Demographics

While many draw comparisons to 1994's Fed actions, rate rises, and the subsequent economic and equity market performance, UBS' commodity team examines the five main drivers of that mid-90s disinflationary boom and how (or if) they are applicable in the US' current new normal. Their findings "this may be a 1994 redux, but it ain't no 1995 replay," as they note, in fact, it's a bear market waiting to happen. Every one of these processes is deflationary, not disinflationary. And they are self reinforcing. And deflation, in direct contrast to disinflation, is very bad for asset prices (with a serious equity and credit bear-market). So just as we have noted previously any taper will likely eventually lead to an 'un-taper' reflation effort (which will see gold once again strengthen) along with the exposure of the fallacy that the Fed really has become.

We take a new look at Japan from the 1980s to today in order to decipher what “Abenomics” might do to this fragile nation. We argue that moving Japan from its current stable, but unsustainable equilibrium, through activist monetary policy risk a run on the sovereign. We present part I and part II here today. We hope you enjoy it.

Positive demographic cycles have been one of the key components in the strong growth trends for a number of Asian countries. As Morgan Stanley note in their most recent 'China Deleveraging' discussion, the decline in the ratio of the non-working (elderly and children) to working-age (15-64 years) population has coincided with periods of economic boom for various countries in Asia in the past 50 years. But... as Nomura's Richard Koo notes - having experienced the very same unstoppable shift in Japan - "demographics will cease to be a positive for China’s economic growth and start to have a negative impact." Fundamentally, Koo adds, this means "the nation will grow old before it grows rich." Demographics, capital accumulation and productivity are the three most important drivers of potential growth, and these three factors are intertwined to a certain extent. China has already entered its first stage of demographic challenge, with its GDP growth slowing on the back of all three contributors of growth. Given the lessons of Japan and the Asian Tigers, China is set to suffer notably from this demographic drag - and its entirely foreseeable.

This morning’s news that the China leadership has launched a “mini-stimulus” package might confirm what we’ve long feared – China’s economic situation is more perilous than we thought. It looks like a comparatively modest supply-side package of tax cuts, export boosts and railway stimulus, designed to “arouse the energy of the market” according the State Council. But it could be the first of many new programs according to analysts. The state is clearly concerned. That it has been forced to act should be a wake up and smell the coffee moment for markets – the implications of China slowdown could be this year’s game changer in markets.

How far has the global economy come in its recovery from the financial crisis? Citi's ten-chart tour highlights that even now, six years after the financial crisis first erupted, the global recovery continues to face some very powerful headwinds. Among the most notable are drag associated with ongoing efforts to consolidate private-sector balance sheets, challenges with managing high levels of public debt and the eventual unwinding of central bank balance sheets, the still-incomplete pattern of adjustment in Europe, and deteriorating demographics across the advanced economies. We see these challenges as being mainly lodged in the advanced economies, where the global financial crisis raged most intensively. But the resulting softness of advanced-economy demand has become an increasing obstacle for growth in the emerging markets. The bottom line is that investors, central planners, and politicians alike are frustrated by the slow pace of global recovery.

When the city of Detroit filed for bankruptcy last week, it became the largest such filing in United States history. Detroit’s population has dropped from 1.8 million in 1950, when it was America’s fifth-largest city, to less than 700,000 today. Its industrial base lies shattered. And yet we live in a world where cities have never had it so good. More than half of the world’s population is urban, for the first time in history, and urban hubs generate an estimated 80% of global GDP. These proportions will rise even higher as emerging-market countries urbanize rapidly. So, what can the world learn from Detroit’s plight? Stories like Detroit’s have played out several times in developed countries during the last half-century. And, as the fate of Mexico’s northern towns suggests, emerging economies are not immune from this process. Detroit’s fate should serve as a warning, not only for China, but for the next generation of urbanizing countries (for example, India) as well. 

Projections based on high rates of endless growth are delusional. Those who embrace these projections are equally delusional. Attacking critics who have taken the time to study the data and trends is not going to magically make these programs sustainable or fix what's broken. Placing one's faith in government projections that always forecast high rates of endless growth (because "growth" fixes everything) is embracing delusion. Reality trumps accounting trickery and delusional projections every time. Let's see how accurate all the government agency projections (including the SSA Trustees) turn out in September 2015, at the end of fiscal year 2015.

The U.S. economy weakened appreciably in the first quarter of 2013. But what if this weakness persists into the second quarter just completed, and worsens still in the second half of this year? Q1 GDP, as reported on June 26th, was revised lower to just 1.8%. And various indications suggest that Q2 could come in slightly lower still, at 1.6%. Might the U.S. economy be guiding to a long-term GDP of 1.5%? That’s the rate identified by such observers as Jeremy Grantham – the rate at which we combine aging demographics, lower fertility rates, high resource costs, and the burdensome legacy of debt. After a four-year reflationary rally in just about everything, and now with an emerging interest rate shock, the second half of 2013 appears to have more downside risk than upside. Have global stock markets started to discount this possibility?

If you’ve wondered what the next recession might bring in the way of U.S. corporate earnings, you don’t have long to wait for an answer.  Analysts expect the 30 companies of the Dow Jones Industrial Average to post a meager 0.7% top line growth for the upcoming Q2 2013 reporting season.  If recent history – think all the way back to Q1 2013 – is any guide, that means we’ll actually see a decline in revenues for the just completed quarter once all the numbers are out.  And with Q1 posting an average negative 0.6% top line comparison to last year, that will constitute a “Revenue recession” for these large and generally well-managed multinationals.  If that makes you question why U.S. stocks are still up 15% on the year, look to both corporate profits (still at record highs) and the anticipation for a better second half.  Hope may not be a strategy, as the old saying goes, but it certainly moves markets.

Looking at the demographics of households with less than $30,000 a year in income, it appears they are mostly headed by retired people. As Visualizing Economics notes, households with incomes below $30,000 are more likely to be located in rural and urban areas than the national average... and looking at the the poverty rate by county, very low income households (under $23,000 for a family of four) are concentrated in places like Mississippi, Texas, and South Dakota.

Earlier we noted the rather peculiarly truthful (lack of optimistically-biased bullshit) annual report from the BIS as reading ZeroHedge-sermon-like. There is a smorgasbord of data, charts, and quotes strewn throughout the 204-page melodrama but one caught our eye. Reflecting on the fact that governments in several major economies currently benefit from historically low funding costs, and yet at the same time, rising debt levels have increased their exposure to higher interest rates, the BIS projects the dismal reality that any rise in interest rates without an equal increase in the output growth rate will further undermine fiscal sustainability. Although predicting when and how a correction in long-term rates will unfold is difficult, it is possible to examine the potential impact on the sustainability of public finances and how any normalization of rates (or Abe's success in creating 2% 'inflation' in Japan) leads the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio to explode to a surely-Krugman-mind-blowing 600% debt-to-GDP.

The economic and asset bubble in Japan burst in 1990, at roughly the same time as its demographic structure reached a tipping point. As UBS' George Magnus notes, the working age population began to fall, marking the start of a relentless rise in both the total and old age dependency ratios; and, he adds, a comparable phenomenon occurred in the US and Europe between 2005-2010. On current trends, Magnus warns, China will replicate at least the demographic part of this phenomenon between now and 2016, against a backdrop of rising concern about the structural nature of the slowdown in economic growth, along with rising credit intensity, indebtedness, and misallocation of resources.

Kyle Bass covers three critical topics in this excellent in-depth interview before turning to a very wide-ranging and interesting Q&A session. The topics he focuses on are Central bank expansion (with a mind-numbing array of awe-full numbers to explain just where the $10 trillion of freshly created money has gone), Japan's near-term outlook ("the next 18 months in Japan will redefine the economic orthodoxy of the west"), and most importantly since, as he notes, "we are investing in things that are propped up and somewhat made up," the psychology of negative outcomes. The latter, Bass explains, is one of the most frequently discussed topics at his firm, as he points out that "denial" is extremely popular in the financial markets. Simply put, Bass explains, we do not want to admit that there is this serious (potentially perilous) outcome that disallows the world to continue on the way it has, and that is why so many people, whether self-preserving or self-dealing, miss all the warning signs and get this wrong - "it's really important to understand that people do not want to come to the [quantitatively correct but potentially catastrophic] conclusion; and that's why things are priced the way they are in the marketplace." Perhaps this sentence best sums up his realism and world view: "I would like to live in a world where it's all rainbows and unicorns and we can make Krugman the President - but intellectually it's simply dishonest."

"Part of my advantage, is that my strength is economic forecasting, but that only works in free markets, when markets are smarter than people. That’s how I started. I watched the stock market, how equities reacted to change in levels of economic activity and I could understand how price signals worked and how to forecast them. Today, all these price signals are compromised and I’m seriously questioning whether I have any competitive advantage left. Ten years ago, if the stock market had done what it has just done now, I could practically guarantee you that growth was going to accelerate. Now, it's a possibility, but I would rather say that the market is rigged and people are chasing these assets, without growth necessarily backing confidence. It's not predicting anything the way it used to and that really makes me reconsider my ability to generate superior returns. If the most important price in the most important economy in the world is being rigged, and everything else is priced off it, what am I supposed to read into other price movements?" - Stanley Druckenmiller

What assets will the core/Empire protect? Those of the core. What will be sacrificed? The periphery.