KNOW we will prevail. It is time to take matters into our own hands.

Only 17% of credit managers (real or leveraged) expect notable widening in spreads (a rise in risk) by year-end, according to Citigroup's most recent client survey. This increasingly extreme bullish sentiment seems dominated by the trend of inflows into real-money accounts (which have chased high-beta, high-yield, and peripheral exposure) whereas hedge funds have used this most recent rally to reduce exposure to the peripheral, notably limited their HY exposure, increased their leveraged loan (secured credit) positioning, and increased core exposure. There remains an over-arching belief that the trend in flows will continue and that these flows will dominate market movements - however, the divergence between European bank and high-yield credit exposures (real-money getting longer, leveraged money reducing/getting short) is as dramatic as it as ever been. The last time we saw such a bull/bear divergence between real- and leveraged-money was at the bottom in Q1 2009 (but that time real-money was short and hedgies were adding longs - and were right!) Although most will say "being bearish about September is so consensus", we doubt that many are positioned that way.

While many claim that inflation is at historic lows, those who spend a large share of their income on necessities might disagree. Inflation for those who spend a large proportion of their income on things like medical services, food, transport, clothing and energy never really went away. And that was also true during the mid 2000s — while headline inflation levels remained low, these numbers masked significant increases in necessities; certainly never to the extent of the 1970s, but not as slight as the CPI rate — pushed downward by deflation in things like consumer electronics imports from Asia — suggested. This biflationary (or polyflationary?) reality is totally ignored by a single CPI figure. To get a true comprehension of the shape of prices, we must look at a much broader set of data.

We won't waste our readers' time with the details of all the 56 documented instances of hyperinflation in the modern, and not so modern, world. They can do so on their own by reading the attached CATO working paper by Hanke and Krus titled simply enough "World Hyperinflations." Those who do read it will discover the details of how it happened to be that in post World War 2 Hungary the equivalent daily inflation rate of 207%, the highest ever recorded, led to a price doubling every 15 hours, certainly one upping such well-known instance of CTRL-P abandon as Zimbabwe (24.7 hours) and Weimar Germany (a tortoise-like 3.70 days). This and much more. What we will point is that at no time in recorded history did a monetary regime end in "hyperdeflation." In fact there is not one hyperdeflationary episode of note. Although, we are quite certain, that virtually all of the 56 and counting hyperinflations in the world, were at one point borderline hyperdeflationary. All it took was central planner stupidity to get the table below, and a paper with the abovementioned title instead of "World Hyperdeflations."