Credit Conditions

Iron Ore prices have dropped 25% since the end of last year, sending the key steel-making component into a bear market after slumping by over 9% overnight - its biggest daily drop on record. We warned last week this was likely to happen on the heels of Copper prices fell on monetary financing fears as we explained here how Iron Ore replaced copper as the collateral pool for new loans (following China's clampdown on cash-for-copper deals last year) and stockpiles hit record highs. What is further hurting the Iron ore prices are concerns over China's new anti-pollution reforms which are set to close thousands of furnaces.

We noted last night that Iron Ore futures prices were in free-fall as the vicious circle of China's commodity-collateral-backed shadow banking system unwind hits home amid fears of contagion from the Chaori Solar default. The first domestic Chinese corporate bond default has retail investors running scared as surprise spreads that the local government did not come to the rescue. The deleveraging is now spreading to copper prices (remember the massive cash-for-copper schemes of last year) as borrowers are forced to sell to meet cash calls which in turn drops copper prices, reducing collateral values and tightening credit conditions even more. This is the biggest copper price drop since Dec 2011...

Shadow banks in China come in a variety of forms and guises. The term is applied to everything from trust companies and wealth management products to pawnshops and underground lenders. What surprising is that China’s biggest shadow bank is actually a creation of the central government and receives billions in financing directly from the banks.  Even more interesting, this shadow bank recently pulled off a successful international IPO where it raised billions of dollars...

In this part, we look at the question: Is gold a currency? Professor Tom Fischer answers, “Yes, gold is a currency with the symbol XAU”.

The 2008 crisis never ended as issues of excess credit and economic imbalances were never resolved. Turkey is the latest installment in the rolling crisis.

Backdrops conductive to crises can drag on for so long – sometimes seemingly forever - as if they’re moving in ultra-slow motion. Invariably, they lull most to sleep. Better yet, such environments even work to embolden the optimists. This is especially the case when policy measures are aggressively employed along the way, repeatedly holding the forces of crisis at bay. In the face of mounting risk, heightened risk-taking and leveraging often work only to exacerbate underlying fragilities. But eventually a critical juncture arrives where newfound momentum has things unwinding at a more frenetic pace. It is the nature of such things that most everyone gets caught totally unprepared. Now, Bubbles are faltering right and left - and fearful “money” is heading for the (closing?) exits. And, as the global pool of speculative finance reverses course, the scale of economic maladjustment and financial system impairment begins to come into clearer focus. It’s time for the marketplace to remove the beer goggles.

The Financial Times no less, warns its readers that they should act like the mighty German Bundesbank and "demand physical gold." The FT also added that gold price manipulation could end in tears.

As we first reported one week ago, the first shadow default in Chinese history, the "Credit Equals Gold #1 Collective Trust Product" issued by China Credit Trust Co. Ltd. (CCT) due to mature Jan 31st with $492 million outstanding, appears ready to go down in the record books. In turn, virtually every sellside desk has issued notes and papers advising what this event would mean ("don't panic, here's a towel", and "all shall be well"), and is holding conference calls with clients to put their mind at ease in the increasingly likely scenario that there is indeed a historic "first" default for a country in which such events have previously been prohibited. So with under 10 days to go, for anyone who is still confused about the role of trusts in China's financial system, a default's significance, the underlying causes, the implications for the broad economy, and what the possible outcomes of the CCT product default are, here is Goldman's Q&A on a potential Chinese trust default.

• Carney Guidance Threshold Strained as BOE Holds Policy (BBG)
• Does one laugh or cry: China Tells Banks to Improve Disclosures in Shadow-Lending Fight (BBG)
• Big Business Doubles Down on GOP Civil War With Tea Party (BBG)
• CIA sued for records on possible role in Nelson Mandela arrest (RT)
• Bridge Scandal Destroys Christie's 'Nice Jerk' Image (BBG)
• Borrowers Hit Social-Media Hurdles (WSJ)
• U.S. Leverage in Iraq Tested As Fears of Civil War Mount (WSJ)
• Austerity drive cuts into Chinese inflation (FT)
• Dish Pulling Its Bid for LightSquared (WSJ)
• BlackRock agrees to end analyst surveys (Reuters)
• Germany defends economic policies after US criticism (FT)
• Bank of Korea Holds Rate Even as Yen Clouds Export Outlook (BBG)

If one listens to Goldman's chief economist Jan Hatzius these days, it is all roses for the global economy in 2014... much like it was for Goldman at the end of 2010, a case of optimism which went stupendously wrong. Goldman's Dominic Wilson admits as much in a brand new note in which he says, "Our economic and market views for 2014 are quite upbeat." However, unlike the blind faith Goldman had in a recovery that was promptly dashed, this time it is hedging, and as a result has just released the following not titled "Where we worry: Risks to our outlook", where Wilson notes: "After significant equity gains in 2013 and with more of a consensus that US growth will improve, it is important to think about the risks to that view. There are two main ways in which our market outlook could be wrong. The first is that our economic forecasts could be wrong. The second is that our economic forecasts could be right but our view of the market implications of those forecasts could be wrong. We highlight five key risks on each front here." In short: these are the ten things that keep Goldman up at night: the following five economic risks, and five market view risks.

The world economy has experienced another year of subdued growth, having failed to meet even the most modest projections for 2013. Most developed economies continued trudging along toward recovery, struggling to identify and implement the right policies. Meanwhile, many emerging economies encountered new internal and external headwinds, impeding their ability to sustain previous years’ economic performance. Nonetheless, some positive developments in the latter part of the year are expected to gain momentum through the coming year. But the global economy is still subject to significant downside risks. In short, while the global economic outlook for 2014 has improved, policymakers worldwide must remain vigilant about downside risks and strengthen international cooperation. Developments in 2013 provide strong incentive for policymakers to do so.

• EU Fines Financial Institutions Over Fixing Key Benchmarks (Reuters)
• Euro-Area Economic Growth Slows as Exports, Consumption Cool (BBG) - someone has a very loose definition of growth
• Ukraine Officials Scour Globe for Cash as Protests Build (BBG)
• Oops: Franklin Boosted Ukraine Bet to $6 Billion as Selloff Began (BBG)
• Japan Plans 18.6 Trillion Yen Economic Package to Support Growth (BBG) - or about 2 months of POMO
• How Peugeot and France ran out of gas (Reuters)
• Iran threatens to trigger oil price war (FT)
• Abe Vows to Pass Secrecy Law That Hurts Cabinet’s Popularity (BBG)
• Brazil economy turns in worst quarter for 5 years (FT)
• Australia’s Slowdown Suggests RBA May Need to Do More (BBG)
• Biden calls for trust with China amid airspace dispute (Reuters)

It took Hilsenrath just under a minute to pump out his 1057 (excluding the title) word thesis on the FOMC minutes. As usual, this is indicative of a comfortable embargo cushion which one can be assured was unbreached, as anything else would be very illegal. "Federal Reserve officials had a wide-ranging discussion about the outlook for monetary policy at their Oct. 29-30 policy meeting. The bottom line was that they stuck to the view that they might begin winding down their $85 billion-per-month bond-buying program in the “coming months” but are looking for ways to reinforce their plans to keep short-term interest rates low for a long-time after the program ends.  They struggled to build a consensus on how they would respond to a variety of different scenarios. One example: What to do if the economy didn’t improve as expected and the costs of continuing bond-buying outweighed the benefits? Another example: How to convince the public that even after bond buying ends, short-term interest rates will remain low."

"I can only say: I'm sorry, America. As a former Federal Reserve official, I was responsible for executing the centerpiece program of the Fed's first plunge into the bond-buying experiment known as quantitative easing.... We were working feverishly to preserve the impression that the Fed knew what it was doing...  The central bank continues to spin QE as a tool for helping Main Street. But I've come to recognize the program for what it really is: the greatest backdoor Wall Street bailout of all time....  Having racked up hundreds of billions of dollars in opaque Fed subsidies, U.S. banks have seen their collective stock price triple since March 2009. The biggest ones have only become more of a cartel: 0.2% of them now control more than 70% of the U.S. bank assets.  As for the rest of America, good luck..... The implication is that the Fed is dutifully compensating for the rest of Washington's dysfunction. But the Fed is at the center of that dysfunction. Case in point: It has allowed QE to become Wall Street's new "too big to fail" policy."

The Fed will have to increase QE (not taper it) because systemic debt is compounding faster than production and interest rates are already zero-bound. Lee Quaintance noted many years ago that the Fed was holding a burning match. This remains true today (only it is a bomb with a short fuse). Thirteen years after the over-levered US equity market collapsed, eleven years following Bernanke’s speech, five years after the over-levered housing bubble burst, and four years into the necessary onset of global Zero Interest Rate Policies and Long-Term Refinancing Operations, global monetary authorities seem to have run out of new outlets for credit. In real economic terms, central bank policies have become ineffective. In other words, the US is now producing as much new debt as goods and services.