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Harvard Study Confirms Level 3 Assets Burden Bank Balance Sheets, Lead To Information Uncertainty

Tyler Durden's picture




An interesting paper out of Harvard Business School that focuses on the information opacity in various asset disclosure classes (Level 1-3), concurrent with some interesting conclusions. From the abstract:

Finance theory suggests that information risk?that is, the uncertainty regarding valuation parameters for an underlying asset?is reflected in firms’ equity betas and the information asymmetry component of bid-ask spreads. We empirically examine these predictions for a sample of large U.S. banks, exploiting recent mandatory disclosures of financial instruments designated as fair value level 1, 2, and 3, which indicate progressively more illiquid and opaque financial instruments. Consistent with predictions, results reveal that  portfolios of level 3 financial assets have higher implied betas and lead to larger bid-ask spreads relative to those designated as level 1 or level 2 assets. Both results are consistent with a higher cost of capital for banks holding more opaque financial assets, as reflected by the level 3 fair value designation.

Nothing earthshattering here, however, it does reinforce the threat that as banks move increasingly more assets to the the mark-to-model Level 3 category, so as to hide the true sad state of their asset exposure, entire security classes that reference the specific balance sheet (think stocks) will likely end up becoming increasingly volatile, as the bank itself is perceived as merely a proxy for unlimited, opaque and likely mismarked Level 3 holdings.

Our results suggest that concerns surrounding the measurement and reporting of illiquid financial instruments appear warranted. Specifically, the evidence suggests that current disclosures surrounding these financial instruments are insufficient to mitigate investor perceptions of greater information risk for highly opaque financial assets. This suggests that further regulation may be warranted, included enhancements to the disclosures particularly for financial instruments reported at level 3 fair value. Our results also suggest that future movements to incorporate risk-weighted regulatory capital, particularly in which illiquid financial instruments receive higher risk weightings, appear justified.

Full paper here:

 




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Wed, 09/02/2009 - 11:59 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:13 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:42 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:43 | Link to Comment AnonymousMonetarist
AnonymousMonetarist's picture

So not knowing for sure that the banksters are too bankrupt to go broke but having enough common sense to suppose that a nickel is worth a nickel and not par results in information risk?

Yeah...

Cognitive dissonance and learned helplessness leads to cognitive helplessness and learned dissonance.

Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:43 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:45 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 18:13 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 12:48 | Link to Comment JohnKing
JohnKing's picture

Yes, we need a Harvard paper to tell us lying is bad. Some first graders already know that.

Wed, 09/02/2009 - 13:05 | Link to Comment koaj
koaj's picture
He was wearing my Harvard tie.
Can you believe it? My Harvard tie.
Like, oh sure, he went to Harvard.
If he's being driven around in my car,
he could actually be living in my house.
Maybe he's even taken my job.
For all I know, right at this moment
he could be fondling my fiancée.
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 15:52 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 16:50 | Link to Comment iknowNOW (not verified)
Wed, 09/02/2009 - 18:17 | Link to Comment Anonymous
Do NOT follow this link or you will be banned from the site!