Carry Trade

Just a matter of when?

Back in January 2010, when in complete disgust of the farce that the market has become, and where fundamentals were completely trumped by central bank intervention, we said, that "Zero Hedge long ago gave up discussing corporate fundamentals due to our long-held tenet that currently the only relevant pieces of financial information are contained in the Fed's H.4.1, H.3 statements." This capitulation in light of the advent of the Central Planner of Last Resort juggernaut was predicated by our belief that ever since 2008, the only thing that would keep the world from keeling over and succumbing to the $20+ trillion in excess debt (excess to a global debt/GDP ratio of 180%, not like even that is sustainable!) would be relentless central bank dilution of monetary intermediaries, read, legacy currencies, all to the benefit of hard currencies such as gold. Needless to say gold back then was just over $1000. Slowly but surely, following several additional central bank intervention attempts, the world is once again starting to realize that everything else is noise, and the only thing that matters is what the Fed, the ECB, the BOE, the SNB, the PBOC and the BOJ will do. Which brings us to today's George Glynos, head of research at Tradition, who basically comes to the same conclusion that we reached 2 years ago, and which the market is slowly understand is the only way out today (not the relentless bid under financial names). The note's title? "If 2011 was the year of the eurozone crisis, 2012 will be the year of the central banks." George is spot on. And it is this why we are virtually certain that by the end of the year, gold will once again be if not the best performing assets, then certainly well north of $2000 as the 2009-2011 playbook is refreshed. Cutting to the chase, here are Glynos' conclusions.

You've just crossed over...

Somehow the fact that the PIIGS can issue Bills (sub 1-year debt) in an environment in which both the ECB and the Fed have made any debt investment under 3 years risk free is taken as a positive sign. But in a continent starved for even the most optically irrelevant good news, this may be all it gets, which it did last night after Italy auctioned off €8 billion 182 bills at a 1.97% rate, the lowest since May. A far more relevant question is where peripheral debt with a maturity greater than 3 years, and thus with implicit risk, would price. But for now at least some of the banks appear to be dipping their toe into a very short-term carry trade, with ECB deposits declining from €484.1 billion to €464.8 billion overnight. Whether or not this is on the back of the assumption that a Greek default is contained remains to be seen: it would be truly laughable if Europe believes things are ok and thus underutilizes the next LTRO in one month only to find itself with a several trillion euro shortfall 3 weeks later. Yet this, being Europe, is the most likely outcome. Offsetting Bill issuance optimism is the ongoing uncertainty over the outcome of the Greek PSI talks, which for now at least have stalled with the cash coupon being the straw man sticking point. The truth is that if hedge funds want a default to proceed with international litigation arbitrage, that most lucrative of hedge fund strategies, they will get a default. Everything else is irrelevant. Below is Bloomberg's summary of how the newsflow is affecting markets.

Over the past month, much has been said about the recent 3 year LTRO, and its function in stabilizing the European bond market. Certainly it has succeeded in causing an unprecedented steepening in European sovereign 2s10s curves across the periphery (well, except for Greece, and recently, Portugal) as by implication the ECB has made it clear that debt with a sub-3 year maturity is virtually risk free, inasmuch at least as the ECB is a credible central bank (and if it is perceived as no longer being one, there will be far bigger issues), along the lines of what the Fed's promise to keep ZIRP through the end of 2013, and today's likely extension announcement through 2014. Yet does filling a much needed for European stability fixed income "black hole" equate to a catalyst for Risk On? Hardly, because as in a new note today Brockhouse Cooper analysts Pierre Lapointe and Alex Bellefleur explains, the LTRO is "not a catalyst for a risk-on rally as the central bank is substituting itself for funding sources that have “dried up.” Sure enough - all the ECB is doing is preserving existing leverage (especially in light of ongoing bank deleveraging), not providing incremental debt, something which could only be done in the context of unsterilized bond monetization ala QE in the US. So just over a month in, what does the LTRO really mean for Europe (especially as we approach the next 3 Year LTRO issuance on February 29)? Here is Brockhouse's explanation.

Lots of questions, and answers, from UBS in this Q&A on the Greek default/restructuring, much of it already covered previously, but the only one that matters is this: "Would the restructuring make the Greek situation sustainable? No. Sorry, but no is the answer. Even with full repudiation of the Greek debt, the situation would not be sustainable. In that event, the deficit would move to the primary balance, 5-6% last year. Not sustainable. And the current account deficit would be in the high single digits. Not sustainable either." So you're telling me there's a chance?

LTRO version 1.0 continues to capture the market's attention.  It was a reason to rally, then fade, now back to an excuse to rally. Our contention all along has been that LTRO was good for banks.  It dramatically reduced the liquidity risk for banks. It did nothing for the solvency of banks or sovereigns, and we continue to believe it doesn't do anything for the liquidity risk of sovereigns. We think the belief that the carry trade is at work is a fallacy. Banks did NOT take down LTRO to buy new assets and are still in deleveraging mode, so will NOT use the next LTRO offering to take on new money. We will see what happens but Peter Tchir believes that the second tranche of LTRO will be a pale comparison of the first in terms of size which will damage market excitement over how much of the "carry" trade is going on.

Following last week's Easter egg by JPMorgan, the misses by financials continue, with Citi crapping the bed following a big miss in both top and bottom line after reporting $17.2 billion and $0.38 EPS on expectations of $18.5 billion and $0.52 per share. The biggest hit to the top line was the DVA adjustment courtesy of tightening CDS spreads, which while adding to top and bottom line in Q3, took out $1.9 billion in Q4 - of course like everything else it was also priced in. And while we are confident the full earnings presentation will be a labyrinth of loss covering, the first thing to realize is that absent a $1.5 billion in loan loss reserve releases, the bank would have reported negative net income, which was $1.364 billion pretax. Yet there is no way to explain the absolute bloodbath in the Securities and Banking group, which saw revenues implode by 53% from $6.7 billion to $3.2 billion Y/Y, and down 10% Q/Q. Notably, Lending revenues down 84% from $1 billion to $164 million. RIP Carry Trade.

All your questions about the historic European downgrade should be answered after reading the following FAQ. Or so S&P believes. Ironically, it does an admirable job, because the following presentation successfully manages to negate years of endless lies and propaganda by Europe's incompetent and corrupt klepocrarts, and lays out the true terrifying perspective currently splayed out before the eurozone better than most analyses we have seen to date. Namely that the failed experiment is coming to an end. And since the Eurozone's idiotic foundation was laid out by the same breed of central planning academic wizards who thought that Keynesianism was a great idea (and continue to determine the fate of the world out of their small corner office in the Marriner Eccles building), the imminent downfall of Europe will only precipitate the final unraveling of the shaman "economic" religion that has taken the world to the brink of utter financial collapse and, gradually, world war.

Stock futures are up sharply after another week of unprecedented volatility. Although last week was relatively tame, only 13 times in the last 60 years has the S&P 500 had a down 1% day during the week between Christmas and New Year's.  We managed one of those days last week.  We also had a 1% positive day.  Futures are strong and looks like stocks will open above 1272 (where they closed on Jan. 3, 2011). Not only does volatility remain elevated, the stories are about the same. We have some new acronyms to contend with, but ultimately the European Debt Crisis (it is both a bank and sovereign crisis) and the strength of the US economy and China's ability to manage its slowdown are the primary stories. Issues in the Mid-East remain on the fringe but threaten to elevate to something more serious with Iran flexing its muscles more and more. So what to do?  Prepare for more headlines, more risk reversals, and more pain.

While nothing out of Italy or France was on the bond docket today, other countries in Europe will be issuing bonds on a virtually daily basis as the continent prepares to roll an record amount of debt in Q1, and in January as well (full calendar here). As such we saw new Bill issuance from Belgium and from Netherlands. The waffle country sold €1.280 billion in 3 Month T-Bills at a 2.13 Bid To Cover, a plunge compared to the 8.59 previously, albeit with the yield dropping from 0.78% to 0.264% as it falls flatly within the risk-free period defined by the 3 Year LTRO. Belgium also issued €1.155 6 Month T-Bills at a 2.01 Bid To Cover compared to 2.76 previously and a rate plunging from 2.438% to 0.364%. Elsewhere the Netherland also took advantage of the now mixed LTRO euphoria to sell €4.65 billion in Bills, specifically €2.99 billion in March 2012 Bills pricing at 0.00% (compared to negative -0.007% before), and €1.66 billion December 2012 Bills at a yield of 0.05% - obviously the market is still enamored with Netherlands as a safe haven on par with Germany. And speaking of the LTRO, that carry trade concept is now dead with the year end cash parking theory scrapped following the announcement thet banks parked the second highest amount in history at the ECB, or €446 billion, just shy of the €452 billion hit on December 27.

If you are looking to fill 20 minutes on this low volume pre-holiday 'trading' day with some sanity (away from the low correlation markets), look no further than the following interview between CMC Market's Michael Hewson and Roubini Global Economics' Megan Greene. From the evolution of the European sovereign debt crisis to a financial and political firestorm, the growing divergence between Merkel's demands and the rest of Europe's needs, to the band-aid plugs to practically unsolvable fiscal differences, she does an excellent job summarizing not just the problems, but the solutions' efficacy so far, and the troublesome future ahead. Furthermore, her perspective on the 3Y LTRO 'carry-trade' that it exacerbates the crisis and is a terrifying prospect fits with our view that while the prospect of this silver bullet is timely for year-end thin markets, the reality is far different (as we see in ITA and ESP bonds today). She notes that this effort will just strengthen the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking systems. Expecting multiple Euro exits, she sees more can-kicking with jolts from mini-crisis to mini-crisis as the political will is just not there for Germany - ever. Monetary union is really a political choice, and with as many countries dropping out as she expects (as austerity fatigue increases), there will simply not be the political will to keep the Euro project going any longer.

Following yesterday's €489 billion LTRO there are few things we know with certainty, primary among them is that the net proceeds from the 3 year refi operation are really €210 billion, due to the rolling of various other duration facilities which are already in use into the LTRO as discussed yesterday. What we do not know, is whether the net proceeds of €210 billion have been used by banks to purchase sovereign debt or as Peter Tchir suggested, are actually used in a reflexive ponzi whereby banks use the explicit ECB guarantee to buy their own debt. Perhaps the best evidence that the LTRO was an epic failure when it comes to subsidizing the peripheral bond market is the fact that hours after its completion the ECB was forced to jump into the secondary market and buy up billions in Italian and Spanish bonds: an action that was supposed to be conducted by the banks themselves. But let's assume that the entire €210 billion form the first LTRO (and there certainly will be more) is used to fund carry trades: what then? Well, luckily UBS has performed a mathematical analysis which looks at how much paper profit banks can extract from said trade and juxtaposes it with the most recent €115 billion capital shortfall calculated by the EBA in its most recent stress test (not to be confused with the second to last stress test which saw Dexia pass with the highest marks possible). The result: woefully insufficient . In other words, anyone who believes that the LTRO will be used by banks as a source of carry "profits" is massively deluded. If anything banks will find creative loophole to prop up their balance sheets and issue more of their own debt instead of chasing pennies in front of the bond vigilante rollercoaster by loading up on more sovereigns. Because the last thing Italian banks can afford is another late Novemeber blow out in yields which brought the system to within hours of imminent collapse.

Congratulations Ben: you succeeded in getting the 30s to a near record low level (and by far the lowest for 2011) , which also means that the entire curve will soon be flat as a pancake, killing Net Interest Margin, aka curve carry for the banks, momentarily. Good bye Bank of America. Have fun riding that bear market rally with no financial leadership for the next several years.

Zero Hedge was the first to observe the curious phenomenon of the collapse in the General Collateral-IOER carry trade following the implementation of the FDIC assessment rate back in early April (discussed in depth here) which continues to force repo rates far below where they would ordinarily be (and is generating an undue amount of stress on short end rates, impacting money markets, repo, and other shadow economy components, and also substantially complicating an unwind by the Fed if and when one occurs). But that's not all. As Barclays' Joseph Abate points out, another consequence, which is rapidly becoming appreciate by repo market players, is that up to a third of all Treasury repo volume now trades at sub zero rates, making life for money markets a living hell, which perhaps that was the goal all along... And while the fails rates for the time being has not picked up substantially (liquidity is still ample although if the Fed continues to pummel the market with its foolhardy sale of Maiden Lane II securities this may change, more on this later), it does present a complication for the Fed, should Bernanke decided to halt securities reinvestment. Granted it appears this will not be a major worry at a time when some believe QE3 is a given, and others believe QE2 Lite will be precisely the ineffectual, yet critical reinvestment of maturity securities.