Bear Stearns
Mass Home Refinancing Rumor Rejected, And Why Even If It Was True It Would Not Help BAC
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/05/2012 16:39 -0500Looking for a reason why the surge of BAC has been abruptly halted after hours? Look no further - as predicted earlier, when we commented on the periodic reincarnation of the always false global refi rumor which served among other things to push BAC higher by almost 10%, the rumor was found to be false... all over again. In other words no refi, no benefit to TBTF, and all of today's gains are based on what Bloomberg noted was a report issued yesterday by a Jaret Seiberg, who until recently was an employee of MF Global, and has since been acquired with his entire Washington Research Group by none other than Guggenheim partners, which just happens to be run by former Bear Stearns exec Alan Scwhartz. From Bloomberg, here is the official denial (which came literally seconds after market close):
- White House Has No Plan for Mass Home Refinancing, Person Says
Incidentally, even if the rumor was true, here is JMP explaining why it would have no real impact on Bank of America
Reggie Middleton on CNBC StreetSigns Sees 2012 As Reluctant/Manipulated Continuation of Q1 2009
Submitted by Reggie Middleton on 01/03/2012 07:42 -0500The iconoclastic outcast being called in to shake things up a little. I'll appear on CNBC @2:30 with my outlook for 2012. I'm not shy about my track record & here's what I'll have to say.
We Just Had A "Rerun" Of Bear Stearns: When Is Lehman Coming?
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 12/07/2011 08:05 -0500
As the attached chart showing USD liquidity swap line usage by the ECB, or more specifically by European banks, we have now seen a surge to levels last seen in August 2009. However, more importantly this is where the usage was for the first time after the failure of Bear Stearns, and when everyone thought all had been fixed... until Lehman came. We are there now, in other words, we have just experienced a behind the scenes Bear-type event. What is disturbing is just how fast the rate of change was this time around compared to before, when it took months to get to $50 billion. Now, it was one week. When "Lehman v2.0" hits and it will hit, the next step function in the Fed's global bailout will be so big and so fast, it will induce vertigo.
Is Illinois Worse Off Than Greece with a Little LTCM and Bear Stearns Thrown In? In Case You Didn’t Know…
Submitted by Reggie Middleton on 08/23/2010 14:10 -0500What does Illinois have in common with Bear Stearns, Ambac Financial, LTCM and Greece? Come on fellas, let's roll the dice. I've got some pension money in case I come up snake eyes...
Bear Stearns: The 'Immaculate Calamity'
Submitted by Econophile on 05/06/2010 01:21 -0500Bear's execs say, "We didn't do it. It's not our fault. Evil speculators conspired against us, and investors irrationally made a run on us." They have no clue and they sound pathetic. Perhaps they should have read two little books.
Did Paulson Have A $2 Billion Bear Stearns CDS Short In Late 2006? Novel Observations On Abacusgate
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/30/2010 06:58 -0500
Reading a 901 page Goldman document production (cover to cover) at 36,000 feet has proven to be both relaxing and quite productive. Among the plethora of emails, documents and memoranda, we may have stumbled upon something that could prove to be an even "bigger short" for John Paulson than RMBS: a $2 billion position in Bear CDS initiated prior to January 2007, as well as all other financial firms. Additionally, we discover that arguably the world's richest hedge fund manager (for a reason) was prophetically putting on bank counterparty hedges as early late 2006, up to and including Goldman Sachs itself. Most relevantly, in what could be damaging disclosure by Fabrice Tourre, the Frenchman notes that as a result of Paulson's mistrust of Goldman's counterparty risk, the Abacus AC1 deal was structured in a novel way in which "they would be acting as protection buyer, facing the ABACUS SPV (as opposed to a structure where Goldman is protection buyer as is usually the case)." This little legalistic variation could make a world of difference in an Attorney General's hands. It may be time to very carefully read the indenture of AC1 and compare it with those of 2006 and earlier "Abaci."
The One Last Ethical Bank? Bear Stearns Just Said No To The Goldman-Paulson Scheme, Did Not Pass "Ethics Standards"
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/18/2010 23:38 -0500Surprises these days come from everywhere: one day we find that some of the wealthiest hedge fund managers are only so thanks to clever schemes involving the enabling of investment banks who have the biggest rolodex of "putzes," finding the last remaining "greater fools" available, another day we discover that a deal that Goldman had no qualms about, was passed on by what may well have been the last remaining ethical bank, Bear Stearns. Greg Zuckerman, as pointed out by Wall Street Manna, in his book "The Greatest Trade Ever" describes Paulson's meetings with Goldman, Bear and Deutsche to "ask if they could create CDOs that Paulson & Co. could essentially bet against. Ironically, it was Bear Stearns that rejected the offer: "[Bear Stearns trader Scott Eichel] worried that Paulson would want especially ugly mortgages for the CDOs, like a bettor asking a football owner to bench a star quarterback to improve the odds of his wager against the team ... he felt it would be improper." Eichel told Zuckerman, " 'It didn't pass our ethics standards; it was a reputation issue, and it didn't pass our moral compass." Sure enough, Goldman et al (allegedly) took down Bear shortly thereafter, and gave it away to Jamie Dimon for pennies on the dollar. In the world of Wall Street, where everyone tries to destroy the dumbest, those who play by some ethical historical rulebook all end up seeing a "run" on their liquidity sooner or later.
Blast From The Past: Bear Stearns' 2006 Annual Global Credit Conference - Groupthink Defined
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 03/22/2010 18:11 -0500Ah, the halcyon days of 2006, when the bubble was cranking, rates were stable and rising, Bernanke was brand new and few realized he would was yet to become the destroyer of capitalism, when subprime was only known to a select few future billionaires, when Bear Stearns was alive and well and was organizing credit conference at the Waldorf Astoria (instead of arranging credit for itself in advance of going bankrupt in 2008) during which nobody said anything relevant (that includes Bear's then chief economist David Malpass) and where participants merely reinforced each other's fallacious groupthink, capped by Peyton Manning as keynote speaker of all people. Companies presenting were all the current and future LBO hits (which would soon undergo Chapter 22 and in some cases 33). We are only amazed that Bear hasn't risen from the dead to recreate the credit conference below, coupled with full bubble frothiness and all other bells and whistles.
Was Larry Summers Selling CDOs To Asian Sovereign Wealth Funds After The Collapse Of The Bear Stearns Hedge Fund?
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/13/2009 18:16 -0500The man cited to be Ben Bernanke's replacement if and when the stock market (not the economy) takes a decided turn for the worse, Larry Summers, has been implicated in an act that may make his transitioning into his role of running monetary policy for the world's biggest economy slightly more complicated. A report that was issued several months ago by Asia Times' blog discloses that the man who has President Obama's attention on all matters financial was in fact selling the AAA-rated tranches of toxic CDOs held by his former employer, multi billion hedge fund D.E. Shaw after the collapse of the CDO-loaded Bear Stearns hedge fund.
Fed Reports Over 30% Loss On Bear Stearns Mortgage Loans
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/23/2009 18:13 -0500Nothing like purchasing a major investment bank on the verge of bankruptcy with no due diligence (actually Ken Lewis would beg to differ). The Fed has reported a loss of 28% on its commercial mortgage loans and 38% on residential mortgage loans as a result of its participation in Maiden Lane, the Bear Stearns bail out vehicle.
Fed Reports Over 30% Loss On Bear Stearns Mortgage Loans
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/23/2009 18:13 -0500Nothing like purchasing a major investment bank on the verge of bankruptcy with no due diligence (actually Ken Lewis would beg to differ). The Fed has reported a loss of 28% on its commercial mortgage loans and 38% on residential mortgage loans as a result of its participation in Maiden Lane, the Bear Stearns bail out vehicle.




