The bankruptcy of America is getting borderline hilarious, even as stock capitalization surges by about $1 trillion based on funny money to be printed by the ECB with the Fed's assistance. In the second coming of moral hazard, one piece of news that some may have missed is Fannie Mae's earlier announcement that the mortgage lender is now more bankrupt than ever before - the firm lost $13.1 billion in net income on $3 billion in revenue. "The first-quarter loss resulted in a net worth deficit of $8.4 billion as of March 31, 2010, taking into account a $3.3 billion reduction in our deficit related to the adoption of new accounting standards, as well as unrealized gains on available-forsale securities during the first quarter. The Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency has therefore asked Treasury to provide us $8.4 billion on or prior to June 30, 2010." Additionally, the Fed backstopped entity also announced that "there is uncertainty regarding future of
business after conservatorship terminated and expect this uncertainty
to continue." But since in America asset prices have not reflected fundamentals in over a year, nobody gives a rat's ass. And the political whores in DC feel like beating up anyone who even dares to mention this particular $7 trillion dollar question mark which is equivalent to 50% of total US debt, so expect no reform to happen here, just like nothing happened with HFT, until the markets hits 1 quadrillion or zero. For all intents and purposes, the two outcomes are equivalent.
Even as the immediate factor for the 1000 point drop in the Dow is investigated for the next several months by the SEC, a process which will likely not come to any reasonable market structure regulatory recommendation before the SEC is forced to analyze the next subsequent (and even greater) crash, the one primary fundamental cause for the sell off in stocks this week was the ever deteriorating situation in Europe. As the euro tumbled on Thursday afternoon, which we noted 20 minutes before the stock market crash began in earnest, as implied correlation algos went berserk, and as viewers were witnessing the near-warfare in Athens live, things just got too real for speculators (investors is so 20th century). Various computerized trading platforms merely kicked on (or rather, off) after the initial panic had already set in, and liquidity evaporated, leading to the implosion in the market. And the primary reason for the initial market pessimism early on Thursday was the fact that even as the whole world was listening to Jean-Claude Trichet to say soothing words after the ECB's rate decision, the central bank president once again did not realize the gravity of the situation. And to speculators, long habituated to Bernanke's endorsement of infinite moral hazard and speculative mania, the fact that someone refused to play "ball" and leave open the possibility that failure is still permitted in our day and age was the last straw. Now, 48 hours later, we learn that the rumors, which we reported about the ECB preparing a bailout fund, were indeed true. Our sense is that at this point the ECB's action is "too little, too late" as contagion fear has already crept deep within the fabric of various overt and shadow funding/liquidity mechanisms. Additionally, the world is now convinced that Europe can only deal with problems retroactively, and who knows how big and unfixable the next problem will be: the ECB, which has lost most of its credibility after "inviting" the IMF to do a heavy part of the bailout, is about to become the laughing stock of global central banks. Trichet is seen merely as a powerless bureaucrat, caught between Merkel's electoral struggles and Bernanke's demands for contagion interception and implicit Fed supremacy over Europe. The contagion from the "isolated" Greek fiasco is rapidly spreading. Here are some of the ways in which markets are about to be affected.
Here are two accounts dissecting in detail the events from yesterday. One is from Dan Hinckley at Wild Analytics, the second from Dan O'Brien.
Bear's execs say, "We didn't do it. It's not our fault. Evil speculators conspired against us, and investors irrationally made a run on us." They have no clue and they sound pathetic. Perhaps they should have read two little books.
Now that moral hazard has been adopted everywhere, and the fate of the entire western world is determined by the successful issuance of hundreds of billions of dollars each and every month (we have gotten to the Maginot line where even a hint of a failed US auction would immediately blow up the global capital markets), it is prudent to take a detailed look into a topic that few have covered previously, namely what does the auction demand curve imply. We refer to the distribution of the Low-Mid-High yield break points in each and every treasury auction and whether they can provide some addition insight into the demand picture behind US sovereign debt.
German Fin Min: Crisis Largely Over In Europe and Germany
German Fin Min: If Greek Budget Consolidation Succeeds, No Tax Money Will Be Lost
German Fin Min: Without Consolidation In Greece We Will Have Unforeseeable Market Consequences
German Fin Min: Failure With Greece Would Put Euro In Question
German Fin Min: Cannot Throw Greece Out Of Eurozone
It's over - the excess debt/GDP terrorists have won, and Moral Hazard is now a global phenomenon. There will be no more failures anywhere. In other words, all your stock profits will come straight from your taxes.
Hands down, our favorite quote on investor’s lack of historical memory comes from Jeremy Grantham who said: “We will learn an enormous amount in the very short term, quite a bit in the medium term and absolutely nothing in the long term. That would be the historical precedent.” In this spirit, we highlight the lessons that should have been learned from the turmoil of 2008, complements of Seth Klarman. The excerpt below is from his annual letter. While most market participants have immediately forgotten these lessons, more prudent investors (who may still suffer from short term memory loss) should consider dusting this list off on an annual basis!
The ongoing Greek debt crisis has revived the old arguments that all national governments need monetary sovereignty. So, what if Greece had stayed with the Drachma, and never switched to the euro? Would this debt crisis be averted?
European central bankers and politicians have been as dumb as their American counterparts ...
"We are trapped in some horrendous Keynesian/monetarist nightmare, where policymakers, aided/abetted/advised by their buddies in the media, in the lobbyist cabal and in financial system, have YET AGAIN decided to go down the route which merely delays the problem/pushes it down the road, but which virtually guarantees that when the NEXT bubble collapses (I assume it will be the Global Government Debt/Bond Bubble and/or the Global Fiat Money/Paper Money/FX Bubble), there is NO pleasant way back. When this next bubble collapses, those of us living/working in these problem economies will realise, too late of course, that WE are the new emerging markets. And no, I don't mean the next China, instead my reference is to Argentina back in the late 90s/early 00s!. So if (as it seems to me) - even though we are agreed on the weak sustainable grwth outlook for the UK US Japan & Europe - that I WAS wrong and that Kevin is right on Austerity and the Reflation Trade, that policymakers will simply keep on behaving recklessly by loading on more debt and blowing more and bigger bubbles until the point of market and/or taxpayer revulsion, then this has some very clear 'asset allocation', and other implications" Bob Janjuah
Moore Capital, which was recently blamed for being a CDS "speculator" by Greece and the EU, discloses that it is in fact net long Greek duration (and its P&L is suffering as a result), according to a fund letter obtained by MarketWatch. It is thus not surprising that the fund is lamenting the botched Greek rescue, and the end of the EMU and hopes an effective bail out will soon be instituted. After all most leading hedge funds have been buying up Greek cash debt on the way down (and this certainly includes Paulson) without CDS hedging; they need it to avoid having the embarrassment of explaining to their LP how the only bet on global moral hazard so far this year has not panned out.
" in 2007 the liabilities of Barclays exceeded the UK’s GDP, the liabilities of Deutsche Bank stood at 80% of Germany’s GDP, and the liabilities of Fortis were several times larger than the GDP of its home country, Belgium ... such financial institutions may not just be “too big to fail”, but in fact “too big to exist” ... It was irrational to let Lehman Brothers fail, but it happened. Those who bet on that failure earned a substantial amount of money. So why not bet on a possible irrationality of European decision-making? "
"Somewhat paradoxically, the show of solidarity for Greece by other euro area members and the ECB raises the risk that the euro will break apart eventually. Seceding from the euro area to devalue is very costly and risky. But seceding to revalue and introduce a harder currency is easier. Germany might opt to do so one day. * The road to such a break-up scenario leads through even more fiscal profligacy and divergence in the euro area, a politicisation of monetary policy, and a weaker currency. Recent events suggest that the trip down this road has started." - Morgan Stanley
We are one step away from the full blown reincarnation of the entire CLO market. We read in Loanconnector that "LCDX14 and LCDX13 are better today on increased volume as accounts have found it increasingly difficult recently to take on exposure via the cash market, sources said. With sellers hard to come by in the cash loan space, investors are turning to synthetics to take on exposure." And there you have it: offer spigots everywhere are shut down as nobody sees any incentive to sell in a market where the Fed has taken away all the risk. And with sellers unwilling to offer product no matter what the cost, the scramble for derivatives and synthetic exposure is coming back with a vengeance. If this is any indication, we expect that the securitization market for corporate loans will be flying within a few weeks as investors needing to allocate capital to moral hazard strategies scramble to get Citi, Goldman, and Barclays to resecuritize all the same crap, and then some, that got us in this mess to begin with. With dividend deals, PIK toggles, no COC bonds, no downgrade trigger issues already a daily occurrence, corporate issuers hold all the cards. For all those companies which have opened restructuring practices over the past year in expectations of surging defaults, our condolences. You - 0, Moral Hazard - Infinity. As for the LCDX situtation: "Meanwhile, the Markit LCDX13 is hitting all time highs of 106.0625-106.1875 this afternoon."
Nasdaq Cumulative TICK Of 5,300 At Highest Since 2002, Relative Put/Call Ratio At Most Extreme Ever: The Bubble Is Now Fully BackSubmitted by Tyler Durden on 04/15/2010 10:29 -0400
The latest confirmation of the stock market bubble comes from Sentiment Trader which points out that yesterday's Nasdaq TICK almost passed an all time high, yet settled down...to 8 year high levels. As ST points out: "There were only three other dates that even come close to the current extreme: October 4, 2001: The NDX was coming off a major low, but still backed off for 3 days before rising again. May 2, 2002: The NDX dropped hard for the next 3 days. May 15, 2002: The NDX managed to rise a bit for the next 2 days, then rolled over into a major decline. Since then, the TICK hasn't managed to get above +4000 at any point, even intraday, much less to the +5300 level it closed at yesterday. Truly remarkable." Ben Bernanke has now succeeded at convincing virtually everyone that moral hazard is the right approach to dealing with an insolvent financial system. And for another indication of just how overbought the market is, Sentiment Trader also points out that the equity-only Put/Call ratio dropped to 0.32, the lowest reading since January 16, 2004, which on a relative basis is 45% below six-month average. The conclusion: " That, my friends, has never happened before (at least going back to 1997)."