Non-Manufacturing ISM Joins All Other Economic Misses, Prints At Lowest Since August, Biggest Miss In A YearSubmitted by Tyler Durden on 04/03/2013 09:14 -0500
Spot the common thread: Chicago PMI, manufacturing ISM, ADP and now Non-manufacturing ISM. If you said all big misses, give yourself a pat on the back. Because in the New Normal, the recovery apparently goes backward and downward especially when funded by what is now some $400 billion in QEternity. Despite expectations of a modest decline from 56.0 in February to just 55.5, the March Services ISM dropped to 54.4, the lowest since August, and the biggest miss in one year, with the critical New Orders components declining by 3.6 to 54.6, Employment down by 3.9 to 53.3 - the lowest since November, and Exports down 4 with imports up 5 surely doing miracles for GDP. Why the big miss? Three reasons: the post Sandy rebuilding effort is over; the abnormally strong winter seasonal adjustments have phased out and now is the time to pay the piper, and of course, the complete collapse in global trade as we have been hammering for the past year, now that Europe is in the worst depression since the 19th century. But don't worry: there is a POMO for that, and for everything else to give the impression that just because the Bad Bank formerly known as the Fed will onboard every piece of toxic garbage that is not nailed down, one can safely ignore reality for ever and ever.
One Of Ireland's Biggest Banks Busted Fudging The Books? Nah! Busted Concealing Debt? Nah! Busted.. Cyprus Was Just The PreambleSubmitted by Reggie Middleton on 04/02/2013 08:59 -0500
Mounds of cold, hard, indisputable evidence not found ANYWHERE else! Damn, you thought Cyprus was newsworthy? Ireland already Troika'd & they're bigger than Cyprus. Depositor recap of banks looks inevitable if this research is right!
It begins here: Introduction of cold, hard evidence of bank shenanigans (with complete documentation) that A) should be prosecuted & B) cause enough concern to make you worry about your bank's integrity.
The sound and fury of a European leadership denying the template-nature of Cyprus was deafening last week following D-Boom's comments and while we suspect the Cyprus deal was from unique and exceptional, it is clear, as Citi's Matt King notes that Cyprus’ significance was always going to stem more from the precedent it created than from its size. In choosing a relatively conventional good bank, bad bank model, the authorities have done much to alleviate the damage that would have been caused by an arbitrary tax on uninsured depositors. But the very “success” of the solution now being adopted seems likely to lead to its replication elsewhere. While arguably good news for the sovereigns and for longer-term growth prospects (though the chasm to be crossed to that growth is treacherous), its negative repercussions for senior bank bondholders still seem far from being priced in. The Cyprus model has three key features, which highlight the effective elimination of many of bondholders’ supposed protections: hasty implementation under national legislation, application to all bonds by statute, and extremely low recoveries. Against this, of course, is the argument - noisily voiced by the authorities - that Cyprus is unique. We, like King, disagree.
The MSM and Cyprus pretend to yell victory after wiping out the business sector and upper middleclass & wealthy's liquidity stores - all to remain part of the euro. It's worth it! Depression is the new success!!!
Hopefully the memory of the new Eurogroup head, who in a one day lost more credibility than his admittedly lying predecessor Juncker ever had, will be jogged courtesy of this full transcript provided by Reuters and the FT of what he told two reporters - on the record - and for the whole world to read. Because, by now, we are confident everyone has had more than enough with watching the entire Eurozone rapidly and tragically turn itself into a complete and utter mythomaniac, kletpocratic circus.
The most positive aspect of last night’s deal was that a deal was reached at all, and that some steps have been taken to counter moral hazard. However, overall, this is a bad deal for Cyprus and the Cypriot population. Cypriot GDP is likely to collapse in the wake of the deal with the possible capital controls hampering the functioning of the economy. The large loan from the eurozone will push debt up to unsustainable levels while the austerity accompanying it (along with the bank restructuring plan) will increase unemployment and cause social tension. There is a strong chance Cyprus could become a zombie economy – reliant on eurozone and central bank funding, with little hope of economic growth. Meanwhile, the country will remain at the edge of the single currency as tensions increase between members with Germany, the ECB and the IMF now looking intent on a more radical approach to the crisis. The eurozone took this one down to the wire. But late last night, after a week of intense back and forth negotiations, a deal was reached on the Cypriot bailout. Below we lay out the key points of the deal (the ones that are known, there are plenty of grey areas remaining) and our key reactions to the deal.
All eyes should remain focused on Cyprus today, especially since there is no data being reported elsewhere. Financial markets closed Friday on a positive note, as an agreement on Cyprus appeared to be taking shape and a minor relief rally across most asset classes overnight vindicated hopes of a positive outcome as details of the detail were announced overnight. More clarity is still required on some aspects of the agreement (deposit and bondholders) but the fact that the national parliament does not need to vote again should stop the deal from unravelling as it did last week. Whether this is enough to restore confidence and prevent a possible cautionary deposit flight from Cyprus remains to be seen.
It's 2:30am, do you know where your deposits are? Tune in to see the Eurogroup explain how this is in the best interest of the Cypriot people, how the 'deal' illustrates the solidarity of the European people, and how the worst of the crisis is now behind us.
*EU COMMISSION SAYS NO CYPRUS PARLIAMENT VOTE NEEDED: SCHAEUBLE
*SCHAEUBLE SAYS TROIKA TO CONTACT RUSSIAN GOVT ON DEAL :BOCY CY
UPDATE: It appears the 'deal' to default/restructure the banks has been designed to bypass the need for parliamentary votes, since it is theoretically not a tax.
While we have little color on what kind of carnage the President of Cyprus had to accept to his fellow countrymen, the news is that :
*CYPRUS, TROIKA REACH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, EU OFFICIAL SAYS
The terms, unsurprisingly what zee Germans wanted, are i) Laiki to be wound down; ii) Bank of Cyprus to survive but with deposit haircuts, and iii) deal would see secured deposits in Laiki moved to Bank of Cyprus. In other words, a deal far worse then the original on proposed by the Eurogroup last week - when the banks still existed. The key appears to be the 'saving' of the insured depositors (crucial to avoid a pan-European bank run) and the crushing of the 'whale' depositors. S&P 500 futures and EUR are surging, Gold is dropping modestly. We await final confirmation of the final terms of the final deal once the Cypriot people wake up (and don't forget the ECB 'standard of living' rules). The Cypriot Parliament still has to vote for this - and not one of them voted for it last week.
It seems that the Cypriot government is going full circle on its plans to save its nation and its people. As UK Think Tank Open Europe notes, "it now seems we have come all the way back round to the deposit levy as a solution in Cyprus. Overnight, the EU/IMF/ECB Troika rejected the plans for a Cypriot solidarity fund, particularly one based on pension assets and gas reserve revenues (which German Chancellor Angela Merkel specifically spoke out against)." The new - Plan 'D' - (Plan A - Haircuts; Plan B - Beg Russia for Bailout; Plan C - Solidarity Fund) appears to be moar haircuts and double-dip on the large depositors (seemingly what Brussels wants anyway). Plan 'D' - a restructuring and bigger deposit levy (a 12.2% tax on deposits above €500,000 or a 9.46% deposit on deposits above €100,000 would yield the necessary €3.5bn) - "may amount to trying to burn the larger depositors twice," as the plan to shift bad assets to a bad bank (along with the large uninsured depositors) and wound down (meaning 20-40% losses) and still face the initial large-deposit-tax - leaving the Russians large depositors with 50%-plus losses. As the FT notes, "that may make sense in the medium term, but in itself does not create new money"
More details are appearing on the latest and greatest plan in the shambles to solve Cyprus' (and Europe's unsolvable) problem. It appears the European Group is implicitly declaring economic war on the 'wealthy' depositors (we noted here non-domestic depositors dominated recent inflows) as these headlines hit:
*EURO AREA SAID TO WEIGH CLOSING CYPRUS POPULAR, BANK OF CYPRUS
*EURO AREA SAID TO WEIGH GOOD BANK, BAD BANK FOR CYPRUS BANKS
*UNINSURED DEPOSITS COULD GO TO CYPRUS BAD BANK, FACE 40% LOSS
We assume followed rapidly by some eurozone law-breaking capital controls to stop the remaining 60% flooding out instantaneously...
It appears, based on government officials, that things are going a little critical in Cyprus. Following rumors of the closure (restructuring) of good/bad bank assets for Cyprus Popular Bank, we get this news:
*CYPRUS HASN'T HAD ANY FURTHER NEWS FROM RUSSIA: OFFICIAL
*CYPRUS POPULAR BANK HAS "FEW HOURS OF LIQUIDITY LEFT": OFFICIAL
As is painfully clear to even the most naive observer, the biggest threat for Europe from this point on, now that Cyprus is officially "unfixed" is what happens when... if the Cyprus banks reopen - will the deluge of bank withdrawals drain 10% of the savings as the country's central banker warned earlier today, 20%, 50% or all of it? It is certain that any and all foreign "oligarch" accounts will be promptly pulled never to be heard of again, and after being treated like third grade European citizens, we doubt the locals will care much for having their cash in a banking system that Europe has shown is equal to all the other "united" banking systems, which however also happen to be just that much more equal. And once foreign TV crews show lines of people scrambling to pull money in Cyprus to the local viewers in Greece, Italy and Spain, will those countries also get comparable ideas? That is precisely the Pandora's box that Europe has now opened, and which it is scrambling to close. How? With the dreaded "contingency plans", among which are such last ditch efforts as capital controls, including "imposing limits on daily withdrawals from bank accounts; capping the amount of money that can be electronically taken out of the country and making these transactions slower to clear; and introducing border checks to cap the amount of cash leaving in the country," most recently utilized in the banana-est of republics such as Argentina.
Short answer: we don't know.
We do, however, know something we have been pointing out since early 2012 - when it comes to the funding strcuture of European banks, there is a dramatic difference between the US and Europe. In the US, as we showed most recently two months ago, the Big Three depositor banks (JPM, Wells and Bank of America, excluding the still pseudo-nationalized Citi), have a record $858 billion in excess deposits over loans. So what about Europe? Here things get bad. Very bad. So bad in fact that we covered it all just one short year ago. What is the reason for this? Well, as readers can surmise based on what just happened in Europe, it once again has to do with deposits, and specifically the loan-to-deposit ratios of European banks. Because if the US has an excess of deposits over loans, Europe is and has always suffered from the inverse: a massive excess of loans (impaired assets) compared to the most critical of bank liabilities - deposits... One doesn't have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that in a world in which European loans are massively mismarked relative to fair value, and where bad and non-performing loans are an exponentially rising component of all "asset" exposure, it will be the liabilities that are ultimately impaired. Liabilities such as deposits.