Netherlands

Analysts are questioning the "double-down effect" the ECB's LTRO exercises are creating in eurozone sovereign spreads. Citi notes a spike in the purchase of government securities since the initial take-up in December.

On January 30, a skeleton fell out of the closet in the Netherlands. Het Financiele Dagblad reported that Vestia, the biggest Public Housing Corporation in the Netherlands with 79 thousand rental units, had had a margin call of 1.6 billion euros on its interest rate derivative portfolio. Vestia had doubled its derivative contracts to 10 billion dollars (in notional value) in 2010 on a loan portfolio of 6 billion euros. They say they had arranged the extra “coverage” already for potential future loans.

The loan to cover the shortfall had secretly been provided by the fund guaranteeing Public Housing Corporations, the Warborgfonds, since September 2011. Recently Vestia was able to secure a replacement loan from the De NederlandseWaterschapsbank.

According to RTLZ, Vestia's Contract Support Annexes will have to be examined in detail to figure out exactly what the conditions are. The Interior Minister has been promised the results of this examination sometime in March.

Twenty Woningcorporaties are preparing to guarantee Vestia liquidity of another billion euros. They will demand strict conditions on this sum according to NRC. They want assurances that they will not have to contribute to the Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting (CNV) so-called reorganization support if any other corporations get into trouble.

It is not entirely clear how many Woningcorporaties have derivative contracts but newspaper Trouw estimates there to be 148 of them. A fall in interest rates of one percent would require 24 to seek additional funding, according to Interior Minister Spies in NOS news. Another 24 on the other hand have been rumoured to be able to withstand this scenario. RTLZ reports that 20 of them have already had margin calls on their derivative products.

It could all lead to a viscous spiral downwards in the sector according to NRC Handelsblad. In fact, four directors of other Woningcorporations anonymously state in Trouw that Public Housing corporations are too lax in offering guarantees to each other through the Waarborgfonds. If the government or the CNV intervenes, it could alarm bankers who will call in all outstanding Vestia loans (NRC). This is not likely according to Vestia mouthpiece Ronald Florisson because the corporation now has enough funding on hand thanks to the winding down of the derivative contracts. Florisson is “very thankful” for the arranged backstop.

Vestia has jacked up the rents for new renters by 9 percent. Several opposition parties are not amused and are going to protest in Parliament this week.

Director Eric Staal left Vestia with a rather unusual golden handshake of 3.5 million euros, allegedly to secure his pension requirements. He had earned 500 thousand euros a year, two or three times the norm for directors of public and semi-public institutions. However this is all being investigated. The PVV (Partij Voor de Vrijheid) is demanding the seizure Staal's Caribbean villa.

Vestia's Advisory Board has recently confirmed that the current director is being paid according to the “Balkenende norm” set by government for the sector. These semi-public servants are allowed to earn 130 percent of a Government Minister's salary, which was 187 340 euros in 2011, plus expenses of 7560 euros. Despite the fact that the salaries of these directors of semi-public institutions have to be published, there are regular scandals in which they have been found to receive much more.

Another noteworthy example of things coming unhinged in the Public Housing sector involves a management company working for one of the corporations. These companies stand between buyers and renters of Woningcorporatie properties and do investment and development work in the sector.

It was reported on 23 February that management concern Redema had had the Owners' Associations savings accounts put into bank accounts in its own name and went bankrupt. It will cost 'hundreds' of families at least 1.5 million dollars. Since more and more public housing is being sold off instead of rented, the whole phenomenon of Owners' Associations is relatively new for many people.

So there is lots of uncertainty in Public Housing these days. The entire Public Housing Corporation sector has loans (I don't believe they issue bonds) outstanding of around 85 billion euros, ultimately guaranteed by government. According to writer Peter Verhaar at nuzakelijk.nl, Standard and Poors rates the sector “extremely strong”. Verhuur argues that the problems are largely due to Public Housing having undergone a fake privatization.

Undertheradar's goal is to give an impression of the state of economics, finance and politics in the Netherlands and compare it to its partners in the eurozone.

Re: LTRO2, banks, CRE and the oppurtunity to see just how much free really costs...

All you need to read.

Could Sweden or Finland be the scene of the next European financial crisis? It is actually far likelier than most people realize. While the world has been laser-focused on the woes of the heavily-indebted PIIGS nations for the last couple of years, property markets in Northern and Western European countries have been bubbling up to dizzying new heights in a repeat performance of the very property bubbles that caused the global financial crisis in the first place. Nordic and Western European countries such as Norway and Switzerland have attracted strong investment inflows due to their perceived economic safe-haven statuses, serving to further inflate these countries’ preexisting property bubbles that had expanded from the mid-1990s until 2008. With their overheated economies and ballooning property bubbles, today’s safe-haven European countries may very well be tomorrow’s Greeces and Italys.

My advice is to put all of the headlines aside because they are not accurate. No deal has actually been struck and there is just the possibility of one at present. The PSI is also nowhere near certain. There has certainly been a proposal made with innumerable and probably impossible conditions to be met by Greece including a demand for a Constitutional change, which under the current Constitution, cannot even be voted on until 2013. I often wonder if Europe really wants to bail Greece out or if Germany is not forcing so many conditions that they are trying to have them exit the Euro on their own so the Germans are not seen as the Lord High Executioner; to quote Mr. Gilbert & Sullivan.

As the banks in Europe report out earnings; or the lack thereof in most cases, it becomes clear that the LTRO is helping with liquidity but not with solvency past some very short term point. This is always the case of course but it is beginning to hit home. The balance sheets for many European banks have now swelled on the liability side with more and more debt piling up courtesy of the ECB while their assets decrease due to the Basel III mandates so that the financials of these banks begin to deteriorate. It is not just the losses from their Greek debt holdings that are coming into play but also their potential future losses from sovereign debt write downs markedly for Portugal soon I think but also perhaps for Spain and Italy in the near term as the recession in Europe brings new problems to the fore which will further reduce the value of sovereign and bank credits in Europe.

Having spent much of the day attempting to explain the difference between nominal and real wealth creation and that asset price movements are different to the economy, we turn back to Michael Cembalest of JP Morgan to set the story straight on one of the most frequently cited reasons for the rally: "It's the economy, stupid".  It is hard to disagree that there are positive signs, but as the JPM CIO opines, let's be realistic: US growth is projected to be ~2.5% for 2012. Some argue that profits are the driver, and they are doing well, but their apparent strength is masked by a sad truth that gets little exposure. Looking at where those profits come from shows that if labor compensation grew at trends comparable to prior recoveries, a big chunk of current-cycle profits would disappear (quicker than a rehypothecated 2Y BTP under Corzine's watch). Cembalest summarizes that while this doesn't mean these profits are entirely illusory; it does mean that they come with related costs: such as weak household income and bloated government budget deficits - which have a cost as well (don't they?).

• IMF Official: 'Huge' Greek Program Implementation Risks In Next Few Days (WSJ)
• European Banks Take Greek Hit After Deal (Bloomberg)
• Obama Urged to Resist Calls to Use Oil Reserves Amid Iran Risks (Bloomberg)
• Hungary hits at Brussels funds threat (FT)
• Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule Before Inciting Foreign Outrage (Bloomberg)
• Germany fights eurozone firewall moves (FT)
• New York Federal Reserve Said to Plan Sale of AIG-Linked Mortgage Bonds (Bloomberg)
• G-20 Asks Europe to Beef Up Funds (WSJ)
• New Push for Reform in China (WSJ)

The day dawns with a deal for Greece that is full of smoke and mirrors; lies and deceptions. It is a deal pretty much as expected and, as I have said before, now the realities are going to be confronted. Europe has spun the agreement and the Euro has rallied some and the S&P futures are up but the next few weeks, I am afraid, will hold some serious disappointments. The page turns today because now we are about to confront not what is told to us but the actuality of what has been presented to us and just what will happen as a result.

• Spiegel: Stop the 130-billion bank transfer! (Spiegel)
• Greece Wins Bailout as Europe Chooses Aid Over Default (Bloomberg)
• Greek pro-bailout parties at all-time low, poll shows (Reuters)
• Eurozone agrees €130bn Greek bail-out (FT)
• Top Banks in EU Rush for Safety (WSJ)
• Medvedev Adviser Says Kudrin Would Be Better Prime Minister (Bloomberg)
• US and Mexico in landmark oil deal (FT)
• McCain calls for US to support Syria rebels (FT)
• Coal Shipments to India Overtaking China on Fuel Shortage (Bloomberg)
• Gillard Shrugs Off Ousting Threat (WSJ)

The FT's Peter Spiegel has scoped up some additional details from the 10 page debt sustainability analysis that is at the basis of the latest Greek bailout talks. Some of the critical details:

• "even under the most optimistic scenario, the austerity measures being imposed on Athens risk a recession so deep that Greece will not be able to climb out of the debt hole over the course of the new €170bn bail-out."
• A German-led group of creditor countries – including the Netherlands and Finland – has expressed extreme reluctance since they received the report about the advisability of allowing the second rescue to go through.
• A “tailored downside scenario” prepared for eurozone leaders in the report suggests Greek debt could fall far more slowly than hoped, to only 160 per cent of economic output by 2020 – far below the target of 120 per cent set by the International Monetary Fund
  • Under such a scenario, Greece would need about €245bn in bail-out aid, nearly twice the €136bn under the “baseline” projections.
• “Prolonged financial support on appropriate terms by the official sector may be necessary,” the report said, a clear reference to the possibility that bail-out funds may be needed indefinitely.
• Even in best case scenario country will need at least €50 billion on top of €136 billion.
• A recapitalisation of the Greek banking sector, which originally was projected to cost €30bn, will now cost €50bn. A highly touted Greek privatisation plan, which originally hoped to raise €50bn, will now be delayed by five years and bring in only €30bn by the end of the decade.

Translated, this is yet another confirmation of what we have claimed all along - that Germany is no longer playing along.

For several weeks now we have been warning that while the conventional wisdom is that Europe will never let Greece slide into default, Germany has been quietly preparing for just that. This culminated on Friday when the schism between Merkel, who is of the persuasion that Greece should remain in the Eurozone, and her Finmin, Wolfgang "Dr. Strangle Schauble" Schauble, who isn't, made Goldman Sachs itself observe that there is: "Growing dissent between Chancellor Merkel and finance minister Schäuble regarding Greece." We now learn, courtesy of the Telegraph's Bruno Waterfield, that Germany is far deeper in Greece insolvency preparations than conventional wisdom thought possible (if not Zero Hedge, where we have been actively warning for over two weeks that Germany is perfectly eager and ready to roll the dice on a Greek default). Yet it is not only Germany that is getting ready for the inevitable. So is Greece.

Open Europe has published a briefing note outlining the ten questions and issues that still need to be resolved in the coming weeks in order for Greece to avoid a full and disorderly default on March 20. The briefing argues that, realistically, only a few of these issues are likely to be fully resolved before the deadline meaning that Greece’s future in the euro will come down to one question: whether Germany and other Triple A countries will deem this to be enough political cover to approve the second Greek bailout package. In particular, the briefing argues that recent analyses of Greece’s woes have underplayed the importance of the problems posed by the large amount of funding which needs to be released to ensure the voluntary Greek restructuring can work – almost €94bn – as well as the massive time constraints presented by issues such as getting parliamentary approval for the bailout deal in Germany and Finland. While the eurozone also continues to ignore or side-line questions over the whether a 120% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2020 would be sustainable and if, given the recent riots, Greece has come close to the social and political level of austerity which it can credibly enforce.

The good people at Knight put together a comprehensive list of potential ratings for banks in Europe after Moody's came out with their outlooks. We agree that banks getting shifted to non-investment grade is a big deal.  We saw the impact for Portugal once it got taken out of the indices, and we think for banks it will be an even bigger deal to lose that investment grade status.  Sure, they can still go to the LTRO, but it is hard to function as anything other than a zombie bank once you lose that rating...