Money On The Sidelines

Much has been made of equity inflows this week (though we note a significant outflow from high-yield bond funds - just as risk-on in its nature) and once again the money-on-the-sidelines fallacy is hawked at every opportunity. Two critical aspects are important to get past this 'fact' as some positive driver. First, money does not 'enter' the market, it is swapped (e.g. Person A's cash is used to buy shares from Person B; after the transaction the roles are swapped with Person B holding cash on the sidelines and Person A holding shares); and secondly, as Morgan Stanley's Gerard Minack notes, despite all the disclaimers – retail flows assume that past performance is a good guide to future outcomes. Consequently money tends to flow to investments that have done well, rather than investments that will do well.

It seems equity markets at all-time highs, high-yield funding markets near all-time low yields, and supposed money on the sidelines flooding back into stocks are just not enough to provide cover for the latest IPO:

*TOYS R US FILES TO WITHDRAW IPO :TOYS US

Not citing any specific reasons for the withdrawal, we suspect the weather and market conditions will be blamed as they just reported abysmal earnings of $239mm vs $343mm last year and sales down $155mm from last year (with Q4 comp sales -4.5% domestically and 5.4% international). Back to the drawing board for KKR and Bain to push this off to the next greater fool.

While chart analogs provide optically pleasing (and often far too shockingly correct) indications of the human herd tendencies towards fear and greed, a glance through the headlines and reporting of prior periods can provide just as much of a concerning 'analog' as any chart. In this case, while a picture can paint a thousand words; a thousand words may also paint the biggest picture of all. It seems, socially and empirically, it is never different this time as these 1936 Wall Street Journal archives read only too well... from devaluations lifting stocks to inflationary side-effects of money flow and from short-covering, money-on-the-sidelines, Jobs, Europe, low-volume ramps, BTFD, and profit-taking, to brokers advising stocks for the long-run before a 40% decline.

With yields compressed to record low levels, thanks to Bernanke's repression, and a consensus expecting margin stability and a huge hockey-stick in earnings going forward, the question is why aren't there more LBOs? Earnings yields relative to high-yield financing is back up at levels seen during the LBO Boom of 2003-7 and Private Equity shops appear full of money on the sidelines, so why aren't there more LBOs? At its simplest level, an LBO is enabled by a relative mis-pricing between debt and equity ‘costs’ that a private equity firm can utilize to fund the deal (cheap credit relative to equity in the WACC). These factors appear defensible but the main fear we have is their sustainability.

If yesterday's indications of the near-record overweight net long positioning in Russell 2000 Futures & incredible net short VIX futures positioning, along with the extreme flows contrarian indication was not enough to concern investors that the 'money' is in, then the following four charts should cross the tipping point. Citi's Panic/Euphoria guage for US stocks has only been more euphoric on two occasions - Q4 2000 & 2008; Goldman's S&P 500 positioning has only been this extremely long-biased on two occasions - Q4 2008 & Q2 2011; and Barclays' credit-equity divergence has only been this over-bought stocks on two occasions - Q4 2008 & Q2 2012. It doesn't take a PhD to comprehend the extent of excess priced into stocks currently - no matter what Maria B tries to tell us.

Much was made of the first two days of this year as indicative of the great 'meme' that every sell-side rep and commission-taking asset manager has pumped investors full of - the 'great rotation' is here. Finally, rates were rising, growth was here, money on the sidelines was moving, and the supposedly 'dumb money' was rotating from bonds to stocks. However, that is not what happened now is it? 10Y yields are now practically unchanged on the year - even as stocks continue to be bid - with the major divergence beginning on January 11th. There is, however, an alternate 'great rotation' that appears just as powerful - that of covering idiosyncratic AAPL longs and rotating into systemic long equity positions (or covering AAPL-hedging short equity index positions). We suspect, given the volume shifts below, that much of the mysterious buying power in S&P 500 futures is indeed beta-hedge unwinds from massively over-exposed AAPL longs unwinding. With AAPL's earnings due tonight, perhaps this 'rotation' will be over.

When people talk about "cash in the bank", or "money on the sidelines", the conventional wisdom reverts to an image of inert capital, used by banks to fund loans (as has been the case under fractional reserve banking since time immemorial) sitting in a bank vault or numbered account either physically or electronically, and collecting interest, well, collecting interest in the Old Normal (not the New ZIRPy one, where instead of discussing why it is not collecting interest the progressive intelligentsia would rather debate such trolling idiocies as trillion dollar coins, quadrillion euro Swiss cheeses, and quintillion yen tuna). There is one problem, however, with this conventional wisdom: it is dead wrong.  Tracking deposit flow data is so critical, as it provides hints of major inflection points, such as when there is a massive build up of deposits via reserves (either real, from saving clients, or synthetic, via the reserve pathway) which can then be used as investments in the market. And of all major inflection points, perhaps none is more critical than the just released data from today's H.6 statement, which showed that in the trailing 4 week period ended December 31, a record $220 billion was put into savings accounts (obviously a blatant misnomer in a time when there is no interest available on any savings). This is the biggest 4-week total amount injected into US savings accounts ever, greater than in the aftermath of Lehman, greater than during the first debt ceiling crisis, greater than any other time in US history.

In the last two weeks we have pointed out that not only are equity futures traders the most net long in six years but NYSE Margin Debt is also near four year highs. Add to this the fact that VIX futures are the most net short they have ever been - crushed by an all too visible hand - and it appears that equity market participants were critically unafraid of the fiscal cliff uncertainty. What is even more concerning, at least for those who care to be modestly contrarian that is, is that the market appears to be running out of greater fools in every asset class as JPMorgan's speculative position indicator - which combines net positioning across 8 'risky' and 7'safe' assets - is at its most risk-on since just before the crash began in Q3 2007. So, for all those taking heads who expect a flood of new money, who still believe there is money on the sidelines that wants to be put to work, the fact is in the last decade we have been more speculatively positioned long only once - and that marked the top in stocks (and risk-assets everywhere).

Overnight, Frank Partnoy and Jesse Eisinger released an epic magnum opus titled "What's Inside America's Banks", in which they use over 9000 words, including spot on references to Wells Fargo, JPM, Andy Haldane, Kevin Warsh, Basel II, Basel III (whose regulatory framework is now 509 pages and includes a ridiculous 78 calculus equations to suggest that banks have to delever by some $3 trillion, which is why it will never pass) to give their answer: "Nobody knows." Of course, while this yeoman's effort may come as news to a broader cross-section of the population, is it well known by anyone who has even a passing interest in the loan-loss reserve release earnings generating black boxes formerly known as banks (which once upon a time made their money using Net Interest margin, and actually lending out money to make a profit), and now simply known as FDIC insured Bank Holding Company hedge funds. This also happens to be the second sentence in the lead paragraph of the story: "Sophisticated investors describe big banks as “black boxes” that may still be concealing enormous risks—the sort that could again take down the economy." So far so good, and again - not truly news. What however may come as news to none other than the author is that the first sentence of the lead-in: 'Some four years after the 2008 financial crisis, public trust in banks is as low as ever" is, sadly, wrong.

A month ago, we showed something disturbing: the weekly increase in savings deposits held at Commercial banks soared by a record $132 billion, more than the comparable surge during the Lehman Failure, the First Debt Ceiling Fiasco (not to be confused with the upcoming second one), and the First Greek Insolvency. And while there were certainly macro factors behind the move which usually indicates a spike in risk-aversion (and at least in the old days was accompanied by a plunge in stocks), a large reason for the surge was the unexpected rotation of some $70 billion in savings deposits at Thrift institutions leading to a combined increase in Savings accounts of some $60 billion. Moments ago the Fed released its weekly H.6 update where we find that while the relentless increase in savings accounts at commercial banks has continued, rising by another $70 billion in the past week, this time there was no offsetting drop in Savings deposits at Thrift Institutions, which also increased by $10.0 billion. The end result: an increase of $79.3 billion in total saving deposits at both commercial banks and thrifts, or an amount that is only the third largest weekly jump ever following the $102 billion surge following Lehman and the $92.4 billion rotation into savings following the first US debt ceiling debacle and US downgrade in August 2011.

Perhaps one of the most startling and telling charts of the New Normal, one which few talk about, is the soaring difference between bank loans - traditionally the source of growth for banks, at least in their Old Normal business model which did not envision all of them becoming glorified, Too Big To Fail hedge funds, ala the Goldman Sachs "Bank Holding Company" model; and deposits - traditionally the source of capital banks use to fund said loans. Historically, and logically, the relationship between the two time series has been virtually one to one. However, ever since the advent of actively managed Central Planning by the Fed, as a result of which Ben Bernanke dumped nearly $2 trillion in excess deposits on banks to facilitate their risk taking even more, the traditional correlation between loans and deposits has broken down. It is time to once again start talking about this chart as for the first time ever the difference between deposits and loans has hit a record $2 trillion! But that's just the beginning - the rabbit hole goes so much deeper...

In Late 2006, the S&P 500 futures market traded around 1435 and the commitment of traders was at an extreme net long position. The market fell shortly after only to manage a miraculous rise in the face of hedge funds going bust and an exploding and over-leveraged credit market. In mid-2008, the S&P 500 futures also traded around these levels, from where the epic collapse really began. Six years later, the S&P 500 futures traders are the most bullishly positioned they have been since those heady over-confident days. Still believe the talking heads that there is money on the sidelines waiting to be put to work? Still convinced that there will be some epic rally if the 'fiscal cliff' fallacy is resolved? Positioning (real money) trumps Sentiment (AAII surveys etc.) every day in our book. The Bernank will be pleased at his success.

Spend more than 10 minutes watching business television and you will undoubtedly be told that there's a lot of money on the sidelines, everyone owns bonds, and once 'some catalyst - election? fiscal cliff? year-end?' is completed then that rush of desirous greedy capital will send Tom Lee's own S&P 500 to new 'giddy' heights. Well, back here in reality-land (away from the total misunderstanding that the cash on the sidelines will always be there as the person you 'buy' your shares from is left with the same 'cash' you held before) it appears that these two charts suggest those sidelined investors are anything but. As Morgan Stanley notes, 77% of US investors are now bullish on US equities - near record highs - and if, like us, you prefer positioning (as opposed to sentiment) data, the net longs in S&P 500 futures are as high as they were in 2007 (right before the peak) and in late 2008 (right before the 27% plunge in the first quarter of 2009). But apart from that...

Something odd popped up while going through the weekly H.6 update...