European Central Bank

Most publications talk about the 10B or 17B Cyprus bailout.   Let’s take a pop quiz on the right answer:

(a) 17B Euros (89% of GDP)
(b) 10B Euros (52% of GDP)
(c) 2.5B Euros (13% of GDP)
(d) -3.0B Euros (-15% of GDP)
(e) -7.5B Euros (-39% of GDP)

Now let’s work through the answers... (hint: we don’t see any version of the numbers where Cyprus is not a net creditor to the EU bailout regime, as opposed to a net beneficiary.)

The sound and fury of a European leadership denying the template-nature of Cyprus was deafening last week following D-Boom's comments and while we suspect the Cyprus deal was from unique and exceptional, it is clear, as Citi's Matt King notes that Cyprus’ significance was always going to stem more from the precedent it created than from its size. In choosing a relatively conventional good bank, bad bank model, the authorities have done much to alleviate the damage that would have been caused by an arbitrary tax on uninsured depositors. But the very “success” of the solution now being adopted seems likely to lead to its replication elsewhere. While arguably good news for the sovereigns and for longer-term growth prospects (though the chasm to be crossed to that growth is treacherous), its negative repercussions for senior bank bondholders still seem far from being priced in. The Cyprus model has three key features, which highlight the effective elimination of many of bondholders’ supposed protections: hasty implementation under national legislation, application to all bonds by statute, and extremely low recoveries. Against this, of course, is the argument - noisily voiced by the authorities - that Cyprus is unique. We, like King, disagree.

There are many lessons and implications from the Cypriot crisis (we list 25 here). Among the most important is that conditionality is back, energetically, which is very important when considering the circumstances under which other, bigger, countries might access ESM or OMT. We believe, like BNP's James Mortimer-Lee, that the market has been too complacent, seeing OMT and “whatever it takes” as unconditional – that’s wrong. A second lesson is that a harsher line is being taken by the core. This partly reflects more effective firewalls, so that core countries are more willing to “burn” the private sector, where doing so does not represent a serious systemic risk. Cyprus may not be a template, but we have seen enough to glimpse what the new pan eurozone bank resolution system could look like. Risk for certain classes of stakeholders in banks has risen. We are a long way from seeing the eurozone crisis resolved.

Suddenly it should be dawning on a lot of Europeans that deposit-guarantee limits matter. In Slovenia, the maximum is 100,000 euros per depositor, the same as in Cyprus. (Deposit- insurance programs vary among the 17 countries that use the euro.) For a few days last week, it looked as if customers at Laiki and Bank of Cyprus would lose even some of their insured deposits, which would have been a sacrilege. That plan was scrapped, but could resurface elsewhere for all we know should some genius at the German Finance Ministry insist upon it. The one constant among bailouts of euro-area countries is that there is no rhyme or reason, much less fairness, in the way many details get worked out... So far, there have been no signs of a mass exodus in countries such as Italy or Spain. But deposit migrations can happen slowly, with lots of time passing before they appear in official statistics. Or maybe little will change and most bank customers will go on believing “it can’t happen here,” until one day it does.

When governments begin doing things that are extreme and outside of the normal patterns of behavior then it is not a stretch to say that they are in trouble. They are responding this way because they are in a critical and perhaps life threatening situation. They do not tell the truth about sovereign finances and cover up everything at the ECB but they must be looking at the real numbers and experiencing some sort of epileptic fit. I would say that you can now speculate in Europe. I would say that you can bet in a manner no different than a casino. Actually no; I would say it is worse. You can put your money down and then the dealer can say, "New Rules, Game Change; all the money on the table is required for the House and it is now mine." If you had suspicions before; they have been confirmed. Anything, everything can and might be done and then justified by the unwillingness of the nations in Europe to pay for any more of a troubled country's difficulties. Whatever boundaries that existed have been breached. There is no Law, no fences and no limits. First Greece and now Cyprus and Pandora has raised the lid on her Box.

An oveview of the technical condition of the major currencies.  Offered as a compliment to macro analysis.  

No, it wasn't Ben Bernanke or Alan Greenspan, it wasn't Jean-Claude Trichet or his successor Mario Draghi, nor was it Mervyn King, Carney, Shirakawa, or Hildebrand. The answer, as shocking as it may sound, was...

It appears the European Central Bank is having trouble keeping its lies straight. When Jeroen Dijsselbloem ("Diesel-BOOM", "D-Boom", or just "Diesel") made his now infamous "template" comment last week, reality was shattered for many trend-following, momentum-monkey, hope-and-dreamers that actual real monetary pain could exist for a bank that was entirely incompetent (and insolvent). Instantly the rest of Europe stepped up to deny-deny-deny (as did D-Boom himself) explaining this was a 'unique' situation with French ECB Director Benoît Coeuré explicitly stating that Cyprus is not a model for future bank rescues. However, as Reuters reports, it appears fellow-Dutchman and ECB Governing Council member Klaas Knot said last night that there was "little wrong" with J-Boom's comment and that "the content of his remarks comes down to an approach which has been on the table for a longer time in Europe. This approach will be part of the European liquidation policy." Further confirming D-Boom's perspective, Knot added that, "there has to be transparency about losses in the banking sector... and banks have to wind down their loss-making operations." It seems that in 2012 the ECB split was between the Germans and Draghi on unlimited inflation threats; in 2013 it will be between those who want bail-ins and bail-outs.

In one of a few early hints that Europe might surprise the world with its Cyprus bailout, on February 10th the Financial Times leaked the content of a secret EU memo. It reported that bank depositor haircuts were among three options being considered to reduce bailout costs. And the memo also warned ominously that “such drastic action could restart contagion in eurozone financial markets.” Clearly, policymakers decided to take their chances. And now we’re living through the contagion that the memo’s authors predicted. But what exactly does that mean? Sure, we can see volatility in asset prices, but how long will it last? Some pundits say it’ll blow over like a late afternoon shower on an otherwise sunny day. I disagree. I’ll suggest there’s more to it than rising market volatility and that we should take a closer look at the meaning of contagion. I’ll argue there are three different types at work today: vanilla contagion, latent contagion and stealth contagion. And when you add up the three effects, Cyprus will have a bigger global impact than many expect.

For the last year or so, Mario Draghi (the omnipotent head of the ECB) has discussed 'market fragmentation' as a major concern. The reason is clear - his easy money policies are entirely ineffectual in a monetary union when his actions do not 'leak' out to the real economy. Nowhere is this fragmentation more obvious than in the inexorable rise in peripheral lending rates (to small business) compared to the drop (over the last 18 months) in the core. Simply put, whether it is demand (balance sheet recessionary debt minimization) or supply (banks hoarding for safety), whatever the punch ladeled from the ECB's bowl, it is not helping the most needy economies. Of course, that was never really the point anyway - as we have pointed out many times; the actions of the ECB are (just as with the Fed) to enable the banking system to live long enough to somehow emerge from the black hole of loan losses and portfolio destruction that they heaped upon themselves. This chart is yet another example of proof that monetary policy is entirely ineffectual in the new normal - and yet the central planners push for moar...

Gold rose 1.1% in March, its first monthly rise in six. 

For the quarter, gold was 4.5% lower in dollar terms and 1.4% lower in euros. However, signalling that the demise of gold is greatly exaggerated, gold is 3.7% higher in Japanese yen and 2.6% higher in sterling.

As one astute financial journalist said to me “ ‘cash in the bank’ doesn’t have quite the same ring to it anymore.”

Far from being a unique situation, the fragile exposure of unsecured depositors across the Euro zone is the norm; and their fragility was further increased in the last twelve months thanks to policies created by the same authorities who now refuse to honor their promise of a banking union, and instead impose capital controls, which have effectively destroyed any credibility on the safety of capital in the Euro zone. However, even if one accepts my view, the unintended outcome begs the following question: Why was there cheap money available for subordinated debt holders to cash out, but there is none now to protect the savings of depositors?

• Lesson #1 Government agencies allocate capital better than the private sector
• Lesson #2 Central banks should control asset prices and prevent them from falling
• Lesson #3 Darwin & Schumpeter were wrong, creationists are right; there is such a thing as a free lunch
• Lesson #4 Towards a new orthopraxy
• Lesson #5 Wondrous tools used by the clergy to grow GDP
• Lesson #6 How to finance infinite needs

It's that time of the month again when, with little fanfare, the NY Fed discreetly discloses on which days of the upcoming month shorting is unadvisable, because on the other end of every sale or short will be none other than Kevin Henry & Co., and some $45 billion in buying power-cum-short stop loss triggers (not to mention every possible Citadel HFT algo operating at a less than arm's length from the Liberty 33 trading desk). In short: we get the advance monthly schedule of POMO days. And as everyone knows, one should never fight the Fed (unless, of course, one is the European Central Bank, the People's Bank of China, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and pretty much every other central bank now that the entire world has devolved to outright currency warfare, but let's ignore that particular weak link in the media's propaganda narrative for the time being). So how does April look? In short: for anyone seeking to short the market in order to take advantage of the inevitable end of the Fed's despotic central-Ponzi planning regime (for reference, please see Bernie Madoff): not good.

Investors take note: a major development is at hand. As bankrupt nations and banks continue to spiral downward there will be more and more desperate attempts to plug the holes in their balance sheets by any means necessary.  And it will be a LOT more than they claim,