Bank of Japan

All you can read.

Earlier in the week, UBS' Art Cashin noted that some traders were re-reading Bernanke’s speech of November 21, 2002 on countering inflation. Prior re-readings had given clues on things like QE1 and even Operation Twist. The primary theme of the speech was - what can the Fed do to fight deflation (and stimulate the economy) if the Fed Funds rate fell to zero (aah, those simple golden years). Cashin points out that most of the operations, however, tend to be means to make money available or easy. With nearly $2 trillion in excess free reserves that doesn’t seem to be the problem. Inducing spending is the problem. Of all the suggestions, the wider inflation tolerance may be the only one that may do that.

All you need to know.

Société Générale head of foreign exchange research Kit Juckes on the US dollar dynamic, QE 3, 4, and 5, "even lower rates for even longer than you thought," and the Bank of Japan slowly learning to match policies with the Fed.

Watch out for exchange controls in Switzerland this weekend.

Three months ago, just when things looked like they were about to turn south, the Fed's trusty mouthpiece, Jon Hilsenrath, made it clear that the market can stop falling as the Fed was "considering" sterilized QE, or more Twist, something we explained later would be impossible in the current format as the Fed would run out of sub 3 Year paper by the end of August. It did however halt the drop in stocks for a month or two until Europe became permanently unfixed. Hilsenrath then cralwed back into his WSJ cubicle. Until today: two weeks before the all critical June 20 FOMC meeting, the faithful Fed scribe has been charged with his latest leak commission: "Fed Considers More Action Amid New Recovery Doubts." And as it has been leaked (now that people have actually done the appropriate math), so it shall be.

Thus we have the world’s three most important Central banks as well as the global economy’s “economic miracle” retreating from aggressive monetary intervention.

German taxpayers still have an opportunity to just say no

Maybe the real reason that the Treasury offered China direct access (thus cutting out the middleman and offering China cheaper access than ever) was precisely because China was selling, and because the Treasury was concerned about the effect on rates, and wanted to give China some incentive to keep buying. As Jon Huntsman noted in a 2010 cable leaked by Wikileaks, the PBOC has felt pressured to keep buying, and as various PBOC officials have hinted in recent months, China is actively seeking to convert out of treasuries and into gold. And that makes sense — treasuries are yielding ever deeper negative real rates. People holding treasuries are losing their purchasing power. No wonder the treasury is willing to cut Wall Street out of the deal. And it isn’t like the Treasury would have taken this move lightly — cutting Wall Street out of the equation is a slap in the face to Wall Street

With only new home sales (which we actually report as opposed to NAR goalseeked marketing materials) to hit the docket in the US, the only newsflow that matters again will be that coming out of Europe, which is holding an informal summit. As BofA reminds us, the summit was originally set up to discuss growth. Now, it is there for Grexit damage control. Today's discussions will focus on the use of existing tools for supporting short-term growth. Spain and Greece are likely to be on the agenda as well. On Greece, although discussions should focus on the pros and cons of a Greek exit, we believe there will be no communiqué other than to mention that Greece should stay in the euro area and implement the programme. On Spain, discussions will likely focus on the banking sector. The discussion will likely be around using the EFSF (or its successor ESM) directly to fund the banking sector, a step Germany opposed in the past. Overall, we do not expect many decisions from the summit. Rather, we expect a communiqué about what was officially discussed, and a date for a later rendezvous. In other words, "investors are likely to be let down by today's summit" (that was BofA's assessment). Also let down, were markets in the overnight session when the BOJ, contrary to some expectations, left its QE program unchanged. As usual keep an eye on headlines: record EUR interest means violent short covering squeezes if the algos sense a hint of optimism in any red flashing text (if only briefly, as the long-term outlook for the situation is quite hopeless).

All you need to read.

Based on a swap-spread-based model, EURUSD should trade around 1.30, but based on GDP-weighted sovereign credit risk EURUSD should trade around 1.00; so who is right and what are the factors that supporting the Euro at higher levels than many would assume (given the rising probability of a Euro-zone #fail and the 0.82 lows from 2000). UBS addresses four key reasons for the apparent paradox based on the difference between ECB and Fed 'monetization', the EZ's balanced current account (independent of foreign capital flows), and the high-oil-price induced petro-dollar circulation diversifying into Euros (or out of USD). The final and most telling of factors though is bank deleveraging as European financial entities, who remain under pressure to shrink their balance sheets and re-build capital, have been selling foreign assets. They remain EUR dismalists with a year-end target of 1.15 but expect the slide to these levels to be cushioned (absent an imminent break-up) by banks' 'shrinkage'.

All you need to read and some more.

All is (once again) failing. What to do? Much more of the same of course. Only this time whip out the nuclear option: the Helicopter Money Drop. This is the logical next step that Citigroup's Willen Buiter sees as "Central Banks should also engage in 'helicopter money drops' to stimulate effective demand" - temporary tax cuts, increases in transfer payments, or boosts to exhaustive public spending - all financed directly by the willing central bank accomplice in the monetization gambit. In his words: "This will always be effective if it is implemented on a sufficient scale." It is not difficult to implement, would likely be politically popular (nom, nom, nom, more iPads), and in his mind need not become inflationary. He does come down to earth a little though from this likely-endgame scenario noting that "helicopter money is not [however] a solution to fiscal unsustainability." It is just a means of providing a temporary fiscal stimulus without adding to the stock of interest-bearing, redeemable public debt. Any attempt to permanently finance even rather small (permanent) general government deficits (as a share of GDP) by creating additional base money would soon – once inflation expectations adjust to this extreme fiscal dominance regime - give rise to unacceptably high rates of inflation and even hyperinflation. His estimate of the size of this one-off helicopter drop - beyond which these inflation fears may appear - is around 2% of GDP - hardly the stuff of Keynes-/Koo-ian wet dreams. The fact that this is being discussed as a possibility (and was likely always the end-game) by a somewhat mainstream economist should be shocking as perhaps this surreality is nearer than many would like to imagine.

Preaching from the pulpit of the fiscally most undisciplined country in the world