B+

The first is a long-term chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). The recent price history has traced out a pattern that looks remarkably similar to the one that presaged the crash of 2008, with one difference: massive quantitative easing and Eurozone bailouts pushed the B leg into an overextension. If this pattern is valid, the C leg down could be a real doozy.

• Greece now in "Great Depression", PM says (Reuters)
• Geithner "Washington must act to avoid damaging economy" (Reuters)
• Moody’s warns eurozone core (FT)
• Germany Pushes Back After Moody’s Lowers Rating Outlook (Bloomberg)
• Austria's Fekter says Greek euro exit not discussed (Reuters)
• In Greek crisis, lessons in a shrimp farm's travails (Reuters)
• Fed's Raskin: No government backstop for banks that do prop trading (Reuters)
• Campbell Chases Millennials With Lentils Madras Curry (Bloomberg)

There was a time when regulators caught red-handed abusing their privileges, aka, doing nothing in the face of glaring malfeasance, would quietly fade away only to even more quietly reappear, sans press release, as a third general counsel or some other C-grade menial role paying a minimum 6 figure compensation to the individual for years of doing nothing. This is no longer the case: it appears that the best such exposed "regulators" can hope for going forward is to get media positions. Such is the case with John Ewan. Who is John Ewan? None other than the director "responsible for the management of the setting of Libor" at the British Bankers' Association. In other words, the man whom The Sun of all non-captured publications (oddly enough, tabloids sometimes have more journalistic integrity than Reuters and the FT as we will shortly find) has dubbed Mr. Libor. The Sun continues: "In a staggering profile on the internet Mr Ewan reveals he joined the BBA in 2005 to “put Libor on a secure commercial footing”. That year Barclays traders began fiddling the figures they submitted for the Libor calculations. On the LinkedIn networking site Mr Ewan boasts of generating a “tenfold” increase in revenue from licensing out the Libor rate." He adds: “I introduced new products and obtained EU, US and Japanese trademarks for BBA Libor. "I successfully negotiated contracts with derivatives exchanges and all of the major data vendors." Well, in the aftermath of Lieborgate surely Ewan is going to someone receptive to his permissive and highly profitable tactics over the years, such as Barclays. Actually no: instead of a bank, the only place that is willing to accept Ewan is media conglomerate Reuters. And not just as anyone: "Thomson Reuters confirmed that Ewan has joined the company as head of business development for its fixing and benchmark business." We wonder how much revenue Mr. Ewan generated for Reuters?

With just a few days left until the pre-opening soccer games begin in the UK, we continue our five part series (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3) on the intersection between markets and the Olympics by considering whether an integrated Europe would have performed relatively better - i.e. would 2+2>4 - and what are the factors. Goldman's analysis of the pros and cons of 'integrating' their Olympic teams is extremely apropos the current deteriorating (yet desperately dreaming of improving) coordination of these 17 disparate nations. The answer, of course, is that there are some benefits from this medal 'integration' in specific cases but since German reunification, their medal performance has deteriorated - even in the team events where aggregating talent pools should have its greatest gains. In a 'zero-sum' context such as competing for Olympic medals, Germany's gains must come at the expense of other countries - and rather notably there are few French medal winners before or after an 'integration. Sounds familiar?

With Valencia bust, Spanish bonds at all-time record spreads to bunds, and yields at euro-era record highs, Spain's access to public markets for more debt is as good as closed. What is most concerning however, as FAZ reports, is that "the money will last [only] until September", and "Spain has no 'Plan B". Yesterday's market meltdown - especially at the front-end of the Spanish curve - is now being dubbed 'Black Friday' and the desperation is clear among the Spanish elite. Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo (JMGM) attacked the ECB for their inaction in the SMP (bond-buying program) as they do "nothing to stop the fire of the [Spanish] government debt" and when asked how he saw the future of the European Union, he replied that it could "not go on much longer." The riots protest rallies continue to gather pace as Black Friday saw the gravely concerned union-leaders (facing worrying austerity) calling for a second general strike (yeah - that will help) as they warn of a 'hot autumn'. It appears Spain has skipped 'worse' and gone from bad to worst as they work "to ensure that financial liabilities do not poison the national debt" - a little late we hesitate to point out.

Falling interest rates are a feature of our current monetary regime, so central that any look at a graph of 10-year Treasury yields shows that it is a ratchet (and a racket, but that is a topic for another day!).  There are corrections, but over 31 years the rate of interest has been falling too steadily and for too long to be the product of random chance.  It is a salient, if not the central fact, of life in the irredeemable US dollar system. Irving Fisher, writing about falling prices (I shall address the connection between falling prices and falling interest rates in a forthcoming paper) proposed a paradox: “The more the debtors pay, the more they owe.” Debtors slowly pay down their debts and reduce the principle owed.  This would reduce the NPV of their debts in a normal environment.  But in a falling-interest-rate environment, the NPV of outstanding debt is rising due to the falling interest rate at a pace much faster than it is falling due to debtors’ payments.  The debtors are on a treadmill and they are going backwards at an accelerating rate. How apropos is Fisher’s eloquent sentence summarizing the problem!

One of the most widely accepted truisms of our time is that deflation is bad: bad for debtors, bad for the indebted government, and therefore bad for the economy. What all this overlooks is how wonderful mild deflation is for those who owe no debt but who own the debt and the income streams that flow from debt. What the "deflation is bad" argument ignores is who controls the financial and political systems, and what set of conditions benefits them. Everyone assuming the Federal government has the power to create inflation and that inflation is "good" should examine the interests of those who control the government's policies, i.e. those who own the debt. Put another way: here's what will be scarce: reliable income streams and liquidity.

What's Ben gonna do?

We are saved. No, we are doomed. The reaction to the much-heralded agreement to bailout Spain's banks is not good. Spanish bond yields are at their post-Euro highs at 7.21%, Spanish bond spreads (and 5Y CDS) are trading at 600bps as Valencia calls for its bailout, Montoro denies, then admits that indeed they are part of the fiasco. Spain's front-end is very weak with 3Y back over 6% with the entire curve at its flattest in 6 months. Italy is also cracking wider with the short-end getting crushed (2Y +42bps at 3.9%) - exactly where all that LTRO collateral is being held (more ECB margin calls?). While Italy's has reverted back to a zero basis to CDS, Spain has continued to see its bonds underperform CDS dramatically - which in the case of Greece and Portugal was the litmus test for a market switchijng from muddle-through to pending PSI as trust in CDS triggers reduces. Meanwhile, Germany's 2Y rate hits a record low below -6bps. Spain's IBEX is down almost 4% (but Italy's MIB worse) as EURUSD cracks below 1.22 once again. European financial credit (senior and sub) are getting cruyshed and it appears that broadly speaking equitieas are starting to catch up to the reality in credit markets - though have a long way to go. S&P 500 e-mini futures are down ove 9 pts from the close (and over 15pts from yesterday's highs). Europe's VIX is snapping 10% higher after capitulating al la US VIX but remains dramatically rich to crediot still.

Two years ago, in January 2010, Zero Hedge wrote "This Is The Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied" which became one of our most read stories of the year. The reason? Perhaps something to do with an implicit attempt at capital controls by the government on one of the primary forms of cash aggregation available: $2.7 trillion in US money market funds. The proximal catalyst back then were new proposed regulations seeking to pull one of these three core pillars (these being no volatility, instantaneous liquidity, and redeemability) from the foundation of the entire money market industry, by changing the primary assumptions of the key Money Market Rule 2a-7. A key proposal would give money market fund managers the option to "suspend redemptions to allow for the orderly liquidation of fund assets." In other words: an attempt to prevent money market runs (the same thing that crushed Lehman when the Reserve Fund broke the buck). This idea, which previously had been implicitly backed by the all important Group of 30 which is basically the shadow central planners of the world (don't believe us? check out the roster of current members), did not get too far, and was quickly forgotten. Until today, when the New York Fed decided to bring it back from the dead by publishing "The Minimum Balance At Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market FUnds". Now it is well known that any attempt to prevent a bank runs achieves nothing but merely accelerating just that (as Europe recently learned). But this coming from central planners - who never can accurately predict a rational response - is not surprising. What is surprising is that this proposal is reincarnated now. The question becomes: why now? What does the Fed know about market liquidity conditions that it does not want to share, and more importantly, is the Fed seeing a rapid deterioration in liquidity conditions in the future, that may and/or will prompt retail investors to pull their money in another Lehman-like bank run repeat?

The world's largest hedge fund is not as sanguine about the hope that remains in the markets today. The firm's founder, Ray Dalio, who has written extensively on the good, bad, and ugly of deleveragings, sounds a rather concerned note in his latest quarterly letter to investors as the "developed world remains mired in the deleveraging phase of the long-term debt cycle" and has spread to the emerging world "through diminished capital flows which have weakened their growth rates and undermined asset prices". Between China, Europe, and the US, which he discusses in detail, he sees the lack of global private sector credit creation leaving the world's economies highly reliant on government support through monetary and fiscal stimulation. The breadth of this slowdown creates a dangerous dynamic because, given the inter-connectedness of economies and capital flows, one country's decline tends to reinforce another's, making a self-reinforcing global decline more likely and a reversal more difficult to produce. After discounting a relatively imminent return to normalcy in early 2011, markets are now pricing in a meaningful deleveraging for an extended period of time, including negative real earnings growth, negative real yields, high defaults and sustained lower levels of commodity prices. Lastly he believes the common-wisdom - that the Germans and the ECB will save the day - is misplaced.

Still the divergent world views between equity and rates as during the last days.

EGBs better supported. Equities, too…

Spain held so so today, did overshoot 7%, but closed back below. The level itself is just symbolic; we all know…Fact is, Spanish funding is a costly thing.

Credit feeling slightly heavier than equities.

Middle East situation not really in the prices, as the tension in Syria is growing to new heights.

IMF annual review of EZ policies pitches a lot of already pitched ideas (QE, etc etc). No news

Nothing crisp from Ben – outside comments that “Europe is not close to having a long term solution”… Thanks for the thumb up!

Same story again: Recurrent picture of Hard Core grinding slightly tighter, Soft Core doubling down on that . Italy eventually better today but still over the 6% mark and Spain stuck over 6.75%. Equities just a tick weaker after all. Gold non-QE victim. EUR slammed through 22, but rebounded off 1.219.

Eventually quite resilient markets, given all the expectations…

After all that I analyzed above, and hereby invoking the last article of the Constitution I declare the following:

a) Faced with the choice not to eat for three (3) months or to pay the tax you’re demanding I’ll choose not to pay a single penny.

b) Faced with the choice to commit suicide or become a murderer, I’ll choose to murder you.

c) If you have not made an error with this Income Tax Assessment Notice that you’ve sent me, then you’re a bunch of cheats and scoundrels and thieves.