Discount Window

Today the ECB is expected to do absolutely nothing, although many have their hopes up that at the post announcement press conference Mario Draghi may possibly hint at some more easing (with what collateral we wonder, and with what Germany) to bring some spring into the step of a continent that has milked $1.3 trillion in 3 year repo/discount window borrowings for all their worth and then some. And instead if the ECB cuts its rate below the psychological barrier of 1% today, or at any time over the next several months, it will make Hugh Hendry once again that much richer. Recall as of November: "He’s made bets that he says will deliver a 40-to-1 return if the ECB cuts rates below 1% next year." Below is a full rundown of what to expect, and not to expected, from the former Goldmanite, now head of the central bank for the world's biggest economic region.

At least that is the bogey according to JPMorgan's Pawan Wadhwa, who in a note announced that the ECB may resume SMP purchases if the 10 year hits 6.5% (as in a few hours), much to the chagrin of Germany, which was foosed into believing LTRO 1+2 would mean no more SMP purchases. More importantly, since the 6.50% barrier will be taken down with impunity in days if not hours, and the SMP has proven time and again to be powerless to prevent mass selling, the next big bogey is 7.50% at which the ECB will likely announce another 3-year Discount Window bazooka, pardon, LTRO. What JPM does not say is that with the halflife of each successive LTRO getting cut in half, LTRO 4 will be needed in June, LTRO 5 in July, LTRO 6 in July, LTRO 7 in July and so on. Most importantly, now that banks, who are desperate for some cash infusion from either the Fed or the ECB, know what the critical threshold bogey for action is, they will be sure to facilitate the ECB's life, and send Spanish 10 Years plunging to at least 7.50% and demand Draghi play ball, again. In other words: now that the market knows what the consensus is to get more European QE, it will promptly do it. After all the LTRO was never for the benefit of the countries: it was always and only to benefit Europe's insolvent banks. If that means "Greecing" Spain in the process, so be it.

And like that, Europe is broken again. Following a spate of negative European data (what else is there), including a miss in German industrial production as well as a miss in UK manufacturing output, all eyes are again on Spain, especially those of the bond vigilantes, who have sold off the sovereign European bond market, sending the Spanish-Bund spread to over 400 bps for the first time since December 2011. The main reason today: a Goldman report saying Spain will unlikely meet its 2012 and 2013 budget targets, as well as JPM Chief Economist David Mackie saying Spanish government "missteps" have raised questions about its credibility, making investors reluctant to purchase Spanish debt. Stress has returned to periphery, if it broadened into bank funding markets more LTROs would be forthcoming; if that “failed to hold yields at an appropriate level” Spain may need assistance from the EFSF/ESM and the IMF. Euro area unlikely to return to stability in sovereigns without some burden sharing; nominal growth likely to stay below borrowing costs, making fiscal targets “all but impossible to achieve”. UBS piles in saying Spanish banking stresses still haven't been addressed. Finally, a big red flag is that market liquidity is once again starting to disappear, and as Peter Tchir points out, Main is now being quoted with 3/4 bps bid/ask spread, all the way up to 1 bps spread. In other words, as we have been warning for weeks, the period of fake LTRO-induced calm is over, and the market is demanding more central planner liquid heroin. The question becomes whether Europe has even more worthless collateral in exchange for which the ECB will continue handing out discount window money in sterilized sheep's clothing. Yet nowhere is the resumption in risk flaring more evident than in the Swiss Franc, where the EURCHF all of a sudden broke through the critical 1.20 SNB floor, which was set back in September 2011, the day gold was trading at its all time high. Said otherwise, everyone is once again scrambling for safety. And since they can't get it in the CHF, it is only a matter of time, before gold resumes its ascent as the paper currency alternative that sent it to its all time highs late last summer.

No surprise in today's ECB announcement. The Press conference in 45 minutes is also expected to be largely a non-event, although we will be delighted to hear Mario's response to the quality of Europe's collateral backing the trillions in fresh discount window borrowings spent on buying up Spanish and Italian bonds, which are gradually going underwater.

Oh where to begin. The weakness in the markets started late last night when Australia posted a surprising second consecutive deficit of $480MM on expectations of a $1.1 billion surplus (with the previous deficit revised even higher). This is obviously quite troubling because as we pointed out 3 weeks ago when recounting the biggest Chinese trade deficit since 1989 we asked readers to "observe the following sequence of very recent headlines: "Japan trade deficit hits record", "Australia Records First Trade Deficit in 11 Months on 8% Plunge in Exports", "Brazil Posts First Monthly Trade Deficit in 12 Months " then of course this: "[US] Trade deficit hits 3-year record imbalance", and finally, as of late last night, we get the following stunning headline: "China Has Biggest Trade Shortfall Since 1989 on Europe Turmoil." So who is exporting? Nobody knows, but everyone knows why the Aussie dollar plunged on the headline. The shock sent reverberations across Asian markets, which then spilled over into Europe. Things in Europe went from bad to worse, after Germany reported its February factory orders rose a modest 0.3% on expectations of a solid 1.5% rebound from the -1.8% drop in January. But the straw on the camel's back was Spain trying to raise €3.5 billion in bonds outside of the LTRO's maturity, where the results confirmed that it will be a long, hard summer for the Iberian country, which not only raised far less, or €2.6 billion, but the internals were quite atrocious, blowing up the entire Spanish bond curve, and sending Spanish CDS to the widest in over half a year.

A core piece of last week's European newsflow was that following much pushback, Angela Merkel, who understands the underlying math all too well, finally dropped her opposition to expanding the European "firewall" in the form of a combined EFSF and ESM rescue mechanisms, to bring the total "firepower" to €800 billion (ignoring for a moment that when the true dry powder of the combined vehicle is just about €500 billion net as explained here, hardly enough to rescue Spain, let alone Italy). Yet as has been explained here repeatedly, and as Merkel has figured out, this is easily the most symbolic expansion of a rescue facility ever. Because while the ECB's agreement to allow Eurobanks to abuse its €1 trillion discount window for three years (which is what the LTRO is), following the replacement of JC Trichet with a Goldman apparatchik, at least infused the system with $1.3 trillion in new fungible liquidity (and resulted in a stock market performance boost for the ages, one which is now unwinding), the 'firewall" does not represent new money, nor is a "firewall" to begin with - it is merely one massive contingent liability which will remain unfunded in perpetuity. Slowly the German media is waking up, and in an article in Der Spiegel, the authors observe that "Even a 1-Trillion Euro Firewall wouldn't be enough." And they are correct, because the size of the firewall is completely irrelevant, as explained later. All the "firewall" does is shift even more backstop responsibility on the only true AAA-country left in the Eurozone, Germany. However, the main cause of problems in Europe - a massive debt overhang which can at best be rolled over but never paid down due to the increasingly lower cash flow generation of Europe's (and America's) assets, still remains, and will do so until the debt is finally written down. However, it can't because one bank's liability is another bank's asset. And so we go back to square one, which is that the system is caught in the biggest Catch 22, as we explained back in 2009. We are glad to see that slowly but surely this damning conclusion is finally being understood by most.

In the not quite 100 years since the founding of your institution, America has exchanged central banking for a kind of central planning and the gold standard for what I will call the Ph.D. standard. I regret the changes and will propose reforms, or, I suppose, re-reforms, as my program is very much in accord with that of the founders of this institution. Have you ever read the Federal Reserve Act? The authorizing legislation projected a body “to provide for the establishment of the Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper and to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.” By now can we identify the operative phrase? Of course: “for other purposes.” As you prepare to mark the Fed’s centenary, may I urge you to reflect on just how far you have wandered from the intentions of the founders? The institution they envisioned would operate passively, through the discount window. It would not create credit but rather liquefy the existing stock of credit by turning good-quality commercial bills into cash— temporarily. This it would do according to the demands of the seasons and the cycle. The Fed would respond to the community, not try to anticipate or lead it. It would not override the price mechanism— as today’s Fed seems to do at every available opportunity—but yield to it.

Update: yup. It's Jon "Mouthpiece" Hilsenrath all right. This is nothing but a test to gauge if the market will ramp on the clarification that future QE may be sterilized. If market ramps regardless, the sterilized clause will be ultimately eliminated. Full story link.

While we have yet to see the actual report, almost certainly emanating from Jon Hilsenrath, it appears that the QE3 rumormill has started, initially with speculation that the Fed's activity will be merely "sterilized" or more Twist-type purchases, unclear however if in TSYs or also in MBS. Via the WSJ:

• Fed Officials consider "sterilized" option for Future bond buying
• Operation Twist Reprise, QE Other Options For Fed Bond
• Still Unclear Whether Fed Will Launch Another Bond-Buy

As a reminder, yesterday we said that according to the EURUSD, the implied market expectation is for a $750 billion QE out of the Fed. However, that is for unsterilized balance sheet expansion. If the Fed goes ahead and does not grow its balance sheet (hence "sterilized"), it may well be EURUSD, and thus risk, and gold, negative, as no new money will enter the market for actual speculation. Which perhaps is precisely what the Fed is planning, as every incremental dollar now goes into Crude first, and everything else later. In other words: this is a very big risk off indicator as no new money will be available to pump up stocks!

Just like the first time around, the net gain from the LTRO when taking into account rolling off instruments, will be lower than the Gross amount. How much? According to SocGen, the final number by which the ECB's deposit account will increase will be about €210 billion less than the overhead number. From SocGen's Lauren Rosborough: "The LTRO outcome: €529.53bio was allocated to 800 institutions (compared with €489.19bio allocated to 523 institutions in Dec). The net increase, according to our economists, is €311bio (adjusted for yesterday’s MRO reduction, 3m LTRO allotment this morning, and the roll-off of the 3m and 6m LTROs tomorrow). The allocation was above our and at the upper end of the market range of expectations. After a brief and limited positive risk move (AUD/USD spiked to 1.0857), currencies are broadly unchanged and the EUR/USD is lower, possibly reflecting positioning unwinds. The LTRO outcome opens the way for further positive risk moves (high-beta, non-Japan Asia, lower DXY) but recent price action suggests to us that the rally is fatigued." Net: this means that following settlement, European banks will park not €500 billion but up to €810 billion with the ECB, on which they will collect 25 bps (while paying 1%, aka inverse carry as described here first). It also means that in three years Europe's bank will have to not only pay the ECB €1 trillion in case (assuming there is no perpetual rollover of the LTRO, which there will be), but also delever by another €2.5 billion, for net asset drop of €3.5 trillion. Good luck building up shareholder equity by the same amount to offset unchanging liabilities.

Since for all intents and purposes the ECB's LTRO is equivalent (and likely accepts even 'looser' collateral) to the Fed's massive (for its time) liquidity injection following the failure of Lehman, a good question is what happened to stocks after the Discount Window usage spiked back in the fall of 2008. Spoiler alert: nothing good.

Goldman waited exactly 20 minutes to try to comfort the market, especially the EURUSD which is getting increasingly jittery, that €1 trillion in Discount Window borrowings is a "positive." We beg to differ that trillions in more debt collateralized by candy bar boxes and condoms will cure an excess debt problem, especially with all the good collateral now gone, and we are confident that ongoing deleveraging needs will put a major cog in the system, especially since the only liquidity expansion move now is "fade", at least until the next major crisis.

The results for the second European 3 year discount window operation, pardon LTRO are in, and the winner is...

• ECB ALLOTS EU 529.5BLN IN 1,092 DAY REFINANCING TENDER
• ECB SAYS 800 BANKS ASKED FOR THREE-YEAR LOANS

Since the expected range was €200 billion - €1 trillion, and just above the median €500 billion, this is clearly within expectations, however notably less than what the Goldman investor survey expected at €680 billion. What is certainly scary is that the number of banks demanding a hand out was a whopping 800, well above the 523 from the first LTRO: clearly many banks are capital deprived.

So it starts - the ECB has just announced its request for bids for the next all important 3 year (1092 Day) Discount Window, pardon, LTRO operation, which is fully priced in now (and following which the market will look toward the Fed for future easing - enter Bernanke and his Humphrey Hawkins testimony tomorrow), and which will create even more negative carry for Euro banks, as the insolvent hedge fund formerly known as the ECB lends out cash at 1% (in exchange for what can generously be described as used candy bar wrappers) and pays back 0.25% on the same cash redeposited back at the ECB. For the results of operation tune in at 11:15 am tomorrow local time or 5:15 Eastern. The only practical result of this operation will be the expansion of the ECB's deposit facility to the mid €700 billions. As for what the final size of the LTRO will be, just ask your hotdog vendor: he has as much guidance as anyone else. Regardless of the size outcome, one thing is certain - the banks that are found to use the ECB's Discount Window should prepare for major stock pain, as the market, devoid of easy targets, focuses on them next as the European stigma trade becomes the hedge fund divergence trade du jour. After all there is a reason why the Fed's Discount Window expansion lasted for all of 3 months, and ended up hurting the participating banks (ahem Dexia) more than any other Fed concoction during the early stages of the Depression.

Earlier today, we presented a Top-Down analysis via SocGen of Wednesday's ECB massive extended Discount Window operation, also known as the second 3 Year LTRO operation (whereby we once again remember that unlike the Fed, the ECB is fully unaware of the adverse consequences of the stigma associated with borrowing last ditch liquidity, but when all else has failed, one has to do what one has to do). And while we will conclude our LTRO preview series with LTRO 2 103: Bottoms-Up, as a courtesy fo those who are fine-tuning their LTRO stigma trade (long banks that will not participate in the upcoming LTRO, short banks that will) SocGen's prediction of which banks will take down LTRO 2 funding, and how much. Draghi said there is no stigma trade. We proved him wrong, at least in the interim. LTRO 2 will finally decide who is right and who is wrong.

A big reason for the dour mood overcast on the market this morning is the failure of G-20 to resolve latent funding issues, with the IMF demanding more money from Germany for a global firewall, and Germany demanding more money from everyone else. A way to summarize events is that in lieu of any credible collateral left (the bulk of it has and will be pledged with the ECB in its discount window, aka LTRO operations, to keep Italian bonds bid and thus perpetuate the fallacy that things are under control), the world is now running out of ideas how to even kick the can down the road. Which is not a good sign as much kicking remains with tens of trillions in debt rollover coming up in the next few years. Below is Art Cashin's summary of this weekend's disappointing G-20 weekend retreat in Cabo san Lucas, which enjoyed the scenery but did nothing to easy the confusion over who pays for what in the next few weeks.