Finland

Euro bonds “didn’t find much support” at the EU conference.
                              -Jean-Claude Juncker

“A majority of European Union leaders at a Brussels summit this week backed joint euro-area bonds.”
                             -Mario  Monti

Encapsulated in these two comments is the problem that Europe is now facing. Two views, two radically different positions and no agreement on a middle ground because there is not one. Of course the periphery countries, the weaker nations want Eurobonds because it would dramatically drop their cost of funding. Of course Germany and their stronger EU countries do not want it because it would dramatically raise their cost of funding. Nations, in the end, will act in their own self-interest, this has been proven more than enough times in history, which is why I stand by my conclusion that Eurobonds will not be forthcoming regardless of the polite rhetoric attached to them.

A quick look at the Fresh-Start Greek Government Bond (GGB2) complex shows that as of this morning it has tumbled to fresh all time lows across the curve, and now trades at a more than 50% loss to the March PSI conversion price. The reason for this dump is not so much on fear of a Greek exit, but once again a reflection of precisely what we expected would happen, and as explained in our January Subordination 101 post. Last week, the fact that a PSI hold out, holding English-law bonds managed to get par recovery while all the other lemmings have so far eaten a nearly 90% loss, has sparked a realization among all the other hold outs that since they have covenant protection, they should all demand the same treatment. And indeed, another one has stepped up, only this time not a holder demanding par maturity paydown, but one who has read their bond indenture and was delighted to find the words "negative pledge." As Bloomberg reports "a holder of Greek bonds that weren’t settled in the biggest-ever debt restructuring said he’ll demand immediate payment unless the government posts collateral against his investment. Rolf Koch, a private investor who says he holds 500,000 Swiss francs ($528,000) of the notes due in July 2013, argued that he’s entitled to equal treatment with Finland, which made getting collateral a condition of contributing to Greece’s second bailout. He wrote to the paying agent, Credit Suisse Group AG, invoking the bonds’ so-called negative-pledge clause, according to the text of a letter seen by Bloomberg News."

Translating Germany's standard line on joiontly-backed European bonds is simple: "We don't want to pay" - it is as simple as that so you can ignore the rest of the rhetoric. France at the next EU summit is going to push for Eurobonds and Germany will resist in what may be a quite unpleasant stand-off. From Germany’s perspective we can easily understand their feelings about this matter because the consequences of Eurobonds are very negative for them. Eurobonds are quite clearly a “transfer union” where Germany is the primary source of funding then for the rest of Europe. If Eurobonds are ever enacted we would suggest selling any/all of the “AAA” countries and buying the periphery ones as the correct play in the intermediate term. In fact, Eurobonds are the crux where Federalism comes head to head with Nationalism and where the rhetoric gives way to actualization.

No one likes paying taxes. You’d think.

The policy responses and hints of policy responses are starting to come out.  What will they be, how big will they be, and what will they accomplish remains to be seen, but the market is due to rally on almost anything. We expect some announcements out of Europe.  A policy shift towards “growth” and some new ECB plans. We don’t think they will work well, especially if they don’t address the root of depositor fear in Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, but with so many indicators pointing to oversold conditions, the markets could snap back, and that is the way Peter Tchir of TF Market Advisors is leaning.

Well, my hat is off to the global central planners for averting the next stage of the unfolding financial crisis for as long as they have. I guess there’s some solace in having had a nice break between the events of 2008/09 and today, which afforded us all the opportunity to attend to our various preparations and enjoy our lives.

Alas, all good things come to an end, and a crisis rooted in ‘too much debt’ with a nice undercurrent of ‘persistently high and rising energy costs’ was never going to be solved by providing cheap liquidity to the largest and most reckless financial institutions. And it has not.

Now that the Greek exit is back to being topic #1 of discussion, just as it was back in the fall of 2011, and the media has been flooded by groundless speculation posited by journalists who have never used excel in their lives and are merely paid mouthpieces of bigger bank interests (long live access journalism and the book sales it facilitates), it is time to rewind to a step by step analysis of precisely what will happen in the moment before Greece announces the EMU exit, how the transition from pre to post occurs, and the aftermath of what said transition would entail, courtesy of one of the smarter minds out there, Citi's Willem Buiter, who pontificated precisely on this topic last year, and whose thoughts he has graciously provided for all to read on his own website. Of course, take all of this with a huge grain of salt - these are observations by the chief economist of a bank which will likely be swept aside the second the EMU starts the post-Grexit rumble.

According to Reuters, Italy is going to propose to the European Union that they should exempt borrowing used to pay their commercial obligations from their calculation of public debt. Monti, the article states, is also going to propose exempting the counting of public debt used for investments. You may be sure that Italy’s $211 billion of derivatives will now be entitled an “investment.”  Now all of this will lower Italy’s debt to GDP ratio which is the real reason for these proposals and so even worse falsified numbers can be handed out to the Press in hopes that money will be invested in Italy based upon not just inaccurate but offically countenanced manufactured data. This way not only the debt to GDP ratio can be falsified but the growth numbers, the fiscal targets and a raft of other numbers that will no longer be real but just a systemic figment of Europe’s imagination.

When we talk about Europe today in an economic context, we really mean the Eurozone, whose seventeen members are the core of Europe and share a common currency, the euro. The euro first came into existence thirteen years ago, on January 1, 1999, replacing national currencies for eleven states; Greece joined two years later. In theory, the idea of a common currency for European nations with common borders is logical, and it was Canadian economist Robert Mundell's work on optimum currency areas that provided much of the theoretical cover. However, the concept was flawed from the start.

Even the President of the EU Parliament admitted it. But just then, another plan surfaced that might speed up that scenario.

Pretend, from now on, that when you see this word it is written in Moldavian and needs to be translated. France and the periphery nations are screaming this word now while almost all of Europe is in recession and one that we believe will be much deeper than forecast. Consequently “growth” does not mean “growth” and the correct translation is “Inflation.” We have long said it would come to this in Europe and here we go. The troubled countries are going to beg and plead for Inflation and Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland are going to resist. With Hollande the most likely next President of France you are going to see a stand-off between the socialist and the centrist countries so that a log jam will develop and the consequences of its uncoupling are anyone’s guess except that it will be likely violent and an extreme series of events. The governance of Europe on May 5 will not be what is found on May 6 and preparation for this should be high upon everyone’s list.

We start today's story of the day by pointing out that Deutsche Bank - easily Europe's most critical financial institution - reported results that were far worse than expected, following a decline in equity and debt trading revenues of 23% and 8%, but primarily due to Europe simply "not being fixed yet" despite what its various politicians tell us. And if DB is still impaired, then something else will have to give. Next, we go to none other than Deutsche Bank strategist Jim Reid, who in his daily Morning Reid piece, reminds the world that with austerity still the primary driver in a double dipping Europe (luckily... at least for now, because no matter how many economists repeat the dogmatic mantra, more debt will never fix an excess debt problem, and in reality austerity is the wrong word - the right one is deleveraging) to wit: "an unconditional ECB is probably what Europe needs now given the austerity drive." However, as German taxpayers who will never fall for unconditional money printing by the ECB (at least someone remembers the Weimar case), the ECB will likely have to keep coming up with creative solutions. Which bring us to the story du jour brought by Suddeutsche Zeitung, according to which the ECB and countries that use the euro are working on an initiative to allow cash-strapped banks direct access to funding from the European Stability Mechanism. As a reminder, both Germany and the ECB have been against this kind of direct uncollateralized, unsterilized injections, so this move is likely a precursor to even more pervasive easing by the European central bank, with the only question being how many headlines of denials by Schauble will hit the tape before this plan is approved. And if all eyes are again back on the ECB, does it mean that the recent distraction face by the IMF can now be forgotten, and more importantly, if the ECB is once again prepping to reliquify, just how bad are things again in Europe? And what happens if this time around the plan to fix a solvency problem with more electronic 1s and 0s does not work?

• China’s Biggest Banks Are Squeezed for Capital (NYT)
• Greeks detect hypocrisy as Dutch coalition stumbles (Reuters)
• Hollande Blames Europe’s Austerity Plan for Le Pen’s Rise (Bloomberg)
• In a Change, Mexico Reins In Its Oil Monopoly (NYT)
• China Tire Demand Slows as Economy Decelerates, Bridgestone Says (Bloomberg)
• Social Security’s financial forecast gets darker; Medicare’s outlook unchanged (WaPo)
• Fed’s 17 Rate Forecasts May Confuse More Than Clarify (Bloomberg)
• Senate to vote on array of Postal Service overhaul proposals (WaPo)
• Weidmann Says Bundesbank Is Preserving Euro Stability (Bloomberg)

Investing in an uncompetitive company in the ugly EU auto market to bail out its own failing subsidiary.

George Soros has been a busy man the last few days. Appearing at the INET Conference a number of times and penning detailed articles for the FT (and here at Project Syndicate) describing the terrible situation in which Europe finds itself - and furthermore offering a potential solution. Critically, he opines, the European crisis is complex since it is a vicious circle of competing crises: sovereign debt, balance of payments, banking, competitiveness, and structurally defective non-optimal currency union. The fact is 'we are very far from equilibrium...of the Maastricht criteria' with his very clear insight that the massive gap, or cognitive dissonance, between the 'official authorities' hope and the outside world who see how abnormal the situation is, is troublesome at best. Analogizing the periphery countries as third-world countries that are heavily indebted in a foreign currency (that they cannot print), his initial conclusion ends with the blunt statement that "the euro has really broken down" and the ensuing discussion of just what this means from both an economic and socially devastating perspective: the destruction of the common market and the European Union and how this will end in acrimonious recriminations with worse conflicts between European states than before.