Countrywide

Bank of America reported results earlier, which were somewhat amusing: reported earnings were $653 million or $0.03 per share. Yet the number that the market is fascinated by is the one arising from "negative valuation adjustments" of $4.8 billion, which included $1.5 billion in DVA "resulting from the narrowing of the company's credit spread", and resulted in a $0.28 per share addition. This is the same number that we were told to ignore when it did not help the bottom line. We will be told to ignore it again next quarter when spreads once again balloon, but for now it leads the market to see a $0.31 adjusted EPS number. In other words, one time items are to be ignored when negative, and praised when providing a "one-time benefit." These also included $0.8 billion in litigation expenses, which are also supposed to be excluded, even though the bank has now been sued by virtually everyone due to its Countrywide legacy portfolio. Yet all of this is accountant fudge heaven: there are only three things that matter. 1) The approaching refi cliff, in terms of tens of billions in maturities, including FDIC-funded TLGP, which are as follows: "$34B of parent company maturities in 2Q12 including the remaining $24B related to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program" 2) sliding sales and trading revenues which dropped from Q1 by $546 million from a year ago to $2.844 billion in FICC, and by $332 million in Equity income to $907 million; and finally 3) and reserve release gimmicks: specifically BAC took a $1.6 billion reserve release even as the net chargeoff percentage increased. Specifically look at the first chart below showing the $1.8 billion surge surge in junior-lien Non-Performing Home Equity Loans due to regulations finally catching up to reality. Also, the bank charged off more in Reps and Warranties than it reserved, even as everyone is now suing the bank for precisely this issue. And this is the environment in which the firm books profits from reserve releases?

There is a lot of talk about IG9 these days.  We think the JPMorgan 'Iksil' story has a lot more to do with tranches than with outright selling of the index. Noone knows what exactly is going on, but we think selling tranches without delta explains far more than just selling the index, given the size and leverage. Critically, in the end it is all speculation as what (if any) trade they have on but if our belief on this being a tranche exposure (for the thesis reasons we explain) then the explanation is far less scary.

A month ago, after causing a spike in cotton prices following the imposition of an export ban, India promptly overturned said surprising move following a surge in protest from not only various trade local groups, but more importantly China, whose already razor thin margins would become negative if input costs soared even further. The whole process lasted about 72 hours from beginning to end. Days after, desperate to fund ongoing budget shortfalls, the government shifted its attention to price controls in a market it knew China would absolutely not mind to having the price kept artificially low - gold. What happened then was an announcement by the government to impose to levy an excise duty on unbranded jewelry. The response was swift - a countrywide strike among India's jewellers who all went dark, crippling demand from one of the traditionally strongest gold markets in the world. And all this happening at a time when the wedding season is at its peak, with Akshaya Tritiya, one of the biggest gold buying festivals later in the month, making the period crucial for jewellers. As of hours ago, the Indian finance ministry has caved, and while it took three days to end the cotton export ban, it took three weeks to end the excise duty proposal, India's Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that the government would consider scrapping a budget proposal to levy an excise duty on unbranded jewellery. The result will be three weeks of pent up demand for precious metals being unleashed suddenly, likely pushing spot gold far higher, to where it would be had this latest artificial price control never been established.

5 days ago saw the 150th year anniversary of an event so historic that a very select few even noticed: the birth of US fiat. Bloomberg was one of the few who commemorated the birth of modern US currency: "On April 2, 1862, the first greenback left the U.S. Treasury, marking the start of a new era in the American monetary system.... The greenbacks were originally intended to be a temporary emergency-financing measure. Almost bankrupt, the Treasury needed money to pay suppliers and troops. The plan was to print a limited supply of United States notes to meet the crisis and then have people convert the currency into Treasury bonds. But United States notes grew in popularity and continued to circulate." The rest, as they say is history. In the intervening 150 years, the greenback saw major transformations: from being issued by the Treasury and backed by gold, it is now printed, mostly in electronic form, by an entity that in its own words, is "set up similarly to private corporations, but operated in the public interest." Of course, when said public interest is not the primary driver of operation, the entity, also known as the Federal Reserve is accountable to precisely nobody. Oh, and the fiat money, which is now just a balance sheet liability of a private corporation, and thus just a plug to the Fed's deficit monetization efforts, is no longer backed by anything besides the "full faith and credit" of a country that is forced to fund more than half of its spending through debt issuance than tax revenues.

Mortgage bondholders are threatening legal action over the $25 billion national mortgage settlement, which will give the five largest servicers credits for principal writedowns that the bondholders may be forced to take. As American Banker notes, the investors in those trusts were not a party to the settlement agreement, and now they are objecting to being forced into taking losses - to the banks' benefit - as a result of it. The government is forcing investors to take losses even though they were not responsible for the foreclosure process abuses that led to the banks' settlement with state and federal officials. "The banks are trying to pay these fines with our money," says Vincent Fiorillo (of DoubleLine). Chris Katopis, the executive director of the bondholder trade group, says it is considering its legal options, including filing a friend of the court amicus brief or suing servicers individually..."Banks are shifting their liability to first-lien investors that were innocent of robo-signing,". Bondholders are especially concerned about writedowns from Bank of America, which has privately securitized more than $285 billion worth of mortgages originated by Countrywide Financial Corp.

All you need to read.

Minutes ago on CNBC, Jim Cramer announced that Greg Smith will never get a job on Wall Street again as "one never goes to the press. Ever." Naturally, the assumption is that the secrets of Wall Street's dirty clothing are supposed to stay inside the family, or else one may wake up with a horsehead in their bed. There is one small problem with that. Now that compensations on Wall Street have plunged, and terminations are set for the biggest spike since the Lehman collapse, the opportunity cost to defect from the club has also collapsed. And if anything, Greg Smith's NYT OpEd has shown that it is not only ok to go to the press, but is in fact cool. So what happens next? Well, as the following Reuters article reports, 'whistleblowing' over corrupt and criminal practices on Wall Street is suddenly becoming the next growth industry. Yes - people may get 'priced out' of the industry, but since the industry will likely fire you regardless in the "New Normal" where fundamentals don't matter, and where the only thing that does matter is the H.4.1 statement (as Zero Hedge incidentally pointed out back in early 2010), why not expose some of the dirt that has been shovelled deep under the coach, and get paid some serious cash while doing it?

• Obama, Cameron discussed tapping oil reserves (Reuters)
• Greek Bonds Signal $2.6 Billion Payout on Credit-Default Swaps (Bloomberg)
• China leader's ouster roils succession plans (Reuters)
• China’s Foreign Direct Investment Falls for Fourth Month (Bloomberg)
• Greek Restructuring Delay Helps Banks as Risks Shift (Bloomberg)
• Concerns Rise Over Eurozone Fiscal Treaty (FT)
• Home default notices rise in February: RealtyTrac (Reuters)
• China PBOC Drains Net CNY57 Bln (WSJ)

And I thought securitization ment they where going to keep the loan docs in a safe place in some bank vault some where...

This is just a small example of what we are uncovering. If we learned anything from the robosigning scandal, if there are more than two “irregularities,” there are thousands.

Now everybody's bank bashing, of course the reason to bash the banks is 4 years old, despite Bove-like analysis to the contrary. I will discuss this on CNBC for a FULL HOUR tomorrow from 12 pm to 1pm.

Hubris is at the heart of this. Everyone says this cannot happen – we won’t allow it. Says who? The EU says: if it is written in an agreement, it must be totally correct, unchangeable, and followed at all costs. New realities can’t intervene and no slippage is allowed. Why the Germans are so sure that they know the future is beyond me. They are fallible too, but they won’t admit it, and the Greeks can’t make them budge. Haven’t they looked around? Santorini has a different economic and social cost structure than Wiesbaden. Humanity (and common sense) seems totally lacking in the negotiations with the Greeks and a violent backlash would be totally understandable. Why the countries that have been fattening up their current account surpluses selling products to Greeks, whom they should have known were basically broke – just as they always have been – should be paid 100% on the euro is beyond me. Major losses should apply not only to sovereign borrowings but also to accounts receivable for cars, electronics, and other consumer goods. The market has not opened its eyes to the impact this Greek unraveling will have. The Eurozone will be mortally wounded and the world will suffer a significant recession – maybe as deep as 2008. European banks will lose much of their capital base and many should be bankrupt, but just as in the Lehman aftermath, the governments will try to save the banks and the banks’ bondholders, solvent or not. As the bank appetite for Eurozone sovereign paper will be decimated, austerity will probably follow shortly, followed by deflation and uncontrollable money creation. The European recession should be one for the record books.

Isn’t it meaningless to look at the inverse floaters in isolation? To assess risk, shouldn’t we look at the entire portfolio held by Freddie Mac?

The CDS index market remains one of the most liquid sources of hedges and positioning available (despite occasional waxing and waning in volumes) and is often used by us as indications of relative flows and sophisticated investor risk appetite. However, as Kamakura Corporation has so diligently quantified, the broad CDS market (specifically including single-names) remains massively concentrated. This concentration, evidenced by the Honolulu-based credit guru's findings that three institutions: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank National Association, have market shares in excess of 19% each has shown little to no reduction (i.e. the market remains as closed as ever) and they warn that this dramatically increases the probability of collusion and monopoly pricing power. We have long argued that the CDS market is valuable (and outright bans are non-sensical and will end badly) as it offers a more liquid (than bonds) market to express a view or more simply hedge efficiently. However, we do feel strongly that CDS (indices especially) should be exchange traded (more straightforward than ever given standardization, electronic trading increases, and clearing) and perhaps Kamakura's work here will be enough to force regulators and the DoJ to finally turn over the rock (as they did in Libor and Muni markets) and do what should have been done in late 2008 when the banks had little to no chips to bargain with on keeping their high margin CDS trading desks in house (though the exchanges would also obviously have to step up to the plate unlike in 2008).

Call Your State Attorney General and "Just Say No"