Creditors

Since the much-heralded 3Y LTRO program was envisioned and enacted, we have been clear in our perspective that while this appears to have signaled a removal of downside (contagion-driven) tail-risk for banks (and implicitly to sovereigns), the market's perceptions are once again short-termist. Missing the 'unintended-consequence' for the 'sugar high' is the forest-and-trees analogy that we have seen again and again for the past few years but we worry that this time, given the sheer size of the program, that the ECB has got a little over its skis. By demanding collateral for their bottomless pit of low-interest loans, the ECB has not only reduced banks' necessary deleveraging needs (and/or capital raising) but has increased risk for all bond-holders (and implicitly equity holders, who are the lowest of the low in the capital structure remember) as the assets underlying the value of bank balance sheets are now increasingly encumbered to the ECB. Post LTRO, Barclays notes that several banking-systems (PIIGS) now have encumbered over 15% of their balance sheets but LTRO merely extends a broader trend among European banks (pledging collateral in return for funding) and on average (even excluding LTRO) 21% of European bank assets are now encumbered, and therefore unavailable for unsecured bond holders, ranging from over 50% at Danske (more a business model choice with covered bonds) to around 1% for Standard Chartered. As the liquidity-fueled euphoria starts to be unwound, perhaps this list of likely stigmatized banks is the place to look for higher beta exposure to the downside (especially as we see ECB margin calls start to pick up).

Greece defaults & if it works, what makes anyone with a thirdof a synapse think that Portugal/Ireland will NOT jump in line to stiff creditors? This is more the end of the beginning than the beginning of the end of the crisis.

Minutes ago we presented Goldman's twisted and conflicted take on Greece in a post PSI world. Needless to say, virtually everything goldman says is to be faded. Which is why not surprisingly, the next analysis, a far more accurate and realistic one, does precisely that. In a just released report from Europe think tank OpenEurope, the conclusion is far less optimistic: "The deal sets the eurozone up for a political row involving Triple-A countries. At the start of this year, 36% of Greece’s debt was held by taxpayer-backed institutions (ECB, IMF, EFSF). By 2015, following the voluntary restructuring and the second bailout, the share could increase to as much as 85%, meaning that Greece’s debt will be overwhelmingly owned by eurozone taxpayers – putting them at risk of large losses under a future default. This deal may have sown the seeds of a major political and economic crisis at the heart of Europe, which in the medium and long term further threatens the stability of the eurozone."

That Goldman would have "thoughts" on the Greek PSI deal and European life in the aftermath, is no surprise: just be sure to take these with a pound of salt. After all Goldman is a key member of the ISDA's European Determination Committee (and co-chairman with JPM of our very own Treasury Borrowings Advisory Committee). Not to mention that Goldman is the firm that allowed the Greek default to happen in the first place, by allowing it to hide its unprecedented debt accumulation far beyond what was allowed by the Maastricht treaty. In either case, here is a summary of what Goldman sees happening next: "After the finalization of the PSI process, only small residual transactional uncertainty remains. The new Greece package ensures low funding costs that under certain assumptions could even be sustainable in the long term. Moreover, the exposure of the Greek private sector to the Greek government declines very substantially… …while the exposure of the European official sector rises to substantial levels. Late-April elections will be a risk; but polls suggest a pro-EUR government is the most likely outcome. The new government will be tasked with creating a better growth environment. Using our GES score, we observe key areas of structural improvement for Greece’s growth environment… …among others, the creation of a more business friendly environment, the establishment of conditions for increased openness to trade and a more effective rule of law." We will shortly present a far more realistic, and far less conflicted.

Only in Greece, can you wipe out €100 billion of debt, and have the new debt that replaces it trade at 20% of face value.  So 85.8% of Greek law bonds “participated”.  The government intends to use the Collective Action Clause to force the holdouts to participate.  It is unclear if the government has actually used the clause already, or just intends to.  Once they use the CAC, that will be a Credit Event for the CDS. English law bonds saw participation less than 70%.  The deadline has been extended until March 23rd.  As discussed all along, the English Law bonds gave some protection to holders and that clearly gave them the confidence to hold out.  Given the Event of Default covenants, and the right to accelerate, some bondholders may push to accelerate after the Greek law bonds get CAC’d. The market now knows that the PSI will be “successful” and a massive amount of debt will be wiped out, but the new bonds are being quoted “when and if issued” at prices ranging from the high teens to mid twenties.   Why are the new bonds so weak?  SUBORDINATION! 

All you need to read.

The biggest sovereign debt restructuring in history is now, well, history. The headlines are finally come in:

• GREECE ISSUES STATEMENT ON DEBT SWAP
• GREECE COMPLETES DEBT SWAP
• GREECE SAYS EU172 BLN OF BONDS TENDERED IN SWAP
• GREECE GETS TENDERS, CONSENTS FROM HOLDERS OF 85.8%
• GREECE SAYS 69% OF NON-GREEK LAW BONDHOLDERS PARTICIPATED

We learn that €152 of the €177 billion in Greek law bonds have tendered, which is 85.8%. This means that €25 billion in Greek law bonds have not - these are the hedge funds that could not be Steven Rattnered into participating, and will now sue Greece for par recoveries.This is also the number that ISDA will look at today to determine if, in conjunction with the CAC, means a credit event has occurred. And yes, the CACs are coming, as is the Credit Event finding:

• GREECE SAYS WILL AMEND TERMS OF GREEK LAW BONDS FOR ALL HOLDERS

While the general market mood is one of pre-default euphoria reminiscent of that in the pre-Lehman weekend, clouds may be brewing. As Reuters reports, "Some hedge funds have found a legal loophole they believe will force Greece to repay some of its debt in full, three sources close to the matter said on Thursday, in a move that would intensify the standoff between the country and its debtors." The loophole? A tiny €412.5 million bond issued by Hellenic Railways with a clause that "allows bondholders to argue that Greece is in default if it is trying to restructure or change the terms of its debt, the sources said. The creditors could already argue that Athens has defaulted, and if they buy up a quarter of that bond -- or enough of it not to be forced into the debt swap -- they can also then demand immediate repayment, a process known as acceleration." More: "The funds are now trying to buy up enough of the bond -- issued by state-owned Hellenic Railways and guaranteed by the government -- to force Greece to repay them in full, to the tune of some 400 million euros. If Greece refuses to do so, this may trigger similar provisions on other Greek railway bonds, potentially landing Athens with a bill of about 3 billion euros, with investors demanding immediate repayment, the sources said." Things could move very fast since the PSI results are due in 7 hours: "Sources close to Greece's negotiation fear the funds could already start the acceleration process by Friday, or next week, if they find they have a big enough majority."

Lies, damn lies and charts.  Why no one in charge dares utter the "F" word (fraud).

All you need to read.

The European Central Bank's recent LTRO programs have effected a significant increase in the amount of encumbered assets -- those pledged as collateral in repo transactions, central bank funding operations, and covered bond issuance as lenders increasingly demand over-collateralized borrowing arrangements to protect against credit risk -- on balance sheets across the pan-European banking system.

As the week's panacea event (no, not iPad3) draws ever closer, overnight news our of Argentina may be critical for any fence-sitting Greek PSI holdouts. As Reuters reports, a US judge has ruled in favor of a holdout creditor forcing Argentina to pay $650mm interest and principal on their long-forgotten defaulted/restructured debt. Argentina defaulted on $100bn bonds in 2002 and has yet to return to the international capital markets. While the Argentinians continue to litigate holdouts, the judge's decision in favor of these so-called 'vulture funds' (an affiliate of Elliott Management) offers renewed confirmation of considerable payouts in time for Greek bond PSI holdouts. Argentina's whiny reasoning that "bondholders who did not take part in the 2005 and 2010 debt swaps do not deserve full recovery because it is unfair to bondholders who accepted less" sums up the perspective of cram-downs and forced action that sovereigns will try to take. The vulture-fund litigation (and successful precedent here) blocks any new debt operations by Argentina until settlement is reached. This coincides with Bingham McCutchen's committee of Swiss-law Greek bond holders who look set to holdout or 'protect the rights of bondholders' as there appears to be several investors actively considering all of their options, including litigation - but as noted above, litigation can take years (though returns could conceivably be very large given par payouts of bonds trading sub-20% currently).

• Key rate for $350 trillion market in limbo - Libor Links Deleted as U.K. Bank Group Backs Away From Rate (Bloomberg)
• Rift Grows Between Germany's Bundesbank and ECB (Spiegel)
• Athens issues threat to bond holdouts (FT)
• SNB to Reveal Board Members’ Currency Transactions After Hildebrand Furor (Bloomberg)
• Sarkozy Floats New Corporate Tax (WSJ)
• Super Tuesday Ensures a GOP War of Attrition (WSJ)
• Martin Wolf - The pain in Spain will test the euro (FT)
• Refinancing Fees Are Reduced for Some F.H.A. Borrowers (NYT)

Paging the eurozone: Coercing banks to lend into a recession didn't work here in 2008. It made things worse.

All you need to read.