Fail

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This is the REAL DEAL for Europe. Anyone who has some kind of counter-argument to these points either doesn’t understand the political environment we’ve entered (even Central Banks are fed up with bowing to political pressure from politicians) or is simply hoping that by ignoring these realities they (the realities) will go away.

Bank Regulatory Capital has been in the news a lot recently - between the $1+ trillion Basel 3 shortfall, the Spanish banks with seemingly their own set of capital issues, or JPM's snafu.  There has been a lot of discussion about Too Big To Fail (“TBTF”) in the U.S. with regulators demanding more and banks fighting it.  After JPM's surprise loss this month, the debate over the proper regulatory framework and capital requirements will reach a fever pitch.  That is great, but maybe it is also time to step back and think about what capital is supposed to do, and with that as a guideline, think of rules that make sense. Specifically, regulatory capital, or capital adequacy, or just plain capital needs to address the worst of eventual loss and potential mark to market loss. Hedges are once again front and center.  The only "perfect" hedge is selling an asset. This "hedge" is also a trade.  The risk profile looks very different than having sold the loan and the capital should reflect that.

Did France, Italy and Greece think they are the only ones who can float strawmen in the media? No. Once again, Germany shows us how it is done. From Tomorrow's edition of Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachricthen: "The Greece-exit is a done deal: According to the German economic news from financial circles EU and the ECB have abandoned the motherland of democracy as a euro member. The reason is, interestingly, not in the upcoming elections - these are basically become irrelevant. The EU has finally realized that the Greeks have not met any agreements and will not continue not to meet them. A banker: "We helped with the Toika. The help of the troika was tied to conditions. Greece has fulfilled none of the conditions, and has been for months now." So more posturing? Or is Germany truly just so sick and tired of bailing out not just Greece (which pockets between 0% and 20% of any actual bailout cash), and indirectly French banks which as of this moment are the biggest pass thru beneficiaries, and of course the ECB with its tens of billions in old par GGB holdings, that this article is, gasp, founded in reality? Is Europe approaching its own Lehman moment when everyone says "just screw it", and let the dice fall where they may? Many said Lehman could never be allowed to fail. They were wrong. Just as many are saying that Europe will never let Greece leave as the costs to the continent are just too great. Well, judging by tonight's epic fiasco of a Euro-summit, the last thing we would attribute to Europe's leaders is clear and rational thought.

Here's My Argument for Fighting the Good Fight Even Against Seemingly Overwhelming Odds ... The Counter-Argument Is that We Should Unplug from the Martrix, and that Will Suck Away Its Power. What Do You Think, Savvy Reader?

As we noted last week, the EURUSD cross-currency basis-swap - or European bank's most desperate way to fund itself in the absence of any further ECB aid, a lack of collateral, and no interbank-lending (trust #fail) - is flashing a warning light. Today that light went ultraviolet. For maturities beyond the LTRO (greater than 3Y or so) the current level of stress is greater than at the end of November last year which was the trigger for the globally coordinated central bank response. 3Y basis swaps are now back above 70bps (below -70bps) and near record lows - signaling a real desperation for term funding among European banks - as we explained here. Translated: central bankers are now calling each other and planning; the only question is what they can do this time: last time the FX swap margin was cut from OIS+100 to OIS+50 bps. Now what: interbank lending at no cost? - Thank you Uncle Ben.

There’s been a lot of excitement in the past year over the rise of North American oil production and the promise of increased oil production across the whole of the Americas in the years to come. National security experts and other geo-political observers have waxed poetic at the thought of this emerging, hemispheric strength in energy supply. What’s less discussed, however, is the negligible effect this supply swing is having on lowering the price of oil, due to the fact that, combined with OPEC production, aggregate global production remains mostly flat.  But there’s another component to this new belief in the changing global landscape for oil: the dawning awareness that OPEC’s power has finally gone into decline. You can read the celebration of OPEC’s waning in power in practically every publication from Foreign Policy to various political blogs and op-eds.

The “austerity” and “growth” to which EU leaders refer are simply two sides of the same coin: that of assuming that massive problems can be dealt with superficially. It’s akin to polishing the brass on the Titanic as it sinks: in the short term, you’re making a small difference, but in the big picture, you’re ignoring the very real, enormous problem you need to tackle.

"You CAN make this shit up."--Jean Claude Juncker

What is a black swan event, or tail event, in the stock market?

- It depends on who’s asking.

- To those familiar with Austrian capital theory, the impending U.S. stock market plunge (of even well over 40%)—like pretty much all that came before in the past century—will certainly  not be a Black Swan, nor even a tail event.
- Nonetheless, the black swan notion is paramount—in perception: Market participants’ failure to expect a perfectly expected event—that is, they price in only Anglo swans despite the  Viennese bird lurking conspicuously in the weeds—much like what is happening today, brings tremendous opportunity.

Because Banning Propaganda “Ties the Hands of America’s Diplomatic Officials, Military, and Others by Inhibiting Our Ability to Effectively Communicate In a Credible Way”

Based on a swap-spread-based model, EURUSD should trade around 1.30, but based on GDP-weighted sovereign credit risk EURUSD should trade around 1.00; so who is right and what are the factors that supporting the Euro at higher levels than many would assume (given the rising probability of a Euro-zone #fail and the 0.82 lows from 2000). UBS addresses four key reasons for the apparent paradox based on the difference between ECB and Fed 'monetization', the EZ's balanced current account (independent of foreign capital flows), and the high-oil-price induced petro-dollar circulation diversifying into Euros (or out of USD). The final and most telling of factors though is bank deleveraging as European financial entities, who remain under pressure to shrink their balance sheets and re-build capital, have been selling foreign assets. They remain EUR dismalists with a year-end target of 1.15 but expect the slide to these levels to be cushioned (absent an imminent break-up) by banks' 'shrinkage'.

All models of non-linear complex systems are crude because they attempt to model millions of interactions with a handful of variables. When it comes to global weather or global markets, our ability to predict non-linear complex systems with what amounts to mathematical tricks (algorithms, etc.) is proscribed by the fundamental limits of the tricks.  Projecting current trends is also an erratic and inaccurate method of prediction. The current trend may continue or it may weaken or reverse. "The Way of the Tao is reversal," but gaming life's propensity for reversal with contrarian thinking is not sure-fire, either. If it was that easy to predict the future of markets, we'd all be millionaires. Part of the intrinsic uncertainty of the future is visible in unintended consequences. The Federal Reserve, for example, predicted that lowering interest rates to zero and paying banks interest on their deposits at the Federal Reserve would rebuild bank reserves by slight-of-hand. Banks would then start lending to qualified borrowers, and the economy would recover strongly as a result.

They were wrong on every count.

At the beginning of the week, European equities are seen modestly higher in the major indices with underperformance noted in the peripheral markets. Markets have sought some solace in the G8 summit over the weekend, with leaders agreeing that the optimal scenario would be Greece remaining within the European Monetary Union, and have furtively agreed that further measures may be necessary to return Europe to growth. The disagreements, however, continue to rollover as leaders fail to commit to a specific growth strategy. The tentative risk sentiment is reflected in the fixed income markets, with the German Bund remaining in negative territory for much of the session and 10yr government bond yield spread between the periphery and the German benchmark tighter on the session. Touted bids by domestic accounts helped support BTPs (Italian paper), especially in the short end of the curve, where the spread between the German equivalent is trading tighter by around 3bps. From Tokyo, comments from Fed’s Lockhart have drawn attention, who commented that with the downside risks emerging from the Eurozone, it would be unwise to take QE3 off the table.

This is where we stand right about now.