International Monetary Fund

Amid the ever-expanding easing program in Europe (longer? more-er? different-er?), one of the gravest concerns was (amid a growing scarcity of collateral), finding willing sellers (at any price) to meet the needs of central bank asset purchasers could be a problem. However, as The FT reports, it appears the Chinese stepped up to the plate to 'help' The ECB (rather The Bundesbank) out from its dilemma. Just as we saw with Chinese selling US Treasuries (whether to diversify away from the major reserve currencies, deal with outflows, or to manage a liquidity crisis at home), The PBoC's reserve management wing, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, has been selling some of its German government bonds since the ECB began buying them in March, say two sources close to central banks in China and Europe. This news has prompted further weakness in Bunds today, despite expectations of Draghi unleashing more buying in December.

As Beijing fights to keep "Mr. Chen" and his "yellow loafers," tea, and Snickers bars from smuggling billions out of the country on behalf of Chinese citizens fearing an economic implosion and a double-digit deval, capital account convertibility may counterintuitively be one of the PBoC's most effective weapons as loosening capital controls will both calm the panicked masses and support the IMF SDR bit. Still, as Citi's David Lubin puts it, "China should expect to see gross capital outflows for the foreseeable future [and] it's not even clear that SDR inclusion will lead to a net capital inflow to China." 

The United States provided approximately $35 billion in economic aid to over 140 countries in fiscal year 2014. The question is: Who received the largest slice of the pie from the U.S.?

It is possible that we might witness the formation of two blocks within OPEC during the next December 4 meet in Vienna. One, led by Venezuela, Ecuador, Libya and Algeria that would want to reduce production levels and the other led by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait that would stick to the current strategy of defending market shar. In the end, it will come down to survival of the fittest. Players who have higher breakeven costs will be the ones who will blink first and thereby reduce their production levels.

On the heels of the nuclear deal and Tehran's ground operation in Syria, Iran is stepping up efforts to prove that contrary to Western rhetoric, it is not in fact "isolated." According to the country's economy minister, Iran is now set to join the BRICS bank and step up its cooperation with Brazil. This is symptomatic of Washington's waning ability to exert American influence on global affairs both political and economic.

We have heard many explanations for the torrid market rally since last September, ranging from the rational - short squeeze - to the generic - "bad news is good news under central planning" to the deranged - "ignore the news, the U.S. economy is actually stronger and China is recovering." And now, courtesy of the U.S. Treasury's Office of Financial Research, here is the official explanation from the government itself.

Watch out for a snowball-effect in the Treasury market...

“October is a particularly dangerous month to speculate in stocks. Followed by July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August, and February.” – Mark Twain

The bottom line is that the "internationalization" and an increasing free float of the Yuan is bearish. And since the currency urgently needs even more devaluation as today's PBOC rate cut confirmed, this may just be the IMF's way of greenlighting even more devaluation for China's currency. And since any devaluation would lead to a surge in capital outflows, what the IMF is doing is merely blessing the Yuan's weakness while pretending it is in a position of strength, in an attempt to slow down the capital outflow as much as possible.

Given what the Japanese have been subjected to in the past two and a half years of QQE, it is nearly criminal to suggest they need only more of it. None of it has worked as promised and stated, so what might have changed? Absolutely nothing except the arrangement of qualifiers and excuses that litter the same shared central bank speech delivered over and over of late. Kuroda says “robust”, Yellen proclaims “strong”, and both only confirm they live not of this world’s economy.

We presume the 'threat' of selling hundreds of billions of dollars of US Treasuries has prompted a softening in the "Currency manipulator" rhetoric from The US Treasuy department. Having previously said the Yuan is "significantly undervalued," today's report shifts the comment to stating that the Yuan is "below appropriate medium-term valuation." Of course, The US Treasury would know exactly how all of the world's currencies should trade in this centrally-planned world.

AsiaPac stocks were generally lower heading into the all-important Chinese macro data (S&P -6pts, Japan -0.7%, China -0.2%) as JPY erased Friday's ramp and crude dropped back below $47. The PBOC left the Onshore Yuan fix practically unchanged (following Friday's significant devaluation). Then the data hit... China GDP beat expectations (printing 6.9% YoY vs 6.8% exp) but is still the lowest growth since Q1 2009. Industrial Production missed (printing 5.7% YoY vs 6.0% exp). Retail Sales beat (10.9% YoY vs 10.8% exp). The initial reaction was kneejerk buying in USDJPY and stocks but that is fading as "good news" will relieve The Fed's angst over growth...

HINT: Monitor Russia for more clues...

PBOC strengthens Yuan by most since Nov 2014

The message from China was heard loud and clear from the IMF meetings in Lima: The United States [Fed] "should assume its global responsibilities" given the dollar's status as reserve currency; "now is not the time to raise rates."

Though emerging economies’ debts seem largely moderate by historic standards, it seems likely that they are being underestimated, perhaps by a large margin. If so, the magnitude of the ongoing reversal in capital flows that emerging economies are experiencing may be larger than is generally believed – potentially large enough to trigger a crisis. In this context, keeping track of opaque and evolving financial linkages is more important than ever.