M2

We start with a typical third Thursday of the month—claims, Philly Fed, and leading indicators—then pile on with mortgage delinquencies and five Fed speakers. Today's POMO focuses on bonds due 5/31/2013 – 11/15/2014

• Fed Global Backlash Grows (WSJ)
• Warsh Says Federal Reserve's Asset Purchases May Fail to Benefit Economy (Bloomberg)
• The HFT parasites are back in full force: High-Frequency Traders Lobby, Donate to Head Off U.S. Rules (Bloomberg)
• China to Tighten Control on Inflows of Overseas Funds (Bloomberg)
• Goldman Faces Lawsuit Over $1.2 Bln Hudson CDO Deals -Filing (WSJ)
• Ireland's Next Blow: Mortgages (WSJ)
• One Law for the Rich, One Law for the Poor: The new foreclosure crisis reveals the shocking unfairness in how the law treats struggling homeowners (Stiglitz)
• Goldman, Natixis Fight Over Swaps Deal Goes to Trial in London (Bloomberg)
• A Recipe for Fascism (TruthOut)

Typically at this time on Thursday we present our weekly Fed balance sheet update. At this point, that particular data is irrelevant as what the Fed's assets look like today, is nothing compared to what they will look like in 8 months, when the Fed will own more Treasuries than China and Japan combined. So instead we present the M2 update, where after 16 consecutive weeks of increases, M2 has finally dipped. Oddly enough, this occurs just before the Fed went balls to the well in buying EVERYTHING.

So much for the Fed's two mythical mandates of promoting "maximum employment" and maintaining "price stability." First, we had Bernanke's predecessor Greenspan confirming in late July on Meet the Press what everyone knows: namely that the primary goal of the Fed is merely to encourage higher stock prices: "if the stock market continues higher it will do more to stimulate the economy than any other measure we have discussed here." And now, courtesy of an Op-Ed by the current chairman, we get confirmation, again, just three months later, from the current chairman, that the Fed cares mostly about stimulating high stock prices, solely to create the completely artificial illusion of "wealth" for the few, the proud, the shareholders, and the banking oligarchy.

An 3rd grader can pick the [fr]odd one out. Yet Wall Street can't. Can you?

It appears that the one topic pundits have the most problems grasping is the spread between the segregation of traditional and shadow monetary aggregates, overall economic deleveraging and aggregate monetary velocity, and how all that impacts GDP. A summary which confirms just how prevalent the confusion is, is this terrific post by the Kalafia Beach Pundit, terrific not because it is even remotely correct (the post is so blatantly wrong - one wonders if Western Asset Management even expects its current and former asset managers to count beyond 2... M2 that is), but because it demonstrates how self-professed "pundits", whether of the beach variety or not, don't have the faintest grasp of more than merely trivial monetary topics.

Democrats--"sadly enough"--would get a shot at still retaining the majority, which would mean the monetary and fiscal policy will most likely stay on its current course. Meanwhile, the 0.25% interest rate hike effective Oct. 20 by the PBoC is "meaningless," because of skyrocketing property prices, and the cost of living inflation has gone up much more than the official figure.

Two simple charts tell it all. Bonus: at the end, we explain how to make Paul Krugman squirm.

With just over a week left to the QE2 announcement, discussion over the amount, implications and effectiveness of QE2 are almost as prevalent (and moot) as those over the imminent collapse of the MBS system. Although whereas the latter is exclusively the provenance of legal interpretation of various contractual terms, and as such most who opine either way will soon be proven wrong to quite wrong, as in America contracts no longer are enforced (did nobody learn anything from the GM/Chrysler fiasco for pete's sake), when it comes to printing money the ultimate outcome will certainly have an impact. And the more the printing, the better. One of the amusing debates on the topic has been how much debt will the Fed print. Those who continue to refuse to acknowledge that the economy is in a near-comatose state, of course, hold on to the hope that the amount will be negligible: something like $500 billion (there was a time when half a trillion was a lot of money). A month ago we stated that the full amount will be much larger, and that the Fed will be a marginal buyer of up to $3 trillion. Turns out, even we were optimistic. A brand new analysis by Jan Hatzius, which performs a top down look at how much monetary stimulus is needed to fill the estimated 300 bps hole between the -7% Taylor Implied Funds Rate (of which, Hatzius believes, various other Federal interventions have already filled roughly 400 bps of differential) and the existing 0.2% FF rate. Using some back of the envelope math, the Goldman strategist concludes that every $1 trillion in new LSAP (large scale asset purchases) is the equivalent of a 75 bps rate cut (much less than comparable estimates by Dudley, 100-150bps, and Rudebusch, 130bps). In other words: the Fed will need to print $4 trillion in new money to close the Taylor gap. And here we were thinking the economy is in shambles. Incidentally, $4 trillion in crisp new dollar bills (stored in bank excess reserve vaults) will create just a tad of buying interest in commodities such as gold and oil...

The market rally was back on today with stocks shooting up faster than Ben Bernanke could chant "quantitative easing" over his bubbling cauldron (though he was heard incanting: "Double, double toil and trouble; Dollar burn, and assets bubble")...

The only thing mirroring the relentless outflow from stocks these days (now in their 23rd week) is the increase in the M2 money supply: the week ending October 4th was the 14th consecutive weekly increase in the broadest money aggregate compiled by the Fed which hit $8,752.4 billion, an increase of $20 billion from the $8,732.8 billion the week before. Curiously, the Fed decided to massively revise all previous numbers (as if the amount of money that goes in and out of a bank, and should be recorded electronically the second it happens is subject to change). Yet the strangest number to come out of the huge revision had to do with with the flow of money in and out of Small Denomination (under $100,000) time deposits, or in other words the place where the bulk of Main Street America parks their money for some pursuit of nominal yield. The kicker - since the beginning of the year there has not been one weekly inflow into small denomination time deposits! (go ahead and check it) It appears either the less than richest Americans need to constantly pull money out of the bank, as they give up yield (and in a Zero Interest Rate environment there is no yield to be given up) in order to pay their bills, or simply have decided to no longer keep their money with the big (and small) banks (as this includes both commercial banks and thrifts). Could the "starve the banks" campaign be working? If Americans succeed in pulling enough money from their banks via deposit redemption, coupled with the stock trading boycott, it will be the end of Wall Street post haste.

Despite every commodity opening limit up virtually every day for the past two weeks on expectations of a free money tsunami about to be unleashed (and a 14th weekly increase in M2 which we will describe shortly), David Rosenberg still adheres to the belief that deflation is not only here to stay but get worse. And, frankly, we don't disagree. It has long been our contention that the sublimation from deflation to hyperinflation will not pass through the inflation phase at all (or it may, but will last for exactly one millisecond as $3 trillion, by then, excess reserves are released and send every price up by a few quadrillion percent). In the meantime, the input cost-price mechanism is still broken, which leads Rosie to believe that the fact that the 30 Year just closed at an increasing inflection point with the rest of the curve going tighter, is to be ignored. Alas, with corporate margins approaching zero (and if you are Amazon, probably already there) companies face one of three choices: become banks, and borrow at ZIRP, and lend money to their customers via private label credit cards (unlikely), shut down, or raise prices. The last one is what will happen, and will finally put an end to the ridiculous consumer disrectionary rally that has perplexed humans (but not robots) for quarters on end. Furthermore, as to Rosie claims: "For all the talk of how higher Chinese wages were going to be transmitted to higher prices of these imported items, it does not seem to be happening" we will shortly post some thoughts which confirm that this is precisely what is happening.

This week we have official confirmation of our speculation from last week, that the Fed is now the second largest UST holder institution after China, with $821.2 billion in Treasurys. And courtesy of yesterday's POMO schedule announcement, according to which the Fed will purchase $32 billion in UST through November 8, at which point it was have $853 billion, we now know that Brian Sack will be the biggest holder of US Treasurys in the world (surpassing China's $847 billion). Aside from this there was little notable in the weekly balance sheet update: bank reserves increased by $29 billion in the past week, as Primary Dealers added even more to their purchasing capacity post the end of quarter window dressing (more in an upcoming update).

We highlighted the following report from St. Louis Fed's Daniel Thornton in today's Frontrunning, but it may bear repeating as it is the first written salvo in the internal Fed trench warfare over QE2. The report is no surprise: as St Louis is the bastion of Daniel Bullard, one of the biggest non-voting hawks at the Fed, a group which is increasingly getting more vocal with such others as Philly's Plosser and Dallas' Fisher, not to mention Atlanta's Hoenig, the paper titled "Would QE2 Have a Significant Effect on Economic Growth, Employment, or Inflation?" is merely an attempt by the sensible undercurrent at the Fed to distance itself from the policies enacted by the supreme madman in charge of it all. While the report says nothing notably new, it does repeat what all QE2 skeptics know all too well: "It is possible – perhaps even likely – that almost all of any increase in the supply of credit associated with QE2 simply would be held by banks as excess reserves. If so, the effect of QE2 on interest rates could be small and limited to an announcement effect – the effect associated with the FOMC’s announcement – independent of the effect of the FOMC’s actions on the credit supply." Which begs the question - why is this report coming out now? Is this the red herring to the lack of a QE2 announcement on November 3? With everyone certain monetization is imminent and inevitable, is everyone about to end up on the wrong side of the trade? And if so, just how far will the market crash, now that at least 150 S&P points worth of QE2 are priced in...

In his latest letter Van Hoisington cuts through the bullshit and asks the number one question (rhetorically): why are bank excess reserves (aka the ugly, liability side of Quantitative Easing) still so high. He answers: "Either the banks: 1) are not in a position to put additional capital at risk because their balance sheets are shaky; 2) are continuing to experience large write-downs on commercial and residential mortgages, as well as on a wide variety of other loans; or 3) customers may not have the balance sheet capacity or the need to take on additional debt. They could also see no expansionary prospects, or fear an uncertain regulatory future. In other words, no viable outlets exist for banks to loan funds." Which leads him to conclude quite simply that while risk assets may hit all time highs courtesy of free liquidity, the economy, also known as the middle class, will be stuck exactly where it was before QE2... and QE1. Van also looks at that other critical variable: velocity of money - "Velocity is primarily determined by the following: 1) financial innovation; 2) leverage, provided that the debt is for worthwhile projects and the borrowing is not of the Ponzi finance variety; and 3) numerous volatile short-term considerations." As an uptick in velocity is critical for any wholesale reflation (as opposed to merely hyperinflation) plan to work, this is one metric Van is unhappy with. Lastly, Hoisington also looks at the fiscal headwinds facing the country (which more so than anything terrify the Goldman economics team), and presents his vision on the bond-bubble argument.