I hold up my hand, “One moment please” as I introduce you to the 800 pound Greek Gorilla that is about to enter the room. Allow me to now present to you the “OTHER” Greek debt that is outstanding and will have to be accounted for as the country defaults. Detailed below are some of the “OTHER” sovereign obligations of the Greek government which have now been submitted to the ISDA and I list some of them below. You will note that there are bank bonds, Hellenic Railway bonds, Urban Transportation bonds et al that are guaranteed by Greece. You will also note that there are bonds tied to Inflation, Floating Rate Notes, Asset-Backed securities and a whole mélange of other structured products with a Greek sovereign guarantee. What we all thought was fact is now clearly fiction and default will now bring “Acceleration” one could reasonably bet in all kinds of these securitizations and in all kinds of currencies. This could come from the ratings agencies placing Greece in “Default” or it could come from the CDS contracts being triggered depending upon each indenture and you will also note that a great many of these off balance sheet securitizations are governed by English Law and not Greek Law. You may also wish to consider the fallout to the banking system as the lead managers of all of these deals could find themselves behind the eight ball as various clauses trigger and as the holders of these securitizations line up at the judicial bench [ZH note: there is a reason why Allen & Overy is getting paid $1500 an hour to indemnify ISDA with a plethora of exculpation clauses - they know what is coming] The ISDN numbers are on all of these securities and the lead managers may be found on Bloomberg or other sources as well as the holders of the debt. The curtain just lifted and the show is about to get way too interesting!
The BIS published a working paper estimating the costs of moving off-balance sheet derivatives trading to central exchanges in terms of daily margin requirements could be, for a dealer like Deutsche Bank, upwards of $8B, and for JPMorgan, $5B in times of volatility. The cost to the biggest 14 swaps dealers in terms of initial margins? Over $100B.
The cash settlement world of OTC derivatives is not investing, but gaming. And the House sets the rules.
The real outlook of Monetary Easing vs Treasury Yields
Official Statement From Spanish Regulator On 15 Day Financial Short Selling Ban, Which Also Includes OTC DerivativesSubmitted by Tyler Durden on 08/11/2011 17:51 -0400
Just as in the case of France, here is the official statement from the Comision Nactional de Marcado de Valores, disclosing the Spanish 15 day prohibition on shorting stock. The banks impacted are Banca Cívica, S.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., Banco de Sabadell, S.A., Banco de Valencia, S.A., Banco Español de Crédito, S.A., Banco Pastor, S.A. Banco Popular Español, S.A., Banco Santander, S.A., Bankia, S.A., Bankinter, S.A., Caixabank, S.A., Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo, Grupo Catalana de Occidente S.A., Mapfre, S.A., Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, S.A., Renta 4 Servicios de Inversion, S.A. Unlike Frace, Spain has also explicitly banned not only short cash transactions, but also any position in OTC derivatives "which involves creating a net short position, or increasing an existing one." Next and last: the Italian statement, as frankly nobody cares about Waffles.
The Real "Margin" Threat: $600 Trillion In OTC Derivatives, A Multi-Trillion Variation Margin Call, And A Collateral Scramble That Could Send US Treasurys To All Time Records...Submitted by Tyler Durden on 06/05/2011 21:42 -0400
While the dominant topic of conversation when discussing margin hikes (or reductions) usually reverts to silver, ES (stocks) and TEN (bonds), what everyone so far is ignoring is the far more critical topic of real margin risk, in the form of roughly $600 trillion in OTC derivatives. The issue is that while the silver market (for example) is tiny by comparison, it is easy to be pushed around, and thus exchanges can easily represent the illusion that they are in control of counterparty risk (after all, that was the whole point of the recent CME essay on why they hiked silver margins 5 times in a row). Nothing could be further from the truth: where exchanges are truly at risk is when it comes to mitigating the threat of counterparty default for participants in a market that is millions of times bigger than the silver market: the interest rate and credit default swap markets. As part of Dodd-Frank, by the end of 2012, all standardised over-the-counter derivatives will have to be cleared through central counterparties. Yet currently, central clearing covers about half of $400 trillion in
interest rate swaps, 20-30 percent of the $2.5 trillion
in commodities derivatives, and about 10 percent of $30 trillion in
credit default swaps. In other words, over the next year and a half exchanges need to onboard over $200 trillion notional in various products, and in doing so, counterparites, better known as the G14 (or Group of 14 dealers that dominate derivatives trading including Bank of America-Merrill Lynch,
Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, RBS,
Societe Generale, UBS and Wells Fargo Bank) will soon need to post billions in initial margin, and as a brand new BIS report indicates, will likely need significant extra cash to be in compliance with regulatory requirements. Not only that, but once trading on an exchange, the G14 "could face a cash shortfall in very volatile markets when daily margins are increased, triggering demands for several billions of dollars to be paid within a day." Per the BIS "These margin calls could represent as much as 13 percent of a G14 dealer's current holdings of cash and cash equivalents in the case of interest rate swaps." Below we summarize the key findings of a just released discussion by the BIS on the "Expansion of central clearing" and also present a parallel report just released by BNY ConvergEx' Nicholas Colas who independetly has been having "bad dreams" about the possibility of what the transfer to an exchange would mean in terms of collateral posting (read bank cash payouts) and overall market stability, and why a multi-trillion margin call could result in the biggest buying spree in US Treasurys... Ever.
Now we know why BRK, CAT and the other big corporates came oozing out of the woodwork last year to defend the OTC derivatives market. JPMorgan (JPM), Goldman Sachs (GS) and the other OTC dealers let Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) and the other "AAA" corporates play at the roulette table w/o any chips. Isn't this the man who called OTC derivatives weapons of mass destruction?
Financial Economics, Deregulation and OTC Derivatives: Interview with Yves Smith of Naked CapitalismSubmitted by rc whalen on 02/22/2010 08:33 -0400
We ran an interview with our friend Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism today. She has done an excellent job of describing how the intellectual ghetto that was once financial economics has helped to destroy the world of investing and involuntarily turn us all into day traders. The full text follows below. -- Chris
At our firm we frequently receive calls from clients and readers asking about the likelihood of the passage by the Congress in Washington of reform legislation regarding over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, financial regulation and/or mortgage securitization. Our answer is small to none given the political trends and the state of the lobbies in Washington, most specifically the large bank lobby that protects the Sell Side monopoly in OTC derivatives and securities. The fact that Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) is still apparently not comfortable with the entirely watered down House proposal to reform OTC derivatives, for example, tells you all you need to know. Stick a fork in it.
TABB Group Pinpoints OTC Derivatives Regulatory Impact Of The Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act Of 2009 (H.R. 4173)Submitted by Chopshop on 01/13/2010 13:34 -0400
- New Study Analyzes The Bill’s 200-Plus Pages Covering Derivatives, Outlines Potential Industry Impact And Gives A Timeline Leading To US Senate Passage
- Says New Competition Lies Ahead For Dominant Major Dealers From New Group Of Smaller, Nimble Tech-Savvy Dealers
From yesterday's hearing before the U.S. Senate on Over The Counter Derivatives. The full archived webcast can be found here - some perspectives from Citadel's Griffin and Robert Pickel, CEO of ISDA, but most notably a very exhaustive report from Chris Whalen of IRR. While I am not as much a proponent of regulation of CDS as Whalen is, he provides an impressive narrative of recent events which, if one were so inclined, could provide CDS-haters enough ammo to make a sufficiently strong case.
From yesterday's hearing before the U.S. Senate on Over The Counter Derivatives.