Convexity

One of the largest potential volatility events for the equity markets this year will be the Q1 US Debtapalooza.  There are three main issues that are to be debated with a crescendo coming in late February – the Long Term Budget Deal, the 2013 Budget Deal and the Debt Limit.  There will obviously be many consequential threats and theatrics associated with these events – including potential threats for government shutdowns and debt defaults – while the very real consequences could be additional US ratings downgrades.  It is important to remember that outside of the 2008 shock, the Debt Ceiling Debate and consequent US Debt Downgrade in Summer 2011 created the biggest volatility event of the past two decades. Volatility metrics show that the market is extremely complacent heading into these events.

Despite the modest weakness in the long-bond, that so many herald as the next coming of the Great Rotation meme, it would appear that the longer-end of the Treasury bond term-structure actually flattened quite notably since the start of the year. Whether this bear-flattening reflects less extreme long-term concern of hyperinflation (small odds but high impact at long-end), mid-curve-based hedging (January was a massive IG issuance month and MBS convexity concerns are growing), or lower long-term growth/inflation expectations is unclear. But given the Fed's foot on the throat of the short-to-medium-term Treasury term-structure, the longer-end remains a marginally 'free' market and based on the chart below implies equities are well ahead of themselves as we draw a line under January 2013.

How casually, how frighteningly, The risks are now dismissed. Spain’s fall to junk, Greek exit, The looming fiscal cliff. For recent years do demonstrate, The power of QE.What matters sovereign solvency, When you have OMT?

These three letters - C.A.B. - might just be the Dis-Humor story of the day. NPR reports that more than 200 schools across California are coming to the shocking realization that the upfront cash they needed so badly came at quite a price. These 'Capital Appreciation Bonds' are unlike normal bonds (requiring regular coupon payments and principal repayment); instead they provide the 'lent' money upfront and defer all interest and repayment to some magical faery land time in the future (by which time the interest accrued has grown exponentially as the interest accrues on the rising 'principal plus previously accrued interest'). Brilliant - as the Guinness chaps might say. So California schools are now undertaking PayDay or loan-shark style loans defending the idiocy of super-short-term thinking with such statements as "Why would you leave $25 million on the table?" referring to the upfront cash that one Treasurer was able to get his hands on - with clearly no comprehension of the financial instrument's massive convexity. California State Treasurer Bill Lockyer said "It's the school district equivalent of a payday loan or a balloon payment that you might obligate yourself for, so you don't pay for, maybe, 20 years - and suddenly you have a spike... It's so irresponsible."

I recently received the following question from a friend of mine and wanted to share my thoughts with my market pals, and throw this out for feedback.  I would be particularly interested in hearing from my derivatives friends who are much more technically informed than I am on the subject.

“I was looking at something today that I thought you would probably have some comment on:  have you noticed how wide the out months on the VIX are versus the one or two month?  How are you interpreting this?”

From my viewpoint this has been a key debate/driver in the equity derivatives world for a good while now (I started having this discussion in early 2011 with some market pals and the situation has only grown more extreme since then).

Romney's apparent victory in the first Presidential debate was the worst outcome for U.S. stocks, for it gave false hope to a Republican sweeping into the White House. A more gradual acceptance of the November result would give the market a better chance to absorb the news with minimal impact. We are presented with a similar scenario with Washington’s addressing the fiscal cliff.  Optimistic comments about resolving the crisis has spawned gains in equities that are sustainable while losses resulting from downbeat remarks have offered profitable short term buying opportunities.  While much of this price action the past few days has benefitted from typical calendar money flows that will disappear in the middle of next week, some of the positive sentiment arises from the overwhelming belief that both sides can consummate a deal on the budget ahead of the December 31 deadline. The longer investors anticipate such a compromise, the more violently shares will tumble upon recognition that assuaging the crisis with a comprehensive solution will take extra innings.

Sometimes you just have to laugh; or else committing harakiri comes dangerously close to mind. Japan's increasingly terrifying fiscal situation combined with a central bank that is rapidly becoming the laughing stock of the world (though all the other central banks are merely mimicking its actions) is becoming so self-referential (with its almost total domestic ownership of government debt), so short-termist (with its dramatically high short-term funding requirements constantly rolling), and demographically challenged (with its elderly almost entirely reliant upon government transfer payments) that it is hard to comprehend how much longer this farce can carry on. We have previously discussed Japan's WTF charts, but the following collection from Deutsche Bank's Torsten Slok must be seen to be believed. For now - the problem in a nutshell is government-debt per working-age person in Japan will be $140,000 in 2016 - almost triple the rest of the G7.

We all know shorting volatility is dangerous. We learned our lessons from the financial crisis. We all meticulously read “The Black Swan” and then watched the scary movie adaption of the book starring Natalie Portman. We all know that this method produces a steady stream of smooth returns making people think you are a genius until the inevitable disaster forces you to pawn off your Nobel Prize. We all know that shorting volatility will cause you to go insane with a twisted psycho-sexual obsession to master the art of ballet. It’s picking up pennies in front of a convexity steamroller. Knowing these facts we would like to pose a question...Which is riskier right now? Shorting a collateralized far out-of-the-money S&P 500 index put or buying a “risk-free” US treasury bond? Hint: Now the market for safety has an efficient frontier on par with the penny in front of the steamroller trade? If you don’t find that scary then you’re not paying attention.

Hayman Capital's Kyle Bass is back and cutting through the caustic bullshit that surrounds every waking moment in this kick-the-can world. Dispelling the myth of our 'deleveraging' virtue, with global debt having grown from $80tn to over $200tn in the last ten years alone (a 10.7% CAGR) and the frightening reality of central bank balance sheet growth of 16% per annum, Bass concludes (rightly) that "you can't do this for very long" as governments infinitely leverage and central banks have begun the endgame of open-ended money-printing. Addressing the question of timing, Bass notes that while Europe and Japan are 'perceived' to be 'staying together' there are in fact devastating losses occurring (ask Greek bond-holders) and he firmly believes that "Germany will never go joint-and-several with the rest of Europe." The world sits at a place it has never been before in peace-time - as far as global debt balances and deficits - and that is why the global investing playbook is so hard. He goes on to address hyper-levered economies, delayed inflationary outcomes, and worries that the cost-push (lower GDP, higher CPI) prints are just beginning in Europe. As a fiduciary, and something all investors should consider, Bass states "Given what we see coming, our job is not to lose money!"

It would appear the concerns regarding rising rates in the Treasury Bond market are overblown - no matter how much the inflation break-evens spike. Implied volatility for the Interest Rate market is practically at all-time record lows currently as the Fed continues to remove duration and high convexity assets from the market. One thing concerns us though - the velocity of spikes in volatility once it gets down to these levels has empirically been tremendous - though we are sure this time it's different. In fact this time is different, since this time it is the Fed (as majority owner) that faces the pain from the now-marginal Minsky-like seller of Treasuries running away from inflation-flares (or China/Japan tensions) - and what would Treasury do without that pass-through ponzi revenue from the Fed's winnings? Or as Taleb wrote: "There is no freedom without noise - and no stability without volatility."

Retirement must be on again as the Dow creeps up to close at its highest since 12/28/2007 - no more reassuring sign that we need QE stat!! The high-yield bond ETF (HYG) also pushed to new highs - amid heavy volume - as it left its credit-spread and equity risk reality in the dust (as well as its intrinsic value) but who cares - QE/ESM/OMT/WTF - it's on like donkey kong. At least VIX kept some sense of rationality as it closed near its highs on the day, pricing in somewhat the binary concerns of the next 24-36 hours. Volume was nothing to write home about - nor was average trade size - as S&P futures rolled well off their highs to fall back below VWAP into the close and after-hours (when volume picked up). Commodities were mixed with Oil and Copper up, Gold flat and Silver down as the USD dropped (down 0.3% on the week) and stabilized after Europe's close. Treasuries leaked higher in yield (despite a record-breaking 3Y) but remain below Friday's peak-yield levels.

Only 17% of credit managers (real or leveraged) expect notable widening in spreads (a rise in risk) by year-end, according to Citigroup's most recent client survey. This increasingly extreme bullish sentiment seems dominated by the trend of inflows into real-money accounts (which have chased high-beta, high-yield, and peripheral exposure) whereas hedge funds have used this most recent rally to reduce exposure to the peripheral, notably limited their HY exposure, increased their leveraged loan (secured credit) positioning, and increased core exposure. There remains an over-arching belief that the trend in flows will continue and that these flows will dominate market movements - however, the divergence between European bank and high-yield credit exposures (real-money getting longer, leveraged money reducing/getting short) is as dramatic as it as ever been. The last time we saw such a bull/bear divergence between real- and leveraged-money was at the bottom in Q1 2009 (but that time real-money was short and hedgies were adding longs - and were right!) Although most will say "being bearish about September is so consensus", we doubt that many are positioned that way.

Back in March, the last time we saw a notable and relatively sustained rise in Treasury yields, we pointed out a potential driver for this 'apparent' weakness - the heaviness of investment grade corporate bond issuance. This drives relative selling pressure in Treasuries for three potential reasons: pre-emptive rate locks are positioned; managers hedge away interest-rate duration to lock in the 'spread' on the bonds as they are jig-sawed into existing portfolios; and most simply speculative rotation from Treasury bond 'cash' into new issues (thus avoiding the convexity issues associated with such low yields on existing 'secondary' bonds). As the charts below show, in March, as we noted at the time, issuance expectations (the forward calendar) were falling and we suggested Treasury yields would drop as this implicit selling pressure would also lift. While this time Gross and Singer have spurred some risk-aversion, no doubt, the IG calendar suggests a lifting of the selling pressure soon here too.

We previously observed that the US Treasury, under advisement of TBAC Chairman Matt Zames, who currently runs JPM's CIO group in the aftermath of the London #FailWhale and who will become the next JPM CEO after Jamie Dimon decides he has had enough of competing with the Fed over just who it is that run the US capital markets, would soon commence issuing Floating Rate bonds (here and here) as well as the implication that the launch of said product is a green light to get out of Dodge especially if the 1951 Accord is any indication (which as we explained in detail previously was the critical D-Day in which the Fed formerly independent of Treasury control, effectively became a subservient branch of the government, in the process "becoming Independent" according to then president Harry Truman). Sure enough, minutes ago the TBAC just told Tim Geithner they have given their blessing to the launch of Floating Rate Notes. To Wit: "TBAC was unanimous in its support for the introduction of an FRN program as soon as operationally possible. Members felt confident that there would be strong, broad-based demand for the product." Well of course there will be demand - the question is why should Treasury index future cash coupons to inflation when investors are perfectly happy to preserve their capital even if that means collecting 2.5% in exchange for 30 Year paper. What is the reason for this? Why the Fed of course: "Whereas the Fed had, as a matter of practice, reinvested those proceeds in subsequent Treasury auctions, Treasury must now issue that debt to the public to remain cash neutral. For fiscal years 2012-2016, this sums to $667 billion." Slowly but surely, the Fed's intervention in the capital markets is starting to have a structural impact on the US bond market. 

Despite some early angst, Treasury yields have been crushed lower today. Down 7bps from their European close levels, 30Y is trading with a 2.45% handle for the first time ever and 10Y now with a 1.39% handle. Both all-time record lows as the 2Y auctions with a 4x bid-to-cover as 2s5s flattens to almost five year lows as the Fed's ZIRP and Europe's NIRP has pushed investors to front-run into preservation of capital instead of pushing them out on the risk spectrum. For those who care (instead of preferring to listen to dividend-stock-touting talking heads), 10Y TSYs have plenty of room to run if rates keep falling (15% upside if Japanification takes hold) - which prompts the question - just what is the interest expense convexity for the Government if rates were ever to rise from here?