The Fed will have to increase QE (not taper it) because systemic debt is compounding faster than production and interest rates are already zero-bound. Lee Quaintance noted many years ago that the Fed was holding a burning match. This remains true today (only it is a bomb with a short fuse). Thirteen years after the over-levered US equity market collapsed, eleven years following Bernanke’s speech, five years after the over-levered housing bubble burst, and four years into the necessary onset of global Zero Interest Rate Policies and Long-Term Refinancing Operations, global monetary authorities seem to have run out of new outlets for credit. In real economic terms, central bank policies have become ineffective. In other words, the US is now producing as much new debt as goods and services.
In the 1977 Eagles song, Hotel California, a luxury hotel appears inviting and offers a tired traveller comforting relief from his journey. It turns out to be something of a nightmare, however, and he finds that "you can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave". BNP's Paul Mortimer-Lee asks "does that sound a little bit like QE and the Fed?" The FOMC signalled its intention to check out of QE at its June meeting, but by September, it found it could not leave. Is that not just like QE1 and QE2, the scheduled ends of which had to be reversed within relatively short periods? The question now is whether or not we should expect repeated market obstacles to a QE3 exit. Why? Because, as we have noted numerous times, flows matter.
There was a time when the Fed's QE was, at least on paper, supposed to generate jobs (the broad inflation will come on its own, in due course). After all, the prospect of injecting $85 billion in liquidity into a market with the sole goal of pushing the stock markets that benefit the purchasing power of about 10% of the population would hardly have received broad approval even by the co-opted Congress. So, to all those who still naively claim Fed is not the sole reason for the market's relentless march higher, those billions in liquidity must go into the economy, and specifically into job creation, right? As a result, we decided to back into what the average private sector job has ended up costing the US population in pure dollar terms (which in turn ultimately manifests itself in terms of unsustainable government debt and pent up inflation) via the Fed's monetary pathway. Well, according to the ADP data released earlier, in which a paltry 130K private sector jobs were created in a month in which the Fed, as always, injected $85 billion, the bottom line came to a whopping $654K per job! And taking the average job growth throughout 2013, this number, as can be seen on the chart below, is a laughter-inducing $553K!
Now that the prevailing mainstream media consensus has finally caught up with our "tinfoil" view, which for years was mocked by the same media, usually on an ad hominem basis, and even the Fed has realized (confirmed by the latest Jackson Hole symposium) it is in a trap as it understands it has to end the market's dependency on monetary heroin but has no idea how to do it without in the process undoing five years of central planning, we have seen some spectacular opinion flip flops take place. Which aside from the occasional headscratcher such as David Rosenberg going bull-retard (we once again wonder: just what does Ray Dalio serve in his cafeteria?) have been almost exclusively from optimistic to pessimistic, or as we call it, realistic. And as the case may be, such as with John Mauldin and his latest missive to potential clients, A Code Red World, a very deep and red shade of pessimistic.
The Fed's capabilities to engineer changes in economic growth and inflation are asymmetric. It has been historically documented that central bank tools are well suited to fight excess demand and rampant inflation; the Fed showed great resolve in containing the fast price increases in the aftermath of World Wars I and II and the Korean War. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rampant inflation was again brought under control by a determined and persistent Federal Reserve. However, when an economy is excessively over-indebted and disinflationary factors force central banks to cut overnight interest rates to as close to zero as possible, central bank policy is powerless to further move inflation or growth metrics. The periods between 1927 and 1939 in the U.S. (and elsewhere), and from 1989 to the present in Japan, are clear examples of the impotence of central bank policy actions during periods of over-indebtedness. Four considerations suggest the Fed will continue to be unsuccessful in engineering increasing growth and higher inflation with their continuation of the current program of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP)...
Since all US rating agencies (Fitch is majority French-owned) have been terrified into submission and will never again touch the rating of the US following the DOJ's witch hunt of S&P, any US rating changes on the margin will come from abroad. Like China's Dagong rating agency, which several hours ago just downgraded the US from A to A-, maintaining its negative outlook. The agency said that while a default has been averted by a last minute agreement in Congress, the fundamental situation of debt growth outpacing fiscal income and GDP remains unchanged. "Hence the government is still approaching the verge of default crisis, a situation that cannot be substantially alleviated in the foreseeable future."
The latest Q2 US Flow of Funds data revealed that the corporate financing surplus declined to zero, for the first time since the Lehman crisis. The financing surplus is a measure of corporate savings, and in principle the lower this financing surplus the more expansionary the corporate sector is. Typically the corporate sector is dis-saving, i.e. capex typically exceeds cash flows from operations. However, the sharp decline in the US corporate surplus is less positive than it appears at first glance because it was driven by a rise in dividend payments rather than a rise in capex. As we have pointed out time and again, with the Fed's ZIRP, the only thing that matters is the share price and with firms increasingly focused on dividends rather than capex, to the extent that it continues, points to lower productivity and potential growth going forward.
Five years ago, when QE first started, we blasted the Fed's "Plan Z" systemic rescue "policy" - which was merely a tried and true dilutive fallback plan used by every collapsing monetary regime starting with the Romans - stating it does absolutely nothing to resolve the biggest underlying threat to the economy and the western way of life, namely the epic accumulation of debt (most of it bad), courtesy of a Fed which has now unleashed a perpetual "buyer of only resort" QE (as we predicted months before QEternity was revealed), which instead only redistributes wealth from the middle class to the wealthiest 0.01%, while providing scraps to the poorest to keep them occupied and away from very violent thoughts. Enter the FT, which in an Op-Ed today titled "QE has stigmatised the well-off" says that "despite it being entirely justified as a save-the-world policy in its first round, it is still at best an unfair and at worst an evil policy. Why? Because of the way in which it redistributes wealth" And now we lean back and await for even more of the incisive mainstream media to suddenly come up with this timely, non-conspiratorial observation.
A week ago, we first reported that Bridgewater's Ray Dalio had finally thrown in the towel on his latest iteration of hope in the "Beautiful deleveraging", and realizing that a 3% yield is enough to grind the US economy to a halt, moved from the pro-inflation camp (someone tell David Rosenberg) back to buying bonds (i.e., deflation). This was music to Bill Gross' ears who in his latest letter, in which he notes in addition to everything else that while the Fed has to taper eventually, it doesn't actually ever have to raise rates, and writes: "The objective, Dalio writes, is to achieve a “beautiful deleveraging,” which assumes minimal defaults and an eventual return of investors’ willingness to take risk again. The beautiful deleveraging of course takes place at the expense of private market savers via financially repressed interest rates, but what the heck. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder and if the Fed’s (and Dalio’s) objective is to grow normally again, then there is likely no more beautiful or deleveraging solution than one that is accomplished via abnormally low interest rates for a long, long time." How long one may ask? "the last time the U.S. economy was this highly levered (early 1940s) it took over 25 years of 10-year Treasury rates averaging 3% less than nominal GDP to accomplish a “beautiful deleveraging.” That would place the 10-year Treasury at close to 1% and the policy rate at 25 basis points until sometime around 2035!" In the early 1940s there was also a world war, but the bottom line is clear: lots and lots of central planning for a long time.
The situation in Italy appears to be going from bad to worse. With a confidence vote pending for Tuesday as the government dissolves into chaos for the umpteenth time, and following the resignation of the CEO of one of Italy's largest non-financial corporations (Telecom Italia), the largest bank (by assets) in Italy - Intesa SanPaolo has announced - effective immediately - the resignation of its CEO and replacement with Carlo Messina. According to sources, the now former CEO had lost the confidence of shareholders (which is odd given the bank's stock is near 2-year highs). We can't help but wonder Ayn Rand-like at the devolution of the ruling class in Italy and what happens next (in light of the crumbling manufacturing and production data).
This is at a time when we have real economic growth barely above 2% and nominal growth of just over 3% (abysmal by any standards) after six years of monetary easing and 5 years of QE1; QE 2; Operation twist; QE “infinity” and huge fiscal deficits. After last week Citi notes it is not clear that this set of policies is going to end anytime soon. It seems far more likely that these policies will be continued as far as the eye can see and even if there are “anecdotal” signs of inflation this Fed (Or the next one) is not a Volcker fed. This Fed does not see inflation as the evil but rather the solution. Gold should also do well as it did from 1977-1980 (while the Fed stays deliberately behind the curve). Unfortunately Citi fears that the backdrop will more closely resemble the late 1970’s/early 1980’s than the “Golden period” of 1995-2000 and that we will have a quite difficult backdrop to manage over the next 2-3 years.
Italy’s Stability Program targets a 5%-6% primary budget surplus, and 3% nominal GDP growth. Both strike JPMorgan's Michael Cembalest as unrealistic in the context of post-crisis Italy. Italy ran a 6% surplus for a brief moment in the 1990’s but it didn’t last, as it was the result of a prior devaluation helping growth, some asset sales and some tax increases. Only asset sales seem feasible in Italy right now, if anything. If Cembalest's concerns are correct, Italy will remain a country with almost twice the debt/GDP ratio as the US; unbreakable interdependency of the government, the banks, and the ECB; and low GDP and employment growth. If history is any guide, he will be right as the last few years have seen the biggest collapse in Italian GDP since The Unification in 1861...
As we warned two weeks ago in "Bernanke's Helicopter is Warming Up", it seems (from the Fed's once uberhawk and now superduperdove Kocherlakota's speech this morning) that the Fed is catching on as to what it needs to do. And what it has no choice but to do. Borrowing from the Europeans, Kocherlakota uttered those three special words: KOCHERLAKOTA SAYS FED MUST DO "WHATEVER IT TAKES" TO AID GROWTH.
Whether this also means that the fund is bearish on overall growth, bullish on deflation, and very bullish that in the Taper is not only off the table but there is potential for even more easing by the Fed, is unknown. What is known is that once the piggyback crew jumps on the Bridgewater bandwagon, which is now saying rates will drop (ostensibly leading to the end of the Great Rotation and perhaps the start of the Great Unrotation out of stocks and into bonds), expect to see some substantial price realignment between the two main assets classes: stocks and bonds.
The equity market’s reactions to monetary policy inflection points, when (or if) the Fed takes the first step to normalize monetary policy following easing in response to recession, have been reasonably similar. As Barclays' Barry Knapp notes, irrespective of the pace of policy accommodation removal – the average policy normalization-related correction during the prior six business cycles is 8.9%. While our memories of an extremely volatile September – five years ago – remain fresh, the last four have been exceptionally tame. However, while another period of fiscal uncertainty seems likely, Knapp fears there is a key difference between this September and the surprisingly low volatility Septembers in 2009-12. In those periods, the Fed was either buying assets or had pre-announced a new program; this year, it is preparing to weaken the portfolio balance effect.