Lehman

For Bonds, It's A Lehman Repeat

There is plenty of discussion of outflows but we though the following chart was perhaps the most insightful at why this drop is different from the last few year's BTFD corrections. As we noted here, corporate bond managers have desperately avoided selling down their cash holdings (since they know dealer liquidity cannot support broad-based selling and its an over-crowded trade) and bid for hedges in CDS markets. But it seems, given the utter collapse in the advance-decline lines for high-yield and investment-grade bonds that the liquidations have begun. While the selling in high-yield bonds is on par with the Lehman liquidationlevels, it is the collapse in investment grade bond demand that is dramatic (and worse than Lehman). It's not like we couldn't see it coming at some point (here) and as we warned here, What Happens Next? Simply put, stocks cannot rally in a world of surging debt finance costs.

Chinese Sovereign Risk Spikes Most Since Lehman

With the nation's short-term funding markets in crisis mode - no matter how much they are jawboned about temporary seasonal factors - it seems yet another indicator of stress is flashing the red warning signal. China's sovereign CDS has spiked by the most since Lehman in the last 3 days - up 55% to 140bps. This is the highest spread (risk) in 18 months and looks eerily similar to the period around the US liquidity market freeze. Hedging individual Chinese bank counterparty risk is hard (given illiquidty) and so it would seem traders are proxying general risk of failure via the nation's sovereign risk (and stocks which also languish at post-Lehman lows). On a related note, Aussie banks have seen there credit risk rise 50% in the last month as they suffer domestically and from the China contagion.

This Is An Extraordinary Time

It's as if we have two economies: the simulacrum one of stocks rising dramatically in a few months, and the real one of household earnings (down) and hours worked (down). It is difficult to justify the feeling that we are living in an extraordinary moment in time, for the fundamental reason that it's impossible to accurately assess the present in a historical context. Extraordinary moments are most easily marked by dramatic events such as declarations of war or election results; lacking such a visible demarcation, what sets this month of 2013 apart from any other month since the Lehman Brothers' collapse in 2008? It seems to me that the ordinariness of June 2013 is masking its true nature as a turning point. Humans soon habituate to whatever conditions they inhabit, and this adaptive trait robs us of the ability to discern just how extraordinary the situation has become.

The Toxic Feedback Loop: Emerging <-> Money <-> Developed Markets

Extreme Developed Market (DM) monetary policy (read The Fed) has floated more than just US equity boats in the last few years. Foreign non-bank investors poured $1.1 trillion into Emerging Market (EM) debt between 2010 and 2012 as free money enabled massive carry trades and rehypothecation (with emerging Europe and Latam receiving the most flows and thus most vulnerable). Supply of cheap USD beget demand of EM (yieldy) debt which created a supply pull for EM corporate debt which is now causing major indigestion as the demand has almost instantly dried up due to Bernanke's promise to take the punchbowl away. From massive dislocations in USD- versus Peso-denominated Chilean bonds to spiking money-market rates in EM funds, the impact (and abruptness) of these colossal outflows has already hit ETFs and now there are signs that the carnage is leaking back into money-market funds (and implicitly that EM credit creation will crunch hurting growth) as their reaching for yield as European stress 'abated' brings back memories of breaking-the-buck and Lehman and as Goldman notes below, potentially "poses systemic risk to the financial system."

Treasuries' Worst Week In 50 Years; Stocks Worst Week In 2013

5Y yields rose a stunning 37% this week - the most in the 50 year record of Bloomberg data. The 38bps increase in yields is also among the worst absolute shifts over that period but off such low levels it is quite a shock. Credit markets saw hedge protection bought early on in the week and then covered as real money started to sell their bonds on the back of redemptions in the last two days. The high-yield bond ETF had its biggest weekly loss in 13 months (notably clinging to the Lehman ledge levels). Equity markets suffered too (down 3.5 to 4.0% from the FOMC) with the S&P's worst week of the year (even as it bounced off its 100DMA). Most sectors hung around the 3-4% drop but homebuilders are down over 8% since the FOMC. The USD surged over 2.1% on the week with JPY's worst week in 43 months. VIX ended the day down 1.7 vols at 18.8% but beware as OPEX and hedge unwinds into underlying covers seems prevalent. Gold's worst week in 21 months left it back under $1300.

 

Pivotfarm's picture

Dive! Take cover! Or, at least, hold on to your pants in the scramble. The Chinese bubble has just burst. It looks like the world is going to have egg on its face and elsewhere as Chinese banks are scrambling to get the hands on cash.

Is This Why The PBOC Is Not Coming To The Rescue?

We have warned a number of times that China is a ticking time-bomb (and the PBoC finds itself between a housing-bubble rock and reflationary liquidity injection hard place) but the collapse of trust in the interbank funding markets suggests things are coming to a head quickly. The problem the administration has is re-surging house prices and a clear bubble in credit (as BofAML notes that they suspect that May housing numbers might have under-reported the true momentum in the market since local governments are pressured to control local prices) that they would like to control (as opposed to exaggerate with stimulus). As we noted here, while the PBOC may prefer to be more selective with their liquidity injections (read bank 'saves' like ICBC last night) due to the preference to control the housing bubble, when they finally fold and enter the liquidity market wholesale, the wave of reflation will rapidly follow (and so will the prices of precious metals and commodities).

Here Is What's Going On In China: The Bronze Swan Redux

A month ago, when stock markets around the globe were hitting all time highs, we wrote "The Bronze Swan Arrives: Is The End Of Copper Financing China's "Lehman Event"?" which as so often happens, many read, but few appreciated for what it truly was - the end of a major shadow leverage conduit (one involving unlimited rehypothecation at that),and the collapse of a core source of shadow liquidity. One month later, China's "Lehman event" is on the verge of appearing, and with Overnight repo rates hitting 25% last night, coupled with rumors of bank bailouts rampant, it very well already may have but don't expect the secretive Chinese politburo and PBOC to disclose it any time soon. So now that the market has finally once again caught up with reality, for the benefit of all those who missed it the first time, here is, once again, a look at the arrival of China's Bronze Swan.

China Interbank Market Freezes As Overnight Repo Explodes To 25%

It seems liquidity (or counterparty mistrust) is beginning to reach extreme levels in China as the nation's banking system is now quoting overnight repo transactions at 25%. The explosion in funding costs echoes the collapse in trust (and surge in TED spread) among US banks in the run-up to the Lehman bankruptcy. MSCI Asia-Pac stocks are down over 3% with China's Shanghai Composite -2.5% at seven-month lows.

  • China’s 1-day Repo Rate Climbs to Highest Since at Least 2006
  • MNI - CHINA OVERNIGHT REPO FIXING AT RECORD HIGH

Guest Post: 25 Years Of Real Estate In One Chart

With Bernanke now making it extremely clear that housing is all we have, the following may raise a few eyebrows. Accommodate, accommodate, accommodate, accommodate... that was and is the mantra. It did not matter whether it was the S&L fiasco, 9/11, the sub-prime bubble or the Lehman collapse, the Fed's policy is to accommodate. All good things must come to an end. Look at that chart. We are about to go off the page. With QE-to-infinity, Bernanke is spent. Each new iteration of accommodation is bringing in less results.

China Joins The Broken "Keynesian Multiplier" Club

A week ago we showed a chart from Charles Gave which does a terrific job at explaining why the modern economic "science", in conjunction with the Fed's negative rate environment, have failed at their ultimate stated mission - to stimulate growth. The reason: the Keynesian multiplier, which has tracked the nominal US GDP 7yr average change with a very high correlation, is now negative. From Gave: "shows that the marginal efficiency of public debt, at least in the US (public spending in emerging markets from a low base usually improves productivity) has been declining structurally since 1981. And it seems that this marginal efficiency has now reached a negative level."... There is now another problem: as the chart below shows, China has developed a Keynesian multiplier problem of its own. Even as the Chinese politburo and the PBOC have been injecting an ever increasing amount of credit into the private sector - the primary source of Chinese growth - the incremental GDP growth has been trending lower, and lower, and lower...

Following Surge In "Fails To Deliver" To Two Year Highs, Treasury Market Finds A Brief Respite

Our "silver lining" concluding remark to last week's lackluster 10 Year bond reopening auction was that "the good news is that with the reopening, dealers should have some additional collateral for a while, or at least until the Fed monetizes it. Look for this CUSIP - VB3 (On The Run) to remain on the POMO exclusion lists for white a while." Sure enough, following the Friday settlement of this auction, things in the Treasury repo market have normalized somewhat after hitting very dangerous levels. How bad did it get? The following chart of failures to deliver from the NY Fed shows just how acute the shortage of "high quality collateral" (where the 10 Year is the fulcrum instrument) got in the past two months, with the total rising to $129 billion, or the biggest freeze in the repo market since the debt-ceiling crisis in the summer of 2011 when this number hit $280 billion.