The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly
accommodative monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis
nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate
target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate)
nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s
balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through
targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.
Zero Hedge posts a weekly update of the Federal Reserve's bloated balance sheet as we believe it is critical to visualize the spiraling debt burden at our "central bank" especially since any day now the Fed will begin purchasing treasury securities outright in defiance of Geithner's lies to the contrary (China can't sell its planned Bills: at 0.925 Bid-To-Cover does anyone honestly think they will instead prefer to buy dollar denominated toiler paper and not roll out their own QE version momentarily?). As Cornelius pointed out earlier the dollar can't find a floor these days: rerisking is rampant the argument goes and that kills the greenback. However, the circular logic also holds: create dollar pain (by whatever means possible) and thus stimulate the market, Larry Summer's all time wet dream (would anyone like to wager that when hedge fund positional disclosure become mandatory DE Shaw will fight until the bitter end). And in this simplistic trilateral world (have fun gaming the yuan), the strength of any one of the trio in the dollar-yen-euro triangle results in implicit weakness of the other two. And vice versa. Yet aside from major broker-dealers who are axed in a given equity direction and thus have all the incentive to impact underlying currencies, is it possible that specific governments may manipulate currency strength via central bank positioning? Why yes.