Bond

Our discussions (here, here, and here) of the dispersion of deleveraging efforts across developed nations, from the McKinsey report last week, raised a number of questions on the timeliness of the deflationary deleveraging process. David Rosenberg, of Gluskin Sheff, notes that the multi-decade debt boom will take years to mean revert and agrees with our views that we are still in the early stages of the global deleveraging cycle. He adds that while many believe last year's extreme volatility was an aberration, he wonders if in fact the opposite is true and that what we saw in 2009-2010 - a double in the S&P 500 from the low to nearby high - was the aberration and market's demands for more and more QE/easing becomes the volatility-inducing swings of dysphoric reality mixed with euphoric money printing salvation. In his words, perhaps the entire three years of angst turned to euphoria turned to angst (and back to euphoria in the first three weeks of 2012?) is the new normal. After all we had angst from 1929 to 1932 then ebullience from 1933 to 1936 and then back to despair in 1937-1938. Without the central banks of the world constantly teasing markets with more and more liquidity, the new baseline normal is dramatically lower than many believe and as such the former's impacts will need to be greater and greater to maintain the mirage of the old normal.

Goldman does it again. Whereas the exploits of one Tom Stolper are well known, and frankly much expected by the general community due to his infallible advice and 100% inverse track record, we did not realize just how pervasive his M.O. was within the broader firm. Now we do. As a reminder, on Monday Goldman came out with a recommendation to sell the 10 Year. "We are now of the view that a break to the upside, to 2.25-2.50%, is likely and recommend going tactically short. Using Mar-12 futures contracts, which closed on Friday at 130-08, we would aim for a target of 126-00 and stops on a close above 132-00."" This naturally generated a healthy dose of skepticism by Zero Hedge: " As a reminder, don't do what Goldman says, do what it does, especially when one looks the firm's Top 6 trades for 2012, of which 5 are losing money, and 2 have been stopped out less than a month into the year." Sure enough, anyone who did the opposite, i.e. buying the 10 year, has now returned +1.48% in three days. Goldman: always working for the client.

Over the past month, much has been said about the recent 3 year LTRO, and its function in stabilizing the European bond market. Certainly it has succeeded in causing an unprecedented steepening in European sovereign 2s10s curves across the periphery (well, except for Greece, and recently, Portugal) as by implication the ECB has made it clear that debt with a sub-3 year maturity is virtually risk free, inasmuch at least as the ECB is a credible central bank (and if it is perceived as no longer being one, there will be far bigger issues), along the lines of what the Fed's promise to keep ZIRP through the end of 2013, and today's likely extension announcement through 2014. Yet does filling a much needed for European stability fixed income "black hole" equate to a catalyst for Risk On? Hardly, because as in a new note today Brockhouse Cooper analysts Pierre Lapointe and Alex Bellefleur explains, the LTRO is "not a catalyst for a risk-on rally as the central bank is substituting itself for funding sources that have “dried up.” Sure enough - all the ECB is doing is preserving existing leverage (especially in light of ongoing bank deleveraging), not providing incremental debt, something which could only be done in the context of unsterilized bond monetization ala QE in the US. So just over a month in, what does the LTRO really mean for Europe (especially as we approach the next 3 Year LTRO issuance on February 29)? Here is Brockhouse's explanation.

Markets have become far less volatile than last year, but many investors remain focused on the Credit Markets for signs and cues as to the next move.  With so many people looking to moves in credit markets and trying to determine how successful an auction has been, we thought it would make sense to go through some examples of how credit trades.  At one extreme you have a real market like for the E-mini S&P futures.  That trades from Sunday at 6pm EST until Friday at 4:15 EST.  It is virtually continuous and at any given time you can see the bids and offers of the entire market.  Then you have credit trading, which has almost nothing in common with ES futures and their incredible liquidity and transparency.

The advance reading of Q4 UK GDP released today came in at -0.2%, slightly below expectations, however many market participants had feared a worse outcome for the indicator, allowing the GBP to pare the losses made in the lead-up to the GDP announcement. The Bank of England minutes released today have shown that the MPC unanimously agreed to keep the UK rate at 0.5%, and maintain the volume of the APF, however they also revealed that some MPC members saw the need for further QE in the future. Despite higher than expected German IFO Business Climate data this morning, European indices are trading in negative territory, with technology and financial stocks suffering the highest losses. This has seen asset reallocations into safe havens, which has seen Bunds outperform for the morning.

Even as the Euro-Dollar 3 Month basis swap has contracted to a nearly 6 month low at -75 bps, on residual hopes that the LTRO will do anything to fix Europe (it won't - just compare it to the €442 billion 1 year LTRO from June 2009 which worked until it didn't for the simple reason that Europe does does not have a liquidity problem), Europe has once again reemerged as a source of risk off (not least of all because the fulcrum security benefiting from the LTRO - the Italian 2 year BTP is for the first time in weeks wider by 17 bps). Why? The same reason as always: Greece, with a touch of Portugal. As BBG observes the positive sentiment in Asia earlier was retraced in the European session, with commodities, FX, equities lower, especially after ECB demurred from accepting losses on its Greek bond holdings. What that means is that as we patiently explained over the weekend, the imminent Greek default (just listen to Soros over in Davos spewing fire and brimstone on Europe for allowing the situation to get to a place where a Greek default is inevitable) will create so many subordinated junior tranches of Greek debt it will make one's head spin. But while the fate of Greece is all but sealed, and a CDS triggered virtually factored in (note: a Greek CDS trigger, in isolation, won't have much of an impact as repeated here before - in fact it will return some normalcy to the market as CDS will be a hedging vehicle once again over ISDA's corrupt trampled corpse), it is what happens to Portugal and its bonds that has the market gasping for air. Because as Zero Hedge pointed out first, a Greek default will be impossible to be enacted in Portugal in its currently envisioned format, as stupid as it may be. In fact, due to the pervasive and broad negative pledges in most medium-term Portuguese bonds, any priming Troika bailout is impossible without providing matching collateral for everyone else under UK indenture bonds!

• Angela Merkel casts doubt on saving Greece from financial meltdown (Guardian)
• Germany Rejects ‘Indecent’ Call to ECB on Greece, Meister Says (Bloomberg)
• Obama Calls for Higher Taxes on Wealthy (Bloomberg)
• Fed set to push back timing of eventual rate hike (Reuters)
• Recession Looms As UK Economy Shrinks By 0.2%, more than expected (SKY)
• King Says BOE Can Increase Bond Purchases If Needed to Meet Inflation Goal (Bloomberg)
• When One Quadrillion Yen is not enough: Japan's first trade deficit since 1980 raises debt doubts (Reuters)
• Sarkozy to quit if he loses poll (FT)
• U.S. Shifts Policy on Nuclear Pacts (WSJ)
• ECB under pressure over Greek bond hit (FT)

As the title of this essay suggests, a loan is an exchange of wealth for income.  Like everything else in a free market (imagine happier days of yore), it is a voluntary trade.  Contrary to the endemic language of victimization, both parties regard themselves as gaining thereby, or else they would not enter into the transaction. In a loan, one party is the borrower and the other is the lender.  Mechanically, it is very simple.  The lender gives the borrower money and the borrower agrees to pay interest on the outstanding balance and to repay the principle. As with many principles in economics, one can shed light on a trade by looking back in history to a time before the trade existed and considering how the trade developed. It is part of the nature of being a human that one is born unable to work, living on the surplus produced by one’s parents.  One grows up and then one can work for a time.  And then one becomes old and infirm, living but not able to work.  If one wishes not to starve to death in old age, one can have lots of children and hope that they will care for their parents in their old age.  Or, one can produce more than one consumes and hoard the difference.

While Paulson's star was finally setting in 2011, that of mega macro fund Brevan Howard was rising, and has been rising for years by never posting a negative return since 2003. The $34.2 billion fund, now about double the size of John Paulson's, returned 12.12% in a year marked by abysmal hedge fund performance. But how did it make money? Simple - by taking advantage of the same permabullish market myopia that marked the beginning of 2011, and that has gripped the market once again. "The Fund’s large gains during the third quarter were due predominantly to pressing the thematic view that markets were ignoring clear signs of economic slowdown and were not correctly pricing the probability of central bank accommodation, particularly the reversal of the ECB rate hikes in April and July." Not to mention the €800 billion ECB liquidity accommodation that started in July and has continued since. So yes: those betting again that the market correction is overdue, will once again be proven right Why? Because "we are about to witness an unprecedented policy move. In the US, Eurozone and UK, fiscal austerity is being prescribed as the cure following the bursting of the credit bubble and to overcome the malaise following a balance-sheet recession. Unfortunately, there is no historical example of when this approach has been successful." As for looking into the future, "we continue to believe that markets remain at risk of  substantial dislocation."

At some point, the market will force the issue of whether or not the ECB is going to be monetizing everything or not. Germany, having already seen the ultimate outcome of monetization (Weimar) has already made it clear that it will not tolerate this.

The biggest market-moving event so far this year is undeniably the positive (so far) aftershock from Germany's capitulation on monetary expansion and as Michael Cembalest of JPMorgan goes on to note that the ECB, directly and indirectly, is giving its governments and its banks the money that the rest of the world has been taking away. Between the ECB's LTRO largesse and its 'crisis management' initiatives (for example: collateral standards, watered down Basel III, lower bank reserve requirements), it seems clear that the resignation of the German contingency (Stark and Weber) from the ECB last year was a signal of the laying-down-of-arms by the Germans relative to the Periphery (perhaps for fear of the 'powerful backlash' that Monti among other has warned about). While the JPMorgan CIO understands the market's positive reaction (as Armageddon risk is reduced/delayed) he remains a skeptic broadly given the structural reforms and any expectations of growth among most euro-zone economies this year. He reminds investors that it should not be lost on anyone that first prize in the Central Bank balance sheet expansion race is not necessarily one you want to win and we wonder just how aware the German press and public are that this is happening under their watchful (if not frustrated) gaze.

With the Fed expected to at least extend the period of guaranteed ZIRP from 2013 to 2014 tomorrow, it is no surprise that the just priced $35 billion in 2 year bonds did so very uneventfully, and at a high yield of 0.25% (38.96% allotted), in line with the When Issued, the note priced like what is was: an issue explicitly guaranteed by the Fed, and a yield reflecting it. The pricing was uneventful in the headline, and in the internals, with the Directs taking down 8.27% (quite lower than the TTM 13.05%), Indirects in line with average at 32.89% and Primary Dealers as usual accounting for more than a majority, or 58.84%. The Bid To Cover was a solid 3.75 if not a record. And now the Dealers will promptly reverse repo the bond back to the as nobody can do anything with a 0.25% yield in an environment in which investors demand double digits ROEs. Most importantly, however, was that this was merely the latest bond auction concluding even with the US debt ceiling still not getting an extension, and even more plundering from the G-fund. Once the ceiling is finally lifted, total US debt will move the maximum $15.2 trillion to well over $15.3 trillion overnight, maybe higher, just as it did back in August.

I warned on Greece 2 years ago, and it seems to have come to fruition. This is who's next....

The latest IMF Global Financial Stability Report is out and it is not pretty. The IMF now sees:

• 2012 world growth outlook cut to 3.3% from 4.0%, 2013 growth revised lower to 3.9% from 4.5%
• 2012 US growth of 1.8%, 2013 at 2.2%
• 2012 UK growth of 0.6%, down from 1.6%
• 2012 China growth of 8.2%, down from 9.0%
• Eurozone to enter "mild" recession, whatever that is, with -0.5% economic growth, to grow again in 2013 by 0.8%. Unclear just how with all the deleveraging...

IMF also adds that without action, the debt crisis may force a 4% Euro-area contraction, in line with what the World Bank, controlled by a former Goldmanite, said. Lastly, the IMF says that Europe needs a larger firewall and bank deleveraging limits. Well there is always that €X trillion February 29 LTRO.