NIM

The diminishing returns of the Fed's quantitative easing are very evident in the latest WFC results.  

If JPM and its "fortress" balance sheet and business model are supposed to represent Q1 earnings for US banks, it will not be a good start to the year. While EPS beat expectations solidly, coming at $1.59 on expectations of $1.39 print, this was largly driven by a bigger than expected loan loss reserve release in its real estate portfolios ($650MM pretax), and card services ($500MM pretax), which was the largest combined release number since the $2 billion reduction in Q1 2012. This took down total JPM total loan loss reserves to $20.8 billion, down from $21.9 billion in Q4, and down $5.1 billion from the $25.9 billion a year ago. This happened even though JPM's NPL declined far more modestly, from $10.7 billion to just $10.4 billion. It was the revenue of $25.12 that missed expectations of $25.85, down from $26.05 billion a year ago, and which is the bigger issue for the bank, driven by disappointing trading results with fixed income markets revenue of $4.8 Billion, down 5% YoY, equity markets revenue of $1.3 Billion, down 6% YoY, and Securities Services revenue of $974mm, flat YoY. Not surprisingly in order to maintain expenses, headcount continue to decline from 258,753 to 255,898.

While the topic of net Fed capital flows, and implicit balance sheet risk has recently gotten substantial prominence some three years after Zero Hedge first started discussing it, one open question is what happens when we cross the "D-Rate" boundary, or as we defined it, the point at which the Fed's Net Interest Margin becomes negative i.e., when the outflows due to interest payable to reserve banks (from IOER) surpasses the cash inflows from the Fed's low-yielding asset portfolio, and when the remittances to the Treasury cease (or technically become negative). To get the full answer of what happens then, we once again refer readers to the paper released yesterday by Morgan Stanley's Greenlaw and Deutsche Bank's Hooper, which discusses not only the parabolic chart that US debt yield will certainly follow over the next several decades, but the trickier concept known as the Fed's technical insolvency, or that moment when the Fed's tiny capital buffer goes negative. In short what would happen is that the Fed will be then forced to print money just so it can continue to print money.

In April of 2010, Zero Hedge first brought up the topic of the Fed's DV01, or the implicit duration risk borne by the Fed's burgeoning balance sheet which at last check will approach 25% of US GDP by the end of 2013 (tangentially, back in 2010 the Fed's DV01 was $1 billion - it is nearly $3 billion now and rising fast). Recently, we have noticed that the mainstream media has, with its usual 2 year delay, picked up on just this topic of the implicit and explicit risk borne by Bernanke's grand (and final) monetary experiment. And slowly but surely they are coming to the inevitable conclusion (which our readers knew two years ago), that the Fed has no way out? Why? Ray Stone of Stone McCarthy explains so simply, a Nobel prize winning economist can get it.

The much anticipated JPM earnings are out and while the company beat superficially, posting Q4 revenue of $24.4 billion vs expectations of $24.3 billion, and adjusted EPS of $1.35 "ex-items" vs expected $1.22, the real story as usual is below the surface. And in this case below the surface means what happens with the firm's Net Interest Margin, Trading Revenues, Loan Loss Reserve Releases and, of course, the busted "CIO and Treasury" aka London Whale unit. Starting with the last we have this: "Treasury and CIO reported a net loss of $157 million, compared with net income of $417 million in the prior year. Net revenue was a loss of $110 million, compared with net revenue of $845 million in the prior year. Net revenue included net securities gains of $103 million from sales of available-for-sale investment securities during the current quarter and principal transactions revenue of $99 million. Net interest income was a loss of $388 million due to low interest rates and limited reinvestment opportunities." JPM also warned to "Expect Treasury and CIO net loss of $300mm +/- in 1Q13; likely to vary each quarter." Funny how the once amazingly profitable CIO is no longer is a cash cow when it can't invest excess deposits and recycle reserves via repo into cornering the IG market. Finally, the Net Interest Margin, firmwide and core, declined by 3 and 7 bps respectively QoQ due to, per JPM, lower loan yields, lower yields on  investment securities; limited reinvestment opportunities; and higher balances in Fed funds sold and certain secured financings. In other words, ZIRP continues to take its toll on a bank which can no longer be a hedge fund and which can't make money on the NIM curve.

Investors in the TBTF banks need to understand that the business model for this industry has changed.  Thank Liz Warren

As the fallout of Liborgate escalates, the next big bank to be impacted in the fallout started by Barclays civil settlement "revelation" is set to be troubled UBS, already some 10,000 bankers lighter, where as many as three dozen bankers are reported by the implicated in the fixing of the rate that until 2009 was the most important for hundreds of trillions in variable rate fixed income products. Only instead of attacking the US or even European jurisdiction, where the next big settlement is set to hit is Japan: a country whose regulators as recently as half a year ago promised there were no major issues with Libor, or Tibor as it is locally known, rate fixings. And while this most recent development will have little material impact on UBS' ongoing business model, the one difference from previous settlements is that it will likely include criminal charges lobbed against some of the 36 bankers. From the FT: "UBS is close to finalising a deal with UK, US and Swiss authorities in which the bank will pay close to $1.5bn and its Japanese securities subsidiary will plead guilty to a US criminal offence. Terms of the guilty plea were still being negotiated, one person familiar with the matter said on Monday, adding that the bank will not lose its ability to conduct business in Japan. The pact between the bank and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, US Department of Justice, UK’s Financial Services Authority and UBS’s main Swiss supervisor Finma is expected to be announced on Wednesday, although last minute negotiations continue."

If yesterday it was Greece that the market was once again inexplicably enthused about, today it is Spain's turn, which is once again in the open-ended action crosshairs, following an unsourced (are there any other kind these days?) report by the FT, saying the country with the 25% unemployment is prepared for an imminent bailout request (contrary to a previous report by Reuters saying the ETA on this is November). That these are simply more bureaucratic tests to gauge the market's response is by now known to all - the truth is nobody knows what happens even if Spain finally requests a (long overdue and priced in) rescue. Because even with bond yields briefly sliding, they will only ramp right back up, even as the Spanish economic deterioration continues. But that bridge will be crossed only when Rajoy is prepared to hand in his resignation together with a signed MOU to a Troika boarding commission. In other news, Spain sold €3.4 billion in 1 year Bills at a yield of 2.823% compared to 2.835% last, and €1.46 billion in 18 month Bills at a yield of 3.022% versus 3.072% last. Since both of these are within the LTRO's maturity (whose 1 year anniversary, and potential partial repayments, is coming fast in January) the bond was a token exercise in optics. Elsewhere, German ZEW Economic Sentiment rose more than expected from -18.2 to -11.5 on expectations of a -14.9 print, despite the ZEW's Dick summarizing the current Eurozone situation simply as "bad", and adding that "downward risks are more pronounced than upward." Confirming his fears was a government official sited by Bild who said that 2013 growth has been reduced from 1.6% to 1.0%. In all this newsflow, the EURUSD has quietly managed to do its usual early am levitation, and was at overnight highs of 1.3015 at last check.

Blowout quarter, or do US bank numbers just blow?

There is a lot of verbiage in the official JPM Q3 Earnings press release which directs to a bottom line number of $1.40, or $5.7 billion on expectations of $1.24, with revenue of $25.9 billion on expectations of $24.53 billion. The primary reason for the lack of disappointment: no major losses in Corporate from CIO, with corporate generating $221 million in Q3, up from a loss of $(1.777) billion in Q2. And then come the adjustments:  $900 million pretax benefit ($0.14 per share after-tax increase in earnings) from reduced mortgage loan loss reserves in Real Estate Portfolios; $825 million pretax incremental charge-offs ($0.13 per share after-tax decrease in earnings) due to regulatory guidance on certain residential loans in Real Estate Portfolios; $888 million pretax benefit ($0.14 per share after-tax increase in earnings) due to extinguishment gains on redeemed trust preferred capital debt securities in Corporate; $684 million pretax expense ($0.11 per share after-tax decrease in earnings) for additional litigation reserves in Corporate; Then there is a DVA loss of $211 MM in banking. Net-net, after taking into account all one-off adjustments, the Q3EPS was really $1.26. But for all the data fudging, and attempts to make the reported EPS non-comparable to the expected one, following an avalanche of one-time adjustments, the bottom line is this: revenues from trading dropped both sequentially and Q/Q while banking expenses rose, Net Interest Margin dropped to a new record low, even as the firm too a major $967 million loan loss reserve release on its loans to $22.8 billion, even as its total Non-Performing Loans rose by a whopping $1.3 billion to $11.370 billion, the largest quarterly jump in years! Just how JPM can justify such a major contribution to earnings coming from loan losses when NPLs have soared is unclear to anyone with a frontal lobe.

In case you missed it. Markets soared on the back of possibly the darkest day in central-planning banking largesse. Gold and Silver were the biggest winners, though stocks will get all the attention we are sure. Treasuries initially sold off on the news that this was an MBS program (and mortgage spreads collapsed from already record tights) but by the close, Treasury yields had almost round-tripped to pre-FOMC levels. For the first hour or so after the news, all assets moved in sync and correlations soared across risk-assets, but as the afternoon wore on, FX carry consolidated, Treasuries retreated (and 2s10s30s fell), dragging risk lower leaving stocks up near their highs in a world of unicorns and free-money. Notably, it appeared that stocks caught up to high-yield credits' recent exuberance and then found little ability to push ahead. HYG (the high-yield bond ETF) remains notably rich to real bond prices. VIX tumbled under 14% (down almost 2 vols) but notably the term structure of vol collapsed even more - as it seemed the QuEnfinity prompted longer-term hedges to be lifted. A remarkable day in many ways as the S&P crosses over 14x P/E and AAPL over 20% of the Nasdaq-100.

TAG ought to be allowed to expire at the end of 2012, but people like Barney Frank and Tim Johnson will be working to preserve this corporate subsidy for their clients among the large banks regardless of the deleterious effect on the US economy.  

So when you see Citi’s Q2 2012 earnings, remember that about ¼ of the number will come from non-interest bearing deposits covered by FDIC's TAG program.

When Operation Twist began in late September 2011, Primary Dealers reported that their net position in bonds with a maturity between 1 and 3 years was ($23) billion or the biggest short since January 2010, while reporting holdings of bonds between 11 and 30 years of $12.4 billion, for a net carry position (Short minus Long) of $(35) billion. What a difference just over 6 months makes: courtesy of Treasury Primary Dealer data, we now know that in the preceding weeks, with the Fed selling paper maturing in under 3 years, the Primary Dealers have loaded up to the gills on short-dated maturities, and in the week ended April 11, they reported $54 billion in 1-3 Year Holdings. At the same time 11-30 Year Maturities declined from othe $12.4 billion at the start of Twist to just $7 billion: don't forget - this is the only type of bonds sold by the Fed (if also including short maturities than the explicit long-end that the Fed is buying). What is interesting is that with nearly 80% of Twist over, the 10 Year was at just under 2.00% the day Twist started, and was....just shy of 2.00% on Friday. In other words in order to "sterilize" the Fed's duration extension, keep rates, and the price of gold, low and promote a "housing recovery" Dealers have been "forced" to part ways with about $100 billion in Net Interest Margin generating units, as the Short minus Long position has risen from -$35 billion to +$54 billion, hitting over $60 billion a few weeks ago.

At first we were going to comment on this "response" by the high priest of Keynesian shamanic tautology to Mark Spitznagel's latest WSJ opinion piece, but then we just started laughing, and kept on laughing, and kept on laughing...