Counterparties

One of the main reasons why we have been not so focused on paper representations of real currencies (i.e., gold and silver) is that ever since the MF Global debacle, in which it became all too clear that if physical gold can be "hypothecated" via conflicting ownership, then there is no way that paper versions of precious metals are viable and indeed credible. After all, the only real owner at the end of the day is the certificate holder, which as we have explained before, is none other than DTCC's Cede & Co. Good luck collecting when the daisy chain of counterparties starts falling. Which leaves physical. And for a good sense of what the "real" price of the metal is, not one determined by institutions whose interest it is to preserve the hegemony of paper, one can either try to procure gold and silver at a retail merchant, or one can look to the premium of a dedicated physical ETF over spot. Such as Eric Sprott's PSLV which as of today is trading at an all time high premium of 30%! In other words, someone is willing to pay up to 30% over spot for the right to be closer to the physical metal than merely have a paper claim on a paper claim (pre hyper rehypothecation and what not). Incidentally the last NAV premium over spot record was back in April 2011 just as silver went parabolic and the entire commodity complex experienced the infamous May 1 takedown when it collapsed by $8 dollars in milliseconds on glaringly obvious coordinated intervention. Said otherwise, like back then, so now there is an actual shortage, manifesting itself in the premium. And while last time its was the price plunge which eased supply needs, we are not so sure how one will be able to spin a collapse of the current, far lower paper silver price.

The title is quite self-explanatory...

Yesterday we asked just who the counterparties on Lehman's Repo 105 transactions were. Today we get our answer: the parties that Lehman used exclusively to mask its true leverage ratio were Barclays, Mizuho, UBS, Mitsubishi, Deutsche Bank, KBC and ABN Amro. This is accompanied by disclosure from the Examiner that these Repos, which should logically have been cheaper to Lehman due to the overcollateralization compared to regular matched repo (remember: 105 instead of 100 plus a minor haircut), in fact were pricier, prompting Lehman staffers such as Mike McGarvey to speculate that counterparties may "try to squeeze Lehman." This is quite a critical development ahead of the lawsuit between the Lehman estate and Barclays (a Repo 105 counterparty), which not only refused to bail out Lehman in the 11th hour, but to subsequently go ahead and in the definition of a fire sale acquire Lehman Brothers' North American brokerage operations for pennies on the dollar, coupled with some serious additional trickery on the side. Another oddity: none of the counterparties were US-based. Did US banks know too well about the imminent collapse of Lehman and thus refuse to participate in the Repo 105 window dressing game? Or, much more relevantly, was Lehman terrified by retaliation of its US-based peers, (be it CDS or stock-based) and as a result refused to open up its deplorable balance sheet to them?

Over the weekend we posted a very critical paper by the Minneapolis Fed discussing the potential weakness with the various liquidity extraction mechanisms (in the absence of a Fed Funds rate hike). Today, the Fed goes one step further, after noting increasing pressure by its own members to commence a tightening policy, and has announced the expansion of its reverse repo program with Primary Dealers, by adding additional counterparties.And guess who the first expansion wave focuses on - why Money Market mutual funds of course. Let's just do all we can to drain the money market system asap, shall we.

"[A]t a centerpiece of the president's reform proposals is to give the government the tools to unwind, dismember, break up, sell these institutions without the taxpayer being put in the position of having to absorb their losses. That's one of the most important reasons why we have to get reform in place. We had no choice at the time other than to do this. And I'm, personally, very confident it was the right thing to do, and we did it in the best way possible for the American people." - Tim Geithner