High Yield

The pricing of 'safe' assets reflects the ongoing uncertainty in a world that is in the grip of the lunacy of policymakers who have seemingly lost all sense of perspective and are engaged in a huge gamble. This essential fundamental backdrop has not changed for the better lately, but for the worse. What this once again demonstrates is that intervention by central banks is creating incentives for many institutional investors to take inordinate risks in the name of preserving the purchasing power of the savings that have been entrusted to them. The problem is that the gains of today are absolutely certain to become the losses of tomorrow for investors taking the bait, as the echo bubble created by loose monetary policy is fated to turn into a major bust once the boom has played out. When the tide is going out, a great many naked swimmers will be revealed.

People always stop and stare at traffic accidents (no matter how minor) and arguing couples (no matter how unattractive); ConvergEx's Nick Colas has the same problem with the ever-moribund CBOE VIX Index, even though it’s essentially the exact opposite of the proverbial train wreck.  Even with the zombie-like march higher for US stocks, surely the uncertain state of the world would demand more than a 13-handle VIX?  Well, it doesn’t; and Nick offers up some off-the-beaten track explanations for why “13” isn’t the right answer.  Implied volatility should either be higher or…  (gulp)… much lower.  The biggest overlooked factor for both directions: the role of technology in society and commerce.

While the main, if completely irrelevant, macroeconomic news of the day will be the first estimate of US Q1 GDP due out later today, perhaps the best testament of just how meaningless fundamental data has become was the scheduled BOJ announcement overnight in which Kuroda's merry men simply stated what was expected by everyone: the Japanese central bank merely repeated its pledge to double the monetary base in two years. The lack of any incremental easing, is what pushed both the USDJPY as low as 98.20 overnight (98.60 at last check), over 100 pips from the highs, and has pressured the Nikkei into its first red close in days, and shows just how habituated with the constant cranking up of the liqudity spigot the G-7 market has truly become.

A peculiar trading session, in which the usual overnight futures levitation has not been led by the BOJ-inspired USDJPY rise (even as the Nikkei225 rose another 0.6% more than offset by the Shanghai Composite drop of 0.86%), which actually has slid all session briefly dipping under 99 moments ago, but by the EURUSD, which saw a bout of buying around 5 am Eastern, just after news hit that the UK would avoid a triple dip recession with Q1 GDP rising 0.3% versus expectations of a 0.1% rise, up from a -0.3% in Q4 (more in Goldman note below). Since the news that the BOE will likely delay engaging in more QE (just in time for the arrival of Carney) is hardly EUR positive we look at the other news hitting around that time, such as Finland saying that the euro can survive in Cyprus exits the Eurozone, and that Merkel has rejected standardized bank guarantees for the foreseeable future, and we are left scratching our heads what is the reason for the brief burst in the Euro.

Due to decades of unreserved credit growth that temporarily boosted the appearance of sustainable economic growth and prosperity, rational economic behavior cannot produce real (inflation-adjusted) economic growth from current levels. The nominal sizes of advanced economies have grown far larger than the rational scope of production that would be needed to sustain them. This fundamental problem explains best the current state of affairs: malaise (i.e., bank system de-leveraging and economic stagnation) spreading through the means of production and the need for increasing policy intervention to stabilize goods, service and asset prices (by depressing the first three and inflating the last?). We live and work in a contrived meta-economy that can be managed through narrow channels in financial and state capitals. Given the overwhelming past misallocation of capital cited above, we think the most important realization for investors in the current environment is that price levels of goods, services and assets may be biased to rise but they are not sustainable in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The crowd is ignoring the obvious, as all signs point towards the next currency reset.

Asset price correlations across a wide spectrum of industries and asset classes are meaningfully lower than the last few months. ConvergEx's Nick Colas note that this is something completely unexpected: we’ve approached a “Normal” capital market over the last 30 days. S&P 500 sector correlations are below 80% relative to the index, foreign stocks are 77-87% correlated to U.S. stocks, and even domestic high yield corporate bonds are 56% dancing to their own tune. However, before we run off celebrating the return to a stock-picker’s market, it is worth noting one statistical point worth your time: when industry sector correlations have dropped below 80% from 2010 to the present, the subsequent one month, one quarter and one year returns have been below average, especially the shorter time frames.

Following much anticipation that today's 30 Year would go off like gangbusters, and with the When Issued ripping to 2.990% at 1 PM, the final result was essentially a dud, with the high yield pricing at 2.998%, leading to a rather substantial tail of 0.8 bps. The internals were rather poor as well, with the Bid to Cover coming in well below the 12 TTM average of 2.62 at 2.49, the Directs taking down 19.2%, Dealers left with their usual average of 49.3%, but with Indirects, which is precisely where the Japanese bid would have materialized, ending with just 31.4% of the take down, well below the 42% in March, below the TTM of 35.4% and the lowest since October's 26.5%. So what gives? And was the surge in the USDJPY ahead of the auction unwarranted? It would appear so. But where are the Japanese FI outflows going then? Simple - it seems that at least one group of buyers has ignored Pimco and BlackRock's advice, and instead has allocated all their "rotating" cash into high yielding Italian and Spanish bonds to capitalize on the EURJPY carry trade. What can possibly go wrong? We will let Mr. Jon Corzine explain that to Mrs. Watanabe...

Sometimes you just have to sit back, gaze at some charts, and say WTF...

A few days ago, Bloomberg released an article in which it described the lamentations emanating from the Primary Dealers whose role in bond purchases is being increasingly undercut by Direct bidders who get to buy US paper directly from the Treasury and without Dealer intermediation. Well, no such worries in today's just concluded $32 billion auction of 3 Year paper, which closed moments ago at a high yield of 0.342%, the lowest "high yield" in 2013 and a Bid To Cover of 3.238, the lowest since September 2011. But what was most notable is that the combined take down of Directs and Indirects was a tiny 35.1%: the lowest non Dealer interest since January 2009. Naturally, the Dealer take down was the inverse or 64.9%, which also was the largest since January 2009. Obviously all this paper will be promptly sold back to the Fed, but any artificial (and inaccurate) concerns that Dealers are not getting their due allocation of paper can now be put to rest.

Succinctly summarizing the positive and negative news, data, and market events of the week...

Barclays index of high yield bond total returns is now 63% higher that its pre-crisis peak. This compares to an equivalent total return index for the S&P 500 was only 12% (and it has yet to break the October 2007 highs). These numbers are astronomical in the face of micro- and macro-fundamentals and while equity markets remain the policy tool du jour for the central planning elite, it appears they are perhaps starting to become a little concerned that driving all the retiring boomers 'safe' money into risky bets may not end so well. Just as Alan Greenspan stepped on the throat of equity markets with his now infamous 'irrational exuberance' speech, we wonder, as Bloomberg notes, if last night's speech to the Economic Club of New York by Bill Dudley is the new normal equivalent, as he noted, "some areas of fixed income - notably high-yield and leveraged loans - do seem somewhat frothy," just as we warned here. With the high-yield index trading at 5.56% yield - the lowest in over 25 years and loans bid at 98.27 (the highest since July 2007), perhaps he is right to note, "we will need to keep a close eye on financial asset prices."

Markets are remarkably schizophrenic about where risk is flowing... and where it isn’t.  For example, ConvergEx's Nick Colas notes, the CBOE VIX Index is up from 12.3 a month ago to a close of 14.0 yesterday. And other risk assets such as Emerging Markets, U.S. Small Caps, Energy names, and developed economy international stocks all show higher 'VIXs' over the same 30 day period.  But... and it’s a big 'But'... just as many sectors/asset classes in our tracking universe show declines in their 'VIXs'.  The most pronounced are domestic Consumer Discretionary, Utilities, and Tech names as well as precious metals and High Yield Corporate bonds, where Implied Vols are 6-17% lower this month and in most cases are at/near 52 week lows.  If you are looking for spots where volatility might make a comeback, these are good places to start. This market reminds us of an old joke: Question: What do you call a person who is both ignorant and apathetic? Answer: I don’t know and I don’t care.

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are down 6.5% on the week (and even BofA has turned red on the week) as US equities have started to show 'slight' strains on European fears (as well as global PMIs and US earnings - what else is there?). Homebuilders gave up all their week's outperformance in the first hour of the day. Dow Transports are down 2.5% on the week now - notably underperforming and reverting their outperformance. VIX surged 1.25 vols to 14.00% - with protection remaining bid relative to stock's modest drop so far. While Treasury yields pushed lower all day (-6bps on the week) as did WTI (-1.5% on the week now), gold and silver flatlined after the spike higher this morning (both up 1.4% on the week). JPY strength was a key factor today as carry-trades were unwound. Risk-assets in general were once again highly correlated as credit tracked lower closing at its lows of the day like stocks. Equity trading volume was above average but average trade size is still falling and S&P 500 futures inability to hold VWAP into the close suggests institutional selling pressure is picking up.

"Equity prices in the US and Europe have been hovering at multi-year highs. To the extent that this reflects powerful policy easing, equity markets may have lost some of its ability to reflect economic trends in exchange for an important role in the policy fight to support spending." This is a statement from a Bank of America report overnight in which the bailed out bank confirms what has been said here since the launch of QE1 - there is no "market", there is no economic growth discounting mechanism, there is merely a monetary policy vehicle. To those, therefore, who can "forecast" what this vehicle does based on the whims of a few good central planners, we congratulate them. Because, explicitly, there is no actual forecasting involved. The only question is how long does the "career trade", in which everyone must be herded into the same trades or else risk loss of a bonus or job, go on for before mean reversion finally strikes. One thing that is clear is that since news is market positive, irrelevant of whether it is good or bad, virtually everything that has happened overnight, or will happen today, does not matter, and all stock watchers have to look forward to is another low volume grind higher, as has been the case for the past two weeks.

The concept of the Great Rotation continues to garner significant investor attention. From a flow perspective, UBS'  analysis across various asset classes infers there is scant evidence of a large rotation out of corporate credit or fixed income in general. They make a few simple observations. First, that the thesis of a great rotation out of Treasury securities into corporate equities is a fallacy - the Federal Reserve and global central banks are the dominant holders of Treasuries; if they decide to sell, the money will not directly flow into equities. Second, the thesis of a great rotation out of corporate credit into equities is complicated by three main cross-currents which suggests, correctly, to them that the Great Rotation debate is much ado about nothing.