Fund Flows

The seemingly inexorable rise of corporate bond ETFs (most specifically HYG and JNK is the high-yield market, and LQD in investment grade) have been discussed at length here as both a 'new' factor in the underlying bond market's technicals (flow) as well as their correlated impact on equity and volatility markets. Goldman Sachs' credit team delve deep into the impact of these relatively new (and rapidly growing) structures with their greater transparency but considerably higher sensitivities and conclude that not only are they here to stay but the consequences of ETF-inclusion (dramatic outperformance bias relative to non-ETF bonds) are deepening the liquidity divide (and relative-value) of what is already a somewhat sparsely-traded market. Our concern is that, as the divide grows (and liquidity is concentrated in ETF bonds), given the crowding tendency we have witnessed, (even with call constraints at extremes thanks to low interest rates), this is yet another crowded 'hot potato' trade hanging like a sword of Damocles over our markets (courtesy of Bernanke's repression).

We won't even pretend to claim we have any idea what is going on here. We know it's pretty and very detailed, so some intern definitely wasted lots of hours to plug goalseeked fund flow data (which is never accurate and is merely an estimated plug using actual calculated private fund flows) into this schematic demonstrating how the Japanese economy performed in the most recent quarter. We also know that while largely irrelevant, it would be useful for our own Federal Reserve to come out with something comparable.

One of the deepest mysteries related to the ongoing rally in U.S. equities is the persistent lack of retail investor involvement. QAs we have vociferously noted, U.S. equity mutual fund flows remain solidly negative and interest in single stock trading among individual investors is similarly moribund - while corporate bond volumes remain flat and Treasury volumes higher.  As Nick Colas, of ConvergEx group, notes, one missing link to explain this dichotomy must be the fundamental lack of financial literacy among U.S. retail investors, yet this relationship is seldom mentioned as a reason for this group’s ongoing apathy in the face of 4-year highs for domestic stocks. You might argue that “It was always thus…” and that is a fair point.   American investors haven’t grown dumber on financial matters in the last decade; they never had the requisite knowledge to begin with.  But it does appear that the events of the last few years have caused some kind of “Tipping point” with regard to investors’ ability to process the world around them.

The easy answer is - well, its those dumb money 'safe' investors finally rotating from bonds to stocks; but what about fund flows provides any evidence for that reality. Alternatively, we suggest, the recent (and somewhat market-unexpected) pop in macro data (surprising to the upside) has seemingly provided a Goldilocks for equities (growth is rising and even if it drops back, Bernanke's got our back) and the inverse for Treasuries (growth is rising and if that's the case then Bernanke's Bond Buying extravaganza is over - mark 'em down). What is stunning to us is the incredibly tight correlation since LTRO2 between macro data (trend and beats/misses) and 10Y Treasury yields. While correlation is not causation, discussion of the macro thesis is strong top-down and suggests more than one person believes this correlation. Our concern - what  dominant data is this macro strength based on - NFP/Claims beat? Retail Sales beat? (consider the controversy of the seasonal adjustments in both and what that would do to the macro data index.

Back in March, the last time we saw a notable and relatively sustained rise in Treasury yields, we pointed out a potential driver for this 'apparent' weakness - the heaviness of investment grade corporate bond issuance. This drives relative selling pressure in Treasuries for three potential reasons: pre-emptive rate locks are positioned; managers hedge away interest-rate duration to lock in the 'spread' on the bonds as they are jig-sawed into existing portfolios; and most simply speculative rotation from Treasury bond 'cash' into new issues (thus avoiding the convexity issues associated with such low yields on existing 'secondary' bonds). As the charts below show, in March, as we noted at the time, issuance expectations (the forward calendar) were falling and we suggested Treasury yields would drop as this implicit selling pressure would also lift. While this time Gross and Singer have spurred some risk-aversion, no doubt, the IG calendar suggests a lifting of the selling pressure soon here too.

Yes, there are call constraints. Yes, there are 'beta' differences. But, given the strong technicals (fund flows) and empirically high correlations between the much-more-like-stocks-than-bonds high-yield credit market and the equity market, the current divergence between equity ebullience and credit curmudgeon-ness is all-too-reminiscent of the post-LTRO2 sanity check that credit 'imposed' on equities. Not only are high-yield bonds underperforming stocks (as we warned last week), but the HYG ETF is now trading at a significant discount to intrinsic value which (back in March) was the start of a more pronounced downturn as cash bonds were force-sold into an illiquid market backdrop.

This is looking more and more like a modem-day depression. After all, last month alone, 85,000 Americans signed on for Social Security disability cheques, which exceeded the 80,000 net new jobs that were created: and a record 46 million Americans or 14.8% of the population (also a record) are in the Food Stamp program (participation averaged 7.9% from 1970 to 2000, by way of contrast) — enrollment has risen an average of over 400,000 per month over the past four years. A record share of 41% pay zero national incomes tax as well (58 million), a share that has doubled over the past two decades. Increasingly, the U.S. is following in the footsteps of Europe of becoming a nation of dependants. Meanwhile, policy stimulus, whether traditional or non-conventional, are still falling well short of generating self-sustaining economic growth.

Consumers are paying an easy $35 dollars per barrel over what they would otherwise dole out for a barrel of oil if fund managers didn`t use the benchmark futures contracts as their own personal ATMs.

There was some hope that today's European summit would provide some more clarity for something else than just the local caterer's 2012 tax payment. It wont. Per Reuters: "Germany does not believe that jointly issued euro zone bonds offer a solution to the bloc's debt crisis and will not change its stance despite calls from France and other countries to consider such a step, a senior German official said on Tuesday. "That's a firm conviction which will not change in June," the official said at a German government briefing before an informal summit of EU leaders on Wednesday. A second summit will be held at the end of June. The official, requesting anonymity, also said he saw no need for leaders to discuss a loosening of deficit goals for struggling euro zone countries like Greece or Spain, nor to explore new ways for recapitalise vulnerable banks at Wednesday's meeting." In other words absolutely the same as in August 2011 when Europe came, saw, and did nothing. Yes, yes, deja vu. Bottom line: just as Citi predicted, until the bottom falls out of the market, nothing will change. They were right. As for the summit, just recycle the Einhorn chart from below. Elsewhere, the OECD slashed world growth forecasts and now officially sees Europe contracting, something everyone else has known for months. "In its twice-yearly economic outlook, the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development forecast that global growth would ease to 3.4 percent this year from 3.6 percent in 2011, before accelerating to 4.2 percent in 2013, in line with its last estimates from late November... The OECD forecast that the 17-member euro zone economy would shrink 0.1 percent this year before posting growth of 0.9 percent in 2013, though regional powerhouse Germany would chalk up growth of 1.2 percent in 2012 and 2.0 percent in 2013." Concluding the overnight news was a meaningless auction of €2.5 billion in 3 and 6 month bills (recall, Bill issuance in LTRO Europe is completely meaningless) in which borrowing rates rose, and a very meaningful downgrade of Japan to A+ from AA, outlook negative, by Fitch which lowered Japan's long-term foreign currency rating to A plus from AA, the local currency rating to A plus from AA minus, and to the country ceiling rating to AA+ from AAA. Yes, Kyle Bass is right. Just a matter of time. Just like with subprime.

What's important is that good markets are for selling and bad markets are for buying; it's counterintuitive. Your perception of how events will play out in the future is determined mostly by your experience in the immediate past; and if the last three investment decisions that you've made have rewarded you – if you feel good about your precepts – you begin to do something natural, which is confuse a bull market with brains, and you begin to become very aggressive. If your last three decisions – irrespective of whether they were well thought out – haven't played out so well, you become cautious. What you need to do is teach your brain to overwhelm or overrule your heart and understand that cheaper is better and more expensive is less good. It's difficult, but it must be done. Many things that are rewarding are difficult.

We are unsure what is more notable in this week's most recent fund flow update: that in the week ended May 2, investors pulled out another whopping $6.6 billion out of domestic equity mutual funds, the 11th consecutive, and a total of $42 billion in 2012 (compared to $10 billion over the same period in 2011), or that as the chart below shows, the two identical S&P overlay arrows (identical in their length and angle) demonstrate just how comparable the effect of QE2 and Operation Twist, or QE3, have been. the two arrows also demonstrate without a doubt, that, as Goldman admitted last month, the "flow" effect at the long-end of the curve (thank you Chubby Checker) is what it was all about, which means that sterilized QE is bunk, and all that matters is of the Fed to be actively monetizing something, anything, in order for stocks to go higher. Regardless, the only question left now is not whether the same drift back lower by 200 S&P point that stocks experienced after the end of QE2 will happen, but when and how rapidly it will take place, just in time for QE4 (NOT Operation Twist-er) to be announced in June. And finally, for those wondering how it is possible that every month US investors can pull cash out of mutual funds without them running out of cash, we say: observe the distinct pattern in Chart 2, which shows that as of March mutual funds held a record low 3.3% in liquid assets on their books.

Every quarter as part of its refunding announcement, the Office of Debt Management together with the all important Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, which as noted previously is basically Wall Street's conduit telling the Treasury what to do, releases its Fiscal Quarterly Report which is for all intents and purposes the most important presentation of any 3 month period, containing not only 70 slides worth of critical charts about the fiscal status of the country, America's debt issuance, its funding needs, the structure of the Treasury portfolio, but more importantly what future debt supply and demand needs look like, as well as various sundry topics which will shape the debate between Wall Street and Treasury execs for the next 3 months: some of the fascinating topics touched upon are fixed income ETFs, algo trading in Treasurys, and finally the implications of High Frequency trading - a topic which has finally made it to the highest levels of executive discussion. It is presented in its entirety below (in a non-click bait fashion as we respect readers' intelligence), although we find the following statement absolutely priceless: "Anticipation of central bank behavior has become a significant driver of market sentiment." This is coming from the banks and Treasury. Q.E.D.

Stock World Weekly visits w/ Mark Hanna, Washington's Blog, Allan Trends, Lee Adler and Pharmboy. 

The week ended April 11th is when equities finally rolled over. Which is why those curious how retail fund flows did in the past week will not be very surprised: if individual investors avoided stocks like Bernie Madoff Asset Management on the way up, there is no reason why they should change their mind on the way down. Sure enough, in the past week, $1.5 billion was withdrawn from domestic equities. Instead, cash, solely with the aim of capital preservation enter taxable bond funds, as it has for the past 3 years now. With the latest redemption, total 2012 flows to date are over $25 billion, or more than double the comparable amount in 2011. It appears that retail has seen right through the once in a lifetime opportunity, and is withdrawing money from stocks at the fastest pace ever, irrelevant of what the myth formerly known as the "market" actually does.

What a quarter! The Dow up 8% and enjoying a record quarter in terms of points — 994 of them to be exact and in percent terms, now just 7% off attaining a new all-time high. The S&P 500 surged 12% (and 3.1% for March; 28% from the October 2011 lows), which was the best performance since 1998. It seems so strange to draw comparisons to 1998, which was the infancy of the Internet revolution; a period of fiscal stability, 5% risk-free rates, sustained 4% real growth in the economy, strong housing markets, political stability, sub-5% unemployment, a stable and predictable central bank. And look at the composition of the rally. Apple soared 48% and accounted for nearly 20% of the appreciation in the S&P 500. But outside of Apple, what led the rally were the low-quality names that got so beat up last year, such as Bank of America bouncing 72% (it was the Dow's worst performer in 2011; financials in aggregate rose 22%). Sears Holdings have skyrocketed 108% this year even though the company doesn't expect to make money this year or next. What does that tell you? What it says is that this bull run was really more about pricing out a possible financial disaster coming out of Europe than anything that could really be described as positive on the global macroeconomic front. What is most fascinating is how the private client sector simply refuses to drink from the Fed liquidity spiked punch bowl, having been burnt by two central bank-induced bubbles separated less than a decade apart leaving David Rosenberg, of Gluskin Sheff, still rightly focused on benefiting from his long-term 3-D view of deleveraging, demographics, and deflation - as he notes US data is on notably shaky ground. This appears to have been very much a trader's rally as he reminds us that liquidity is not an antidote for fundamentals.