net interest margin

In August of 2011, Argentina’s government slowly began to implement a series of actions destined to curtail the right of citizens to access US dollars (foreign exchange in general). The goal was and is to force savings into pesos, as pesos are after the taxable asset in a country that cannot access capital markets and fully monetizes its deficits. From that moment onward  physical US dollars started to trade at a premium. First-hand experience on the ground in Patagonia confirm the irreversible damage caused by interventionist policies: Widespread poverty, abandoned infrastructure, scarcity of consumer goods, unseen unemployment and criminality, and the madness of hedging against inflation with the purchase of new cars. The streets of any forgotten small town in Patagonia are filled with brand new 4×4 vehicles that would be the envy of many in North America. We can now see that the sustainability of the manipulation in a segmented/broken foreign exchange market causes a negative carry, which would create a quasi-fiscal deficit in Argentina (i.e. the deficit of the Banco Central), fully opening the gates to hyperinflation.

The diminishing returns of the Fed's quantitative easing are very evident in the latest WFC results.  

Moments after reporting its surprising 10% equity dilution, DB proceeds to release it Q1 earnings early. Some of the highlights:

• Revenue €9.4 bn, Est. €9.23 bn, up €197MM Y/Y
• Non-Interest expenses €6.6Bn, down 5% Y/Y
• Net Income €1.661 billion, up €253MM Y/Y
• Diluted earnings per share €1.71
• Provision for credit losses at €354MM, up €40 MM from prior year, but down €79MM from Q4.
• Sales and Trading(debt and other products) down €438MM, or -14% Y/Y
• Origination and Advisory net revenues increased by EUR 38 million, or 6%, compared to the first quarter 2012

With no macro data on the docket (the NAR's self promotional "existing home sales" advertising brochure is anything but data), the market will be chasing the usual carry currency pair suspects for hints how to trade. Alas, with even more ominous economics news out of Europe, and an apparently inability of Mrs Watanabe to breach 100 on the USDJPY (hitting 99.98 for the second time in two weeks before rolling over once more), we may be rangebound, or downward boung if CAT shocks everyone with just how bad the Chinese (and global) heavy construction (and thus growth) reality truly is. One asset, however, that has outperformed and is up by well over 2% is gold, trading at $1435 at last check, over $100 from the lows posted a week ago, and rising rapidly on no particular news as the sell off appears to be over and now the snapback comes and the realization that Goldman was happily buying everything its clients were selling all along.

The chart below may be the best one-chart summary of all that is wrong with the US financial system. It is a very simple chart - it shows total JPMorgan deposits, loans and the excess difference of deposits over loans.

If JPM and its "fortress" balance sheet and business model are supposed to represent Q1 earnings for US banks, it will not be a good start to the year. While EPS beat expectations solidly, coming at $1.59 on expectations of $1.39 print, this was largly driven by a bigger than expected loan loss reserve release in its real estate portfolios ($650MM pretax), and card services ($500MM pretax), which was the largest combined release number since the $2 billion reduction in Q1 2012. This took down total JPM total loan loss reserves to $20.8 billion, down from $21.9 billion in Q4, and down $5.1 billion from the $25.9 billion a year ago. This happened even though JPM's NPL declined far more modestly, from $10.7 billion to just $10.4 billion. It was the revenue of $25.12 that missed expectations of $25.85, down from $26.05 billion a year ago, and which is the bigger issue for the bank, driven by disappointing trading results with fixed income markets revenue of $4.8 Billion, down 5% YoY, equity markets revenue of $1.3 Billion, down 6% YoY, and Securities Services revenue of $974mm, flat YoY. Not surprisingly in order to maintain expenses, headcount continue to decline from 258,753 to 255,898.

While the topic of net Fed capital flows, and implicit balance sheet risk has recently gotten substantial prominence some three years after Zero Hedge first started discussing it, one open question is what happens when we cross the "D-Rate" boundary, or as we defined it, the point at which the Fed's Net Interest Margin becomes negative i.e., when the outflows due to interest payable to reserve banks (from IOER) surpasses the cash inflows from the Fed's low-yielding asset portfolio, and when the remittances to the Treasury cease (or technically become negative). To get the full answer of what happens then, we once again refer readers to the paper released yesterday by Morgan Stanley's Greenlaw and Deutsche Bank's Hooper, which discusses not only the parabolic chart that US debt yield will certainly follow over the next several decades, but the trickier concept known as the Fed's technical insolvency, or that moment when the Fed's tiny capital buffer goes negative. In short what would happen is that the Fed will be then forced to print money just so it can continue to print money.

When one thinks of the US banking system, the one thing few consider these days is the threat of a liquidity shortage. After all how can banks have any liquidity strain at a time when the Fed has dumped some $1.7 trillion in excess reserves into the banking system? Well, on one hand as we have shown previously, the bulk of the excess reserve cash is now solidly in the hands of foreign banks who have US-based operations. On the other, it is also safe to assume that with the biggest banks now nothing more than glorified hedge funds (courtesy of ZIRP crushing Net Interest Margin and thus the traditional bank carry trade), and with hedge funds now more net long, and thus levered, than ever according to at least one Goldman metric, banks have to match said levered bullishness to stay competitive with the hedge fund industry. Which is why the news that at noon the Fed reported that Primary Dealer borrowings from its SOMA portfolio, which amounted to $22.3 billion, just happened to be the highest such amount since 2011, may be taken by some as an indicator that suddenly the 21 Primary Dealers that face the Fed for the bulk of their liquidity needs are facing an all too real cash shortage.

Bank of America just reported yet another quarter marked by a bevy of "one-time" charges, which have now become normal course of business, even as NIM declined Y/Y, and sales and trading revenues declined sequentially. Loan loss reserve releases of $900 million more than offset the declining Noninterest income, and contributed to a positive pre-tax net income number. The biggest threat continue to be private Rep and Warrant outstanding claims which increased by almost 42 billion in the quarter to a total of $12.3 billion.

The much anticipated JPM earnings are out and while the company beat superficially, posting Q4 revenue of $24.4 billion vs expectations of $24.3 billion, and adjusted EPS of $1.35 "ex-items" vs expected $1.22, the real story as usual is below the surface. And in this case below the surface means what happens with the firm's Net Interest Margin, Trading Revenues, Loan Loss Reserve Releases and, of course, the busted "CIO and Treasury" aka London Whale unit. Starting with the last we have this: "Treasury and CIO reported a net loss of $157 million, compared with net income of $417 million in the prior year. Net revenue was a loss of $110 million, compared with net revenue of $845 million in the prior year. Net revenue included net securities gains of $103 million from sales of available-for-sale investment securities during the current quarter and principal transactions revenue of $99 million. Net interest income was a loss of $388 million due to low interest rates and limited reinvestment opportunities." JPM also warned to "Expect Treasury and CIO net loss of $300mm +/- in 1Q13; likely to vary each quarter." Funny how the once amazingly profitable CIO is no longer is a cash cow when it can't invest excess deposits and recycle reserves via repo into cornering the IG market. Finally, the Net Interest Margin, firmwide and core, declined by 3 and 7 bps respectively QoQ due to, per JPM, lower loan yields, lower yields on  investment securities; limited reinvestment opportunities; and higher balances in Fed funds sold and certain secured financings. In other words, ZIRP continues to take its toll on a bank which can no longer be a hedge fund and which can't make money on the NIM curve.

While Wall Street combs through Wells Fargo's numbers (which unlike the rest of US banks is not just a glorified hedge fund and actually still lends out deposits, primarily to fund home loans) to find some glimmer of good news (judging by the stock price it hasn't succeeded yet and won't), there is just one number that is of particular significance: that would be $176.5 billion, or the amount of excess total deposits ($976.1 billion) over loans ($799.6 billion) as of Q4. This is an all time record delta (as is to be expected since the entire US financial system now has a $2 trillion excess in deposits over loans), and a dramatic inversion from the excess loans over deposits that marked the bank's "Old Normal" balance sheet.

Overnight, Frank Partnoy and Jesse Eisinger released an epic magnum opus titled "What's Inside America's Banks", in which they use over 9000 words, including spot on references to Wells Fargo, JPM, Andy Haldane, Kevin Warsh, Basel II, Basel III (whose regulatory framework is now 509 pages and includes a ridiculous 78 calculus equations to suggest that banks have to delever by some $3 trillion, which is why it will never pass) to give their answer: "Nobody knows." Of course, while this yeoman's effort may come as news to a broader cross-section of the population, is it well known by anyone who has even a passing interest in the loan-loss reserve release earnings generating black boxes formerly known as banks (which once upon a time made their money using Net Interest margin, and actually lending out money to make a profit), and now simply known as FDIC insured Bank Holding Company hedge funds. This also happens to be the second sentence in the lead paragraph of the story: "Sophisticated investors describe big banks as “black boxes” that may still be concealing enormous risks—the sort that could again take down the economy." So far so good, and again - not truly news. What however may come as news to none other than the author is that the first sentence of the lead-in: 'Some four years after the 2008 financial crisis, public trust in banks is as low as ever" is, sadly, wrong.

Perhaps one of the most startling and telling charts of the New Normal, one which few talk about, is the soaring difference between bank loans - traditionally the source of growth for banks, at least in their Old Normal business model which did not envision all of them becoming glorified, Too Big To Fail hedge funds, ala the Goldman Sachs "Bank Holding Company" model; and deposits - traditionally the source of capital banks use to fund said loans. Historically, and logically, the relationship between the two time series has been virtually one to one. However, ever since the advent of actively managed Central Planning by the Fed, as a result of which Ben Bernanke dumped nearly $2 trillion in excess deposits on banks to facilitate their risk taking even more, the traditional correlation between loans and deposits has broken down. It is time to once again start talking about this chart as for the first time ever the difference between deposits and loans has hit a record $2 trillion! But that's just the beginning - the rabbit hole goes so much deeper...

In a shining example of the law of unintended consequences, when 2012 started Wall Street bankers had expected that all it would take for bonuses to surge and offset 2011's deplorable comp, is another round of QE. Well, QE came and went, not only in the US, but virtually everywhere else, and sure enough the market traded up to new 5 year highs (and just why of all time highs as well), yet something was not going according to plan: bank revenues. Another side-effect of the Fed buying the long end is everyone piling in and frontrunning Bernanke in the 10-30 Year segment, flattening the curve, and making Net Interest Margin profitability a thing of the past. The result has been a year in which despite stocks rising, banker pay is set to tumble even more (for those lucky enough to still even have a job that is, which for UBS and Nomura means about 80% of the employees a year ago) with traders of cash equities and derivatives set to see another 20% drop in comp from 2011 according to Options Group. The end result: 2012 all in comp will be half of what it was in 2007. Say goodbye to the Master of the Universe - they will now have to settle for a galaxy or two at most.

• Moody’s Cuts Ratings on Catalonia, Four Other Spanish Regions (Bloomberg)
• And the market top: Billionaire Ross Interested in Buying Spanish Bank Assets (Bloomberg)
• Japan Jojima denies govt seeks $250 bln BOJ asset buying boost (Reuters)
• China hints at move to strengthen Communist rule (Reuters)... well everyone else is doing it
• Euro-Area Bailout Fund Faces Challenge at EU’s Highest Court (Bloomberg)
• Obama, Romney now tied in presidential race: Reuters/Ipsos poll (Reuters)
• Former China Leader Jiang Resurfaces Before Political Transition (Bloomberg)
• Some in Congress look to $55 billion fiscal cliff 'fallback' (Reuters)
• CLOs stage comeback in US (FT)
• TXU Teeters as Firms Reap $528 Million Fees (Bloomberg)
• China’s Factories Losing Pricing Power in Earnings Threat (Bloomberg)