Output Gap

Next week is light on data, thus developments in the European and US fiscal tensions are likely to remain high on the agenda. The Eurogroup heads of state will meet on Thursday to discuss European financial stability and further aid for Greece. Expectations are for an increase in the Greek financial rescue package, alongside some form of voluntary ‘bail in’ for holders of Greek debt. More comprehensive solutions to stem contagion risk, such as secondary market purchases of EMU government bonds by the EFSF, are said to be also on the cards, but uncertainty is very large. Ahead of the statement resulting from the summit, the market may remain caught in the headlights of headline risk. Discussions over raising the debt ceiling in the US will continue. On the data front, the business surveys will be key to watch. Towards the end of the week the HSBC flash PMI for China, the Euroland flash PMIs and the Philadelphia Fed Survey will all be published. The Euroland surveys are expected to decline slightly, but the Philadelphia Fed survey is expected to rise although our forecast is for a notably smaller rise than that of the consensus.

When it comes to the debt ceiling, we have heard everyone and the kitchen sink's opinion on this issue at this point. Yet one person who has been silent so far is the original skeptic David Rosenberg. Summarized: "Despite the fear mongering, the U.S. government is not going to default. Any backup in bond yields from a failure to cobble together a deal will drive market rates down because of the deflationary implications from the massive fiscal squeeze that would ensue at a time of a huge 5% output gap. Even if there were to be some sort of "buyer's strike" if the U.S. were to be defaulted, rest assured that the Fed would step in aggressively." Obviously to a mega bond bull like Rosenberg, this is the only possible outcome. After all an alternative would mean the central planners have failed, and the most artificially inflated security in the history of man: US bonds, which are only there because they are the "best of all evils" was enjoying an extended "ignore the emperor's nudity" sabbatical... which alas does not change their evilness, nor is this equilibrium stable once more and more realize it is all about gold at the end of the day. And as yesterday demonstrated when existential fear grips the market, the impossible does happen, and both bonds and stocks can sell off, and in the process lead to all time records for gold. Bookmark July 14: it is a harbinger of what is coming.

Enough bullshit, it's time to expose the real unemployment scandal...

Well not quite the CIA, but close enough. The good ex-spies of BIA Behavioral Intelligence Analysis have conducted another behavioral assay, this time targeting global overlord Ben Bernanke and specifically his Wednesday press conference, focusing not on the script but what was left unsaid between the lines. For those unfamiliar, "The BIA team represents a diverse mix of highly accomplished professionals from the national intelligence and business communities, who came together to create and deliver BIA’s ground-breaking solutions for our clients. Our intelligence experts average more than 20 years experience in interviewing, evaluating and collecting information across the globe and have been working with premier firms since 2001 to improve investing and business outcomes through application of our unique methodologies." In lieu of a lie detector being hooked up to the Chairman (Simpsons scene comes to mind), this may be one of the better analyses in interpreting what was said... and unsaid.

A few days ago, JPM's Michael Feroli literally wrote off Q2 GDP: "Recent economic data have been dispiriting, and increasingly 2Q is being written off as a lost quarter in which no progress will be made in closing the output gap." The silver lining, however, according to Feroli was that Q3 GDP would jump on a surge in auto supplies and sales to fill the vacuum left in the post-Fukushima space: "Motor vehicle assemblies sank in April, particularly at the US plants of Japanese automakers, as supply lines for parts from Japan were interrupted. That, in turn, led to a steep drop in inventories of cars on dealer lots. As Japanese parts and supplies come back on line, automakers located in the US are planning to ramp up production to replenish lean inventories." Uhm, lean inventories? It seems Michael has not had a chance to actually see what inventories look like (unlike Zero Hedge readers). In fact as we demonstrated three weeks ago, GM dealer stuffing has hit an all time high, so we can attribute this oversight to Mr. Feroli's zeal to validate yet another projection hockeystick. Yet somehow we fail to see how this massively excess inventories situation will be amenable to prompt restocking. And now we are not the only ones. According to the AP, "General Motors plans to close two U.S. pickup truck plants for two weeks in July as sales of pickups begin to wane and trucks are backlogged on dealer lots, the Associated Press reported Tuesday, citing the auto maker." That sure doesn't sound to us like something that would happen to an industry that has just faced a "steep drop" in inventory.

PIMCO Scott Mather has released a fascinating Q&A in which the key topic of discussion is the artificial push to keep rates low in developed economies, also known as central bank hubris to maintain the "great moderation" in which he clearly explains i) what this means for global fund flow dynamics (using developed country reserves and purchasing EM bonds) and ii) for the future of a system held together with glue and crutches. To wit: "Financial repression is any public policy
that is designed to influence the market price of financing government
debts, either through government bonds or the nation’s currency. Direct
methods of repression include things like setting target interest rates,
monetizing government debt or implementing interest rate caps. Indirect
methods include polices designed to change the amount of debt or
currency at a given price. Examples include requirements to hold minimum
amounts of government debt on bank balance sheets or establishing
minimum requirements for government bonds in pension funds." Just in case anyone is confused why central planning is a bad idea: "Governments may take these steps to improve their ability to
finance public debt and forestall more painful adjustment processes,
though there can be other motives, and because these methods are less
transparent, and thus less controversial, than direct tax hikes or
spending cuts. Investors should be wary of financial repression because
it is primarily a tool to redistribute wealth from creditors (citizens)
to debtors (governments) to the detriment of creditors, fixed income
investors and savers." Needless to say, central planning always fails: "It is important to realize these methods as practiced are only
partially effective and cannot go on forever, as advanced economies
continue to add significantly to their public debts despite low
financing costs. Some intensification of financial repression, fiscal
austerity, or stronger growth must occur to lower the likelihood of a
future debt crisis." Bottom line: "kicking the can" can only go on for so long before EMs (read why below) provide a natural counterbalance to an artificial market created by developed world central banks. PIMCO's advice: get out of balance sheet risky DM bonds ahead of central planning failure, and buy up every EM bond possible, or bypass paper and just buy EM currencies as "EM policymakers who have resisted appreciation will
eventually allow more appreciation over the next three to five years as
they nurture domestic consumption and their economies become less
dependent on export demand." We expect to see much more on this topic as the MSM realizes the implications of this new risk regime change.

Citi's Stephen Englander, who has been quite bearish over the past several months, continue his series of "negative outlook" pieces on risk currencies with this morning's note "Why this sell-off in FX risk is different", in which he warns traders  "we are concerned about risk correlated currencies because we see different forces at play now than over the past two years. The casual assumption that monetary policy remains expansionary, and can ramp up if needed, is questionable -- no one argues that there is a shortage of liquidity. Fiscal policy is, to say the least, not what it used to be. Investor positions and we suspect pricing largely continue to reflect optimism, but this time the assumed policy response may be much more limited than in the last two years, and probably less effective." Naturally, what one can warn about risk FX pairs applies just as well to risk assets in general. And both are things we have been saying for months.

And to think they cut it from 3% to 2.5% just a week ago. Michael Feroli, take it away: "When we revised down our estimate of Q2 GDP growth last week to 2.5% we noted that the risks to this quarter were still to the downside. Given the hard activity data we've received since then -- particularly the auto sales and construction report -- it looks like those downside risks are being realized, and we are lowering our Q2 projection to 2.0%. Even with this revision we'd assess the risks as still a little to the downside. Most of our downward revision in Q2 is located in consumer spending, where we think growth this quarter is tracking close to 1.5%. If our new estimate for Q2 is realized, GDP growth relative to a year-ago would be only 2.4%, implying almost no closing of the output gap over the past year -- an abysmal performance given that the output gap is arguably greater than 5% of potential GDP, or less arguably, that there are still almost 14 million unemployed workers. Our forecast implicitly assumes the debt ceiling issue is resolved in a manner which does not see a technical default of the US Treasury. Of course if that assumption were not to hold all cards would be off the table and we almost certainly have to pencil in a much more severe downgrade to our growth forecast. Our Fed call is unchanged and continues to look for a first hike in 1Q13."

Following its just announced flip flop on oil, Goldman's "sellsiders" go ahead and not only cut Chinese growth prospects, but raise the Nikkei. So let's get this straight: Goldman raises its prices forecast for oil, even as it downgrades the primary driver of demand - China, and somehow the Japanese market, which suddenly is overreliant on natural resources for energy creation in the aftermath of Fukushima, is supposed to surge... Was this script written in Bollywood? Anyway, for those with a sense of humor, here is the gist on China: "Recent data have been worse than we expected. The growth slowdown has been even sharper than we forecast, especially evident in April industrial production (which mainly reflected tighter monetary and fiscal policy, although some specific industries have seen supply-side constraints). In addition, inflation is not coming down as rapidly as we hoped. We now cut our 2011 GDP growth forecast to 9.4% from 10.0%. This partly reflects the lower-than-expected 1Q2011 GDP print (9.2% qoq ann.), but we have also cut 2Q2011,3Q2011, and 4Q2011 growth to 8.0%, 9.0%, and 9.3% qoq ann. from 8.8%, 9.5%, and 9.7% respectively. This is only very slightly above the last official consensus, which came before the disappointing April data, and so we are likely to be above the true consensus now. We expect annual average inflation of 4.7% (up from 4.3%), with a peak in yoy terms of 5.6% in June. We also nudge down our 2012 GDP growth forecast to 9.2% from 9.5%, reflecting in part the impact of higher oil prices. Although we maintain our annual average inflation forecast of 3.0% in 2012, we have a slight acceleration within 2012 as higher oil prices eventually get passed on more fully." Yet while this conclusion in and of itself makes some sense, the following from Goldman's Kathy Matsui in the Nikkei, regarding the firm's outlook on the Japanese stock market, confirms that whoever is coordinating the Goldman sellside push may have crossed the Tropic of Thunder: "Contrary to popular opinion, we believe the disaster will accelerate - rather than delay - Japan's exit from deflation. We see reconstruction demand and exports driving gross domestic product growth to an above-trend pace of 2.5 per cent in 2012...Market participants have argued for some time that it will take a cataclysmic event to drive structural change in Japan; now the world is watching." Bottom line: China down, Japan up, and oil far, far away. Sigh.

Jan Hatzius' economic team finally comes out with a report that bears presenting as it aptly discloses one of the core conundrums facing the Fed: you can have low unemployment (eventually... courtesy of many years of ZIRP and QE in an environment of "fiscal adjustment", or Goldman's term for Congressional "austerity"), or you can have low gas prices. But you can't have both. To wit: "The combination of tight energy markets and high unemployment poses a dilemma for monetary policy. If policy is kept easy to boost growth, unemployment will decline but the oil market is at risk of overheating. But if policy is tightened to confront the pressure from higher oil prices on (headline) inflation, unemployment is likely to remain  far above desirable levels for a long time to come." And while the price of gas can be (very briefly) controlled by various volatility enhancing margin moves by the exchanges (which for those confused are nothing but self-reinforcing loops - increased vol leading to a margin hike, leads to more vol, leading to more margin hikes, etc). Too bad the CME can't just lower margin on unemployment to -100%. But it can't. Which is why very soon the Fed will be forced to admit to the whole world that "ultimately, a return to equilibrium in both the oil and labor market is likely to require an increase in the real price of oil. In theory, policymakers could react to this by  targeting either a combination of temporarily higher headline inflation with stable core inflation, or stable headline with lower—and in an extreme case negative—core inflation."  And here Goldman throws a stunner: when debating the implications for fiscal policy (we all know what monetary policy will look like: QE 3 through N), the firm proposes the following: "one complement to a low interest rate policy could be a higher energy tax. If one believes that higher real energy prices will be needed in coming years, an energy tax would promote that shift and also capture some of the surplus that would otherwise have gone to foreign producers." Is the government about to unleash some EPS destruction in the E&P and refining space? It appears Goldman has already given the green light which is really all it takes.

Goldman's Themistoklis Fiotakis has released the firm's latest EURUSD outlook. And while the most amusing part of the note has nothing to do with FX but with the firm's ongoing attempt to bankrupt clients by holding Greek bonds ("Stay long 30-yr Greek GGBs, opened at 54c (ask) on 03 September 2010, for a target of 65c and a stop on a close below 50c, now at 53.6c (bid).") we will cut to the chase: Goldman is still calling for 1.50 on the EURUSD, driven by dollar weakness and increasing European interest rates (which will surely succeed in bringing the EUR to infinity, and then promptly lead to the destruction of the currency when half the European continent files for bankruptcy). But that is irrelevant: what is important is that due to some regression model thingy, the EUR has room to run, or in Goldmanese: "Given that this simple model has an R-squared of 74%, a significantly high reading for a regression in changes, it is safe to argue that our factor analysis captures the largest part of the EUR variation."

Tomorrow's NFP number will be one of the most critical releases from the BLS: if on one hand the number is far greater than expected, it will effectively mean that QE3 will not begin immediately after the end of QE2, just like QE1 ended on March 31, 2010 only to see QE Lite implemented 4 months later. That the Fed is not willing to take a political gamble and send oil to $150 is conceivable, which is what would happen should Jon Hilsenrath start leaking QE3 rumors. On the other hand, the economy is once again turning lower as recent diffusion data (not to mention housing) has been indicating. Should the Fed implicitly tighten, by not loosening, the economic contraction will accelerate drastically, and capital markets will follow suit. And since as Hugh Hendry noted earlier, there is no China to pick up the slack, the stakes on the all in gamble in this bet that the virtuous cycle has picked up, will likely cost Bernanke his job if he ends up wrong and QE3 is needed anyway. Of course, as many believe, and as Bernanke himself has said, manipulating the market and stimulating inflation is and continues to be the Fed's only objective. Obviously, the waterfall effects in either direction here are huge. Which is why if tomorrow's NFP number is a beat and not just any beat but a massive one (read well over 250,000), it will be an attempt by the administration to cement the idea that the economy is now recovering. Anything at or below consensus will merely push the decision one month forward, however it will be too late to prepare the political landscape for QE3 in May, just two months ahead of the end of QE2. So tomorrow is likely D-Day on QE3 (or at least a direct continuation of POMO past the June 30 expiration date).

Goldman's Jan Hatzius, who whether he likes it or not, is probably the biggest variable as to whether there will be a QE3 or not, as every other Wall Street "strategist" immediately parrots what Hatzius says will happen (in no small part due to Hatzius' close relationship with NY Fed's Bill Dudley) has just released a hypothetical Q&A session in which he provides what potential answers to questions during Bernanke's first ever scheduled press conference on April 26 of this year might look like.  In order to keep the dodecatuple reverse psychology mystery to a maximum, Hatzius also provides what Goldman's answers would look like pari passu with those of the Fed (which is not all than ironic: after all the Fed gets its teleprompted lines straight from the corner offices at 200 West). So for all forensic linguist/economist/psychologists who are hoping to get an extra ounce of informational clarity on the future of monetization post June 30, here it is. Good luck.

Something funny transpired over the the past two years in the Fed's interpretation of the critical Taylor rule, which Bernanke refers to in every testimony before Congress or the Senate: John Taylor, the creator of the rule, and Zero Hedge's nomination for Fed chairman (inasmuch as we need a Federal Reserve) said Bernanke is wrong in his interpretation of the rule, and if he had a proper interpretation the Fed Chairman should already be hiking rate. Yet leave it to Bernanke to believe he knows better what the rule is supposed to mean....than even its creator. From the WSJ: "Stanford University professor John Taylor, an outspoken critic of the Federal Reserve in recent years, has a new complaint: He says Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is misrepresenting Mr. Taylor’s eponymous rule on interest rates." A brief reminder on the Taylor rule, which has been presented numerous times on Zero Hedge before: "The Taylor Rule offers a simple formula that economists often use as a
guide for the appropriate level of the federal funds rate. The formula
provides changes in interest rates depending on the level of inflation
and the output gap, which is the difference between actual gross
domestic product and the economy’s potential output. Depending on how
you define the rule (for instance if you give the output gap a lot of
weight in the formula or just a little, or if you use a projected
inflation rate or actual inflation) you can come up with different
interpretations of whether interest rates should be high, low or even
negative in a theoretical world." And an odd dilemma appears when one uses the original version of the Taylor rule as presented in 1993 or its 1999 revision: they provide totally different results: the first one says the Fed is wrong, the second one validates QE. Yet here is Taylor himself: "I did not propose or prefer an alternative rule in that 1999 paper, and it is hard to see how one could interpret the paper that way." So is the entire US monetary policy based on a rule derivative that is not even endorsed by its creator? The answer is a resounding yes.

The conclusions of our "2011 Thesis - Beggar-thy-Neighbor" was that the world is on a glide path towards a global Fiat Currency Failure and the emergence of a New World Order. We are unclear whether it is planned or happenstance, but what the regularly conducted abstraction mapping process clearly indicates is that it is presently a high probability outcome. The paper uses the Process of Abstraction to avoid the media noise, abstract the facts, synthesis key macro drivers and then arrive at the highest probability outcomes. In the recent article "2011 Tipping Points" we laid out the 37 major Tipping Points we are presently tracking. These Tipping Points are show on the left hand side of the two charts below, which are the basis upon which our ongoing analysis process is conducted. These highly simplified representations of the process gives the reader a graphical perspective on what leads us to our conclusions.