The Economist

Not much going. Markets treading water in sync. Going RN, simply on lower levels. The calm before the Storm?

Minor data week, which will leave market action subject to jitters and rumours, technicals and charts. Tricky auctions of the week will be the one for EUR 8bn Italian bills on Thu and Italian 3 YRS to close the week on a Friday 13th (amount still open; were EUR 3bn 3s and 1.5bn 7 and 8 –year bonds last month). One will bear in mind that the holiday season, which slowly but surely starts to kick in, will further diminish what’s left of liquidity, exacerbating any given move.

We especially enjoy reading things that we disagree with, and that challenge my own beliefs. Strong ideas are made stronger, and weak ideas dissolve in the spotlight of scrutiny. People who are unhappy to read criticisms of their own ideas are opening the floodgates to ignorance and dogmatism. Yet sometimes our own open-minded contrarianism leads us to something unbelievably shitty.

The financial system is being regulated by clueless schmucks — many of whom would also castigate Zero Hedge as a “big fat hoax”, while ignoring grift and degeneracy within the financial establishment and the TBTF banks. In the face of such grotesque incompetence who can blame market participants for wanting a hedge against zero?

When on Friday news broke that German regulator BAFIN (which is just like the SEC except that it also regulates, investigates and actually prosecutes, instead of just watching porn all day) was launching a probe of the biggest bank in Europe, and actually, make that the world, Germany's Deutsche Bank, the shares took a quick, brisk hit, sliding 5% with everyone anxiously expecting to find out just which bank will follow Barclays into the scapegoat abattoir (because nobody had any clue Liebor manipulation was going on until a week ago). Yet while external inquiry into banks is to be expected (everywhere but in the US of course, because in the US no banks manipulated anything. Ever) as a proactive act on behalf of regulators to cover their back, things get a little more tricky when the bank itself admits there was an obvious supervision problem. From Reuters: "Two Deutsche Bank employees have been suspended after it used external auditors to examine whether staff were involved in manipulating interbank lending rates, German magazine Der Spiegel reported, citing no sources." Now what can possibly go wrong if the biggest bank in the world, with just shy of $3 trillion in "assets", which just happens to have a 1.68% Core Tier 1 ratio, is suddenly thrust smack in the middle of the scandal that the Economist just aptly named the finance industry's "tobacco moment"?

All 3 Libor Arguments Fail

Regulators Say Libor Manipulation Started in 2005 ... But Industry Veteran Closely Involved in the Libor Process Says that the Rate Has Been Manipulated for 15 Years

Debate between Krugman and the CFR rages on in round 2 on whether currency devaluation created the Icelandic Miracle or Mirage.  

Neoclassical Economics Is a Scam ...

Given the rather weak near-term and long-term outlook for US coal demand, it’s not surprising that within such a capital-intensive business, a number of smaller coal producers were hit recently with bankruptcy rumors. Indeed, even large cap names like Arch Coal have seen an escalation of concern over debt levels. Accordingly, many have concluded that coal -- in an era of solar, wind, and natural gas -- has finally displaced itself due to its problematic extraction, distant transportation, and overall costs. Is coal finally going away as an energy source?

Not a chance.

Indeed, everything currently unfolding for coal in the United States is precisely what is not unfolding for coal globally. Prices to import natural gas to most countries via LNG remain sky-high, easily protecting coal’s cost advantage. And the demand for coal in the developing world remains gargantuan. Accordingly, just as with oil, lower US demand simply frees up supply to elsewhere in the world. The global coal juggernaut rolls onward.

Stocks just surged over 1% off their lows on absolutely no news whatsoever. The Merkel news was minutes ago (and how is that in any way positive) and the JPM news is old and irrelevant... This is simply ridiculous... they are on their own from a cross-asset perspective and just touched yesterday's closing VWAP which feels very algo-exit-driven...

What few media pundits seem to grasp is that when our trade deficits transfer hundreds of billions of dollars to other nations, those dollars have to end up in dollar-denominated assets like bonds, stocks or real estate. Many people have missed the difference between dollars used to settle accounts and dollars held as a result of trade deficits. Many of those emotionally wedded to the belief that the U.S. dollar is doomed gleefully grabbed onto the news that China and Japan will swap currencies directly (yen and yuan) rather than intermediate the trade with U.S. dollars. This was mistakenly seen as a nail in the coffin of the USD. If I am in Japan and I have yuan due to trade with China, and I want to exchange those yuan for yen, I only need USD for about 10 seconds to intermediate the exchange. Cutting out the USD simply cut the exchange costs and lowered the daily trading volume of the USD. This reduction in the transactions needed to exchange yuan for yen did nothing to change the dollars held by China or Japan as a result of their trade surpluses with the U.S. This also didn't lower the amount of assets or credit (debt) denominated in USD. In other words, the effect on the value of the dollar is trivial. No matter how many exchanges the USD sitting in overseas accounts are pushed through, they still end up in dollar-denominated assets somewhere.

Only a wilful and ideological Keynesian could ignore the salient detail: as soon as the USA left the gold exchange standard,  total factor productivity began to dramatically stagnate.   Coincidence? I don’t think so — a fundamental change in the nature of the money supply coincided almost exactly with a fundamental change to the shape of the nation’s economy. Is  the simultaneous outgrowth in income inequality a coincidence too? Keynesians may respond that correlation does not necessarily imply causation, and though we do not know the exact causation, there are a couple of strong possibilities that may have strangled productivity. It’s not just total factor productivity that has been lower than in the years when America was on the gold exchange standard — as a Bank of England report recently found, GDP growth has averaged lower in the pure fiat money era (2.8% vs 1.8%), and financial crises have been more frequent in the non-gold-standard years.

While Europe is dominating headlines this week, UBS' Art Cashin suggests "mark your calendar and cross your fingers" as he notes the disproportionate prevalence of events that occur in September. Focusing on The Economist's Greg Ip's recent post on a possible seasonal pattern in banking crises, via this recent Reinhart & Rogoff extension paper by Laeven and Valencia, he notes: "The frequency with which the world goes to hell in September seems hardly random." Unfortunately the authors provide no explanation for this beyond observing, "An interesting pattern emerges: banking crises tend to start in the second half of the year, with large September and December effects." Ip and Cashin offer some thoughts on why this is so historically, and more importantly why this time is no different, as the avuncular Art concludes with: "try to enjoy your summer".

In what may come as a shocking surprise to exactly nobody, the next great discovery as more and more layers of the global ponzi onion are exposed, is that China was, in fact, lying about everything. Yes, we know, stunning.

One week to solve all problems, or else....

While this morning saw a rumor of junior bank bondholder haircuts (and burden-sharing) rapidly denied by Spain's de Guindos, it appears the country's smarter individuals are realizing that perhaps a 'bail-in' (a la Citigroup in 2009) is the better way to go than an unending 'bailout' when it comes to the problem banking system. The bigger issue is not the insufficiency of the loan but the fact that such a relatively small loan was impossible for the sovereign to raise itself as no private investors believe their solvency - implying Spain has reached its debt saturation point. Neither government nor taxpayers can afford to take on more debt (which is what the bailout is). The solution, a precedent set by the good ol' USofA with the Citi preferreds, is to cram-up bond-holders. A compulsory debt-for-equity swap for the subordinated and senior unsecured liabilities, "whereby investors bear the vast majority of the cost of their own mistakes, without liquidating the banks and without pushing the Spanish economy into bankruptcy" may initially cause some turmoil in the interbank lending markets (which would need to be supported by the ECB in the interim as it is already). It would be extremely painful for shareholders (who will see massive dilution) and bondholders (arguably rightfully so) but would offer 'real' hope for improving market belief in solvency.