Italy

• Germany Crisis Role in Focus After G-20 Rebuff (Bloomberg)
• G20 to Europe: Show us the money (Reuters)
• Draghi’s Unlimited Loans Are No Panacea (Bloomberg)
• Geithner says Europe has lowered risks of "catastrophe" (Reuters)
• Gone in 22 Seconds (WSJ)
• Gillard beats Rudd to stay Australian PM (FT)
• Brazil Will Continue Reducing Interest Rates, Tombini Says (Bloomberg)
• China to Have ‘Soft Landing’ Soon: Zoellick (Bloomberg)
• China To Be Largest Economy Before 2030: World Bank (Reuters)
• Obama pressed to open emergency oil stocks (FT)

Overnight sentiment is significantly negative, with stocks, bond yields, risk currencies lower after G-20 over the weekend refused to increase IMF funding. The result is an end to the buoyant market sentiment of recent days which has seen the Dax down 1.2%, bund, UST yields lower, and US futures lower. As many had expected, the G-20 has rebuffed EU leaders' request for more assistance, which in turn has placed the onus on Germany to find a way to resolve its internal conflict vis-a-vis a Greek bailout, ironically as many believe that it is Germany who more than anyone wants Greece out. This happens as the Bundestag votes today on second aid package today; Merkel’s government must decide whether to back plans at this week’s summit to combine EFSF and ESM. In other news, tomorrow the ECB will call for bids for the second 3 Year LTRO tomorrow, with results announced on February 29. And with the ECB's deposit facility at €477 billion, it is rather clear that the banks will park the bulk of new proceeds with the ECB once again, where it will continue to be a negative carry trade, earning 0.25% at a cost of 1.00%. And somehow this is favorable for the European sovereign bond market, which continues to ignore the various layers of subordination it is now working under. We expect the market revulsion to this flaw to be violent when it comes, and will result in a rapid and sudden divergence between the various subordinated tranches of sovereign bonds.

While we are aware of politicians' repeated vows about the uniqueness of the Greek case, we remain deeply skeptical. After all, hasn't it been a winning investment strategy to assume that the exact opposite of whatever Europe's elite says will become fact? The recently overheard and filmed conversation between Germany's and Portugal's finmins (http://t.co/iDA9HJPo) points in the direction of an imminent review of the Portuguese case and might be a harbinger of PSI, OSI etc à la Gréce. And why stop there? Why not relieve the Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese etc. of their troublesome load? Wouldn't it be nice to pull a Greek and finally make it for those pesky Maastricht criteria? But regardless of one's view on the ongoing crisis, it makes perfect sense to go where no investor has gone before. We did the unthinkable, read the unreadable and made it back alive to tell the tale: we ploughed through all of the individual bond prospectuses of our favorite list of countries in peril and actually found a lot of useful information for the investor. Given that the sovereign bonds of the Eurozone used to be looked at as riskless assets, it is safe to assume that the exercise hasn't been done by a lot of investors on a regular basis. Judging by the difficulty to even obtain the information, both the interest of investors to obtain it and that of issuers and underwriters to provide it has been and remains extremely limited.

No mas....

The record volatility, and 400 point up and down days in the DJIA of last summer seem like a lifetime ago, having been replaced by a smooth, unperturbed, 45 degree-inclined see of stock market appreciation, rising purely on the $2 trillion or so in liquidity pumped into global markets by the central printers, ever since Italy threatened to blow up the Ponzi last fall. In short - we have once again hit peak complacency. Yet with crude now matching every liquidity injection tick for tick (and then some: Crude's WTI return is now higher than that of stocks), there is absolutely no more space for the world central banks to inject any more stock appreciation without blowing up Obama's reelection chances (and you can be sure they know it). Suddenly the market finds itself without an explicit backstop. So what are some of the "realizations" that can pop the complacency bubble leading to a stock market plunge, and filling the liquidity-filled gap? Here are, courtesy of David Rosenberg, six distinct hurdles that loom ever closer on the horizon, and having been ignored for too long, courtesy of Bernanke et cie, will almost certainly become the market's preoccupation all too soon.

Consider that when we include the rest of the PIIGS countries, Deutsche Bank’s “actual” exposure (as downplayed as it might be) is still 35 BILLION Euros, an amount equal to 60% of the banks’ total equity.

As the banks in Europe report out earnings; or the lack thereof in most cases, it becomes clear that the LTRO is helping with liquidity but not with solvency past some very short term point. This is always the case of course but it is beginning to hit home. The balance sheets for many European banks have now swelled on the liability side with more and more debt piling up courtesy of the ECB while their assets decrease due to the Basel III mandates so that the financials of these banks begin to deteriorate. It is not just the losses from their Greek debt holdings that are coming into play but also their potential future losses from sovereign debt write downs markedly for Portugal soon I think but also perhaps for Spain and Italy in the near term as the recession in Europe brings new problems to the fore which will further reduce the value of sovereign and bank credits in Europe.

• U.S. Postal Service to Cut 35,000 Jobs as Plants Are Shut (BBG) -Expect one whopper of a seasonal adjustment to compensate
• European Banks May Tap ECB for $629 Billion Cash (Bloomberg) - EURUSD surging as all ECB easing now priced in; Fed is next
• Madrid presses EU to ease deficit targets (FT)
• Greek Parliament Approves Debt Write-Down (WSJ)
• Mentor of Central Bankers Fischer Rues Complacency as Economy Accelerates (Bloomberg)
• Draghi Takes Tough Line on Austerity (WSJ)
• European Banks Hit by Losses (WSJ)
• Moody's: won't take ratings action on Japan on Friday (Reuters)
• Athens told to change spending and taxes (FT)

We need to look to Europe now to see what TPTB have in store for us. This is the consummate problem, reaction, solution game being played for all the marbles. First, you get the problem “spiking interest rates for the peripheral countries.” Then the “reaction,” financial panic and fear. Finally the “solution.” The placement of unelected technocrats as the leaders of Greece and Italy with ties to all the power structure’s institution such as the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg group and of course Goldman Sachs. It is like a coup that takes the shadow government from the shadows and puts them in your face. The reason that this is so key is because we are next. They don’t want to roll up everything at once. If they can get Europe safely consolidated then they will move here. That is when interest rates in the U.S. will spike (problem), and we get panic (reaction) and then the solution (bankster technocratic committees in charge and the IMF to the rescue, ie loss of sovereignty). This is the plan and I see it as clear as day.

The surreal keeps getting surrealer. One could probably think that after being forced to pay for the privilege of having a job, to fund European bank solvency out of their pocket as part of the Greek "bailout", and finally to hand over their gold, the Greeks would have at least put up a fight. One would be wrong: instead of doing anything else than the occasional store front looting by marauding gangs, what Greeks are doing instead... is lining up for German lessons. Well, if you can't beat them, may as well learn their language. Athens News reports: "Ruediger Bolz has 350 students coming through the doors of his German language institute in central Athens each day - 20 percent up on a year ago. The rush among Greeks to learn German may seem odd after the war of words between the two countries, with Greeks fuming at German accusations of financial mismanagement and some media playing on Nazi caricatures of Berlin politicians. Yet for Bolz, who has run the Goethe Institute for the last six years, there is no mystery: his pupils are happy to side-step politics and face up to harsh economic realities by acquiring new skills." So years of debt slavery induced misery may be in store, and the sheep are delighted to get the electric cattle prod, but at least they get to beg their employers to take their money with the proper umlaut usage.

“Ms. Katseli, an economist who was labor minister in the government of George Papandreou until she left in a cabinet reshuffle last June, was also upset that Greece’s lenders will have the right to seize the gold reserves in the Bank of Greece under the terms of the new deal.” The Reuters Global Gold Forum confirms that in the small print of the Greek “bailout” is a provision for the creditors to seize Greek national gold reserves. Reuters correspondents in Athens have not got confirmation that this is the case so they are, as ever, working hard to pin that down. Greece owns just some 100 tonnes of gold. According to IMF data, for some reason over the last few months Greece has bought and sold the odd 1,000 ounce lot of its gold bullion reserves. A Reuter’s correspondent notes that “these amounts are so tiny that it could well be a rounding issue, rather than holdings really rising or falling.” While many market participants would expect that Greece’s gold reserves would be on the table in the debt agreement, it is the somewhat covert and untransparent way that this is being done that is of concern to Greeks and to people who believe in the rule of law.

• IMF Official: 'Huge' Greek Program Implementation Risks In Next Few Days (WSJ)
• European Banks Take Greek Hit After Deal (Bloomberg)
• Obama Urged to Resist Calls to Use Oil Reserves Amid Iran Risks (Bloomberg)
• Hungary hits at Brussels funds threat (FT)
• Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule Before Inciting Foreign Outrage (Bloomberg)
• Germany fights eurozone firewall moves (FT)
• New York Federal Reserve Said to Plan Sale of AIG-Linked Mortgage Bonds (Bloomberg)
• G-20 Asks Europe to Beef Up Funds (WSJ)
• New Push for Reform in China (WSJ)

'All is not resolved' is how Morgan Stanley's Arnaud Mares begins his latest diatribe on the debacle that is occurring in Europe. While a disorderly default seems to have been avoided (for now), the Greek problem (as we have discussed extensively) remains unsolved as debt sustainability seems questionable at best, economic recovery a remote hope, and the growing political tensions across Europe (and its people) grow wider. Critically, Mares addresses the seeming complacency towards a Greek exit from the euro area noting that it is no small matter and has dramatic consequences (specifically a la Lehman, the unintended consequences could be catastrophic). Greece (or another nation) leaving the Euro invites concerns over the fungibility of bank deposits across weak and strong nations and with doubt over the Euro, the EU could collapse as free-trade broke down. The key is that, just as in the US downgrade case last year, a Euro-exit implies the impossible is possible and the impact of such an event is much, much higher than most seem to realize. While the likelihood of a Greek euro-exit may remain low (for now), the scale of the impact makes this highly material and suggests the EU will do whatever it takes (print?) within their mandates to hold the status quo. For all practical purposes, it would be the end of the euro as a genuine single currency and to preserve the euro if Greece left would require total federalism in the rest of the area.

In the ongoing 'game of chicken' in Europe (playing out between the core and the periphery as the main two players) it appears we are once again at a point of inflection in the Nash Equilibrium that exists only in the minds of the Eurogroup leaders. As Credit Suisse notes, the continued existence of the Euro will hugely depend on the incentive structure of its members to defend it (and implicitly this means costs and retaliations - downsides - must be appreciated and allocated). These incentives evolve through time (and interventions can have unintended consequences) and brinksmanship and threats (Greece's referendum comments for instance) can improve outcomes in the short-term. Most importantly, it seems the market is among the best mediators to 'fix' each player's action and outcome but each intervention reduces that effect, 'time becomes money' as costs are increasing through procrastination. This leaves the asymmetric interests of the players (remember how exposed the core is to the periphery?) likely to increase break-up risks with Credit Suisse seeing the logical and intended consequence 'an increase in stress' - with either a 'catastrophic' break-up (or member exit) or a long, painful and volatile continuation of the crisis that can only be slowly improved by some type of inter-European enforceable contract. The more intervention, the lower the immediate impact of inaction and the higher the pent-up volatility in the system before threats are taken seriously (or consequences admitted).

We have discussed, at length, the symbiotic (or perhaps parasitic) relationship between the banking system in Europe and the governments (read Central Banks). The LTRO has done nothing but bring them into a closer and more mutually-reinforcing chaotic relationship as we suspect many of the Italian and Spanish banks have gone all-in on the ultimate event risk trade in their government's debt. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the bulk of the Greek bailout money will flow directly to the European banking system and Credit Suisse has recently updated the bank exposure (by country) to peripheral sovereign debt that shows just how massively dependent each peripheral nation's banking system is on its own government for capital and more importantly, how the core (France and Germany) remains massively exposed (in terms of Tier 1 Capital) to the PIIGS. Retroactive (negative) salary cuts may well not be the worst of what is to come as the bankers deleveraging returns to bite them in a phoenix-like resurrection of sovereign risk on now even-more sovereign-bloated (and levered) balance sheets.