Price Action

It would appear, given the actions and rhetoric of the last week or so, that global central bank printing presses have been switched to 'pause' mode and allowed to cool as implicit inflation 'energy' rears its economic-growth-dragging head around the world (as the bears told us earlier). Whether this leads to a slow grind higher or a tactical correction is the question Morgan Stanley considers in a recent note and their answer is that bullish sentiment, 'under-appreciated' risks, and 'tranquil' markets justify a cautious asset allocation. The focus has switched much more to growth, likely why we have not seen a greater deterioration post-printing yet, but this leaves the market much more sensitive to data surprises (as the backstop of QE has been removed for now). Simply put, we tend to agree with MS' view (given our previous discussions of the volatility surface) that as event and growth risks linger, and with valuations no longer cheap in most cases, expectations of a continued grind higher without a tactical correction are overly confident.

The ever-so-popular high-yield bond ETF, HYG, is suffering its biggest 3-day drop since Thanksgiving as higher beta assets are underperforming and the up-in-quality and up-in-capital-structure trade gathers pace post LTRO 2. Even with last week's ex-divi date, we note that this loss of the last 2-3 days wipes out the yield that was 'reached for' of the last 2-3 months. It seems all too easy to buy high-yield bonds when they are on the rise but underlying that ETF is a portfolio of 'junk' assets - some better and some worse obviously - that are increasingly being driven top-down by the fast-money action in this newfound ETF's liquidity (as dealer inventories dwindle). This leaves them prone to just-as-fast exits as the secondary high yield bond market remains 'illiquid' away from benchmark size and ETF-bound assets providing little underlying 'pricing' evidence of market value. This is the largest underperformance of the high-yield market relative to the equity market since the recent rally began.

Just like the first time around, the net gain from the LTRO when taking into account rolling off instruments, will be lower than the Gross amount. How much? According to SocGen, the final number by which the ECB's deposit account will increase will be about €210 billion less than the overhead number. From SocGen's Lauren Rosborough: "The LTRO outcome: €529.53bio was allocated to 800 institutions (compared with €489.19bio allocated to 523 institutions in Dec). The net increase, according to our economists, is €311bio (adjusted for yesterday’s MRO reduction, 3m LTRO allotment this morning, and the roll-off of the 3m and 6m LTROs tomorrow). The allocation was above our and at the upper end of the market range of expectations. After a brief and limited positive risk move (AUD/USD spiked to 1.0857), currencies are broadly unchanged and the EUR/USD is lower, possibly reflecting positioning unwinds. The LTRO outcome opens the way for further positive risk moves (high-beta, non-Japan Asia, lower DXY) but recent price action suggests to us that the rally is fatigued." Net: this means that following settlement, European banks will park not €500 billion but up to €810 billion with the ECB, on which they will collect 25 bps (while paying 1%, aka inverse carry as described here first). It also means that in three years Europe's bank will have to not only pay the ECB €1 trillion in case (assuming there is no perpetual rollover of the LTRO, which there will be), but also delever by another €2.5 billion, for net asset drop of €3.5 trillion. Good luck building up shareholder equity by the same amount to offset unchanging liabilities.

The “Placebo Effect” is fascinating. In a typical drug testing trial, one group of patients will receive the actual drug being tested, and a “control” group will be given an “inert” medicine (or “sugar pill”) that shouldn’t do anything for the patient, but the patient doesn’t know that. So much of what I find wrong about “economics” is that it masquerades as far more of a science than it actually is. It doesn’t have theories that can be “tested” in a real world, where 2 similar situations are treated differently to see which “treatment” works better. Each economy and each situation is so different that it is IMPOSSIBLE to determine why policies failed or what should have been done differently. It is possible to come up with reasonable ideas and theories of what could have been done or should have been done, but they are only theories. The systems are so complex that finding situations with similar starting conditions with similarly motivated entities involved is simply impossible to find. The fact that so much of our policy seems to be based on research into what should have been done in the Great Depression and what has been seen in Japan is frankly scary. There is no way to “know” how the Great Depression would have turned out with a different set of policies. We can make conjectures, but that is all they are – conjectures. The LTRO was designed to support the market, the market is up, so the LTRO must be working. That at least is the logic many investors are applying. They see the improvement in sovereign debt yields, the avalanche of “positive” (if unfounded) headlines, and the relentless march higher of the stock market. So the plan is working? Not so fast.

As the Greek PSI deal rears its ugly head on our screens once again with Merkel, Schaeuble, and Papademos all pulling from one angle or another (and Dallara disquietingly silent in his uselessness), BNP created a simple flowchart of the various steps and probabilities of participation rates, retroactive embedded CACs, CDS triggers, and actual debt reduction that may (or may not) occur in the next week or two. The price action in Greek CDS and Bonds strongly suggest the CDS will trigger (as we have been vehemently explaining for weeks/months now) but there is a long way between here and there.

The better tone in risk markets is largely being driven by encouraging economic data from the US and Europe, which as a result saw Bunds trade in negative territory. Of note, ECB’s Liikanen has said that inflation is not a particular concern in Europe, adding that the ECB has never said that there is an interest rate floor. On the other hand, Gilts are being supported by comments from BoE’s Fisher, as well as less than impressive GDP report. Nevertheless, EUR/USD took out touted barrier at the 1.3400 level earlier in the session, while USD/JPY is trading in close proximity to an intraday option expiry at 80.60.

I am staggered at how easily the concepts of Democracy and the Rule of Law – two of the pillars of the modern world – have been brushed aside in the interests of political expediency. This is not just a eurozone phenomenon but of course the removal of elected governments and the instalment of "insider" technocrats who simply serve the interests of the elite has become a specialisation in Europe. Many will think this kind of development is not a big deal and is instead may be what is needed. Personally I am absolutely certain that the kind of totalitarianism being pushed on us by our leaders will – if allowed to persist and fester – end with consequences which are way beyond anything the printing presses of our central banks could ever hope to contain. Communism failed badly. Why then are we arguably trying to resurrect a version of it, particularly in Europe? Are the banks so powerful that we are all beholden to them and the biggest nonsense of all – that defaults should never happen (unless said defaults are trivial or largely meaningless)?...– So, in terms of markets, be warned. My personal recommendation is to sit in Gold and non-financial high quality corporate credit and blue-chip big cap non-financial global equities. Bond and Currency markets are now so rigged by policy makers that I have no meaningful insights to offer, other than my bubble fears...The end of the bubble will be sign posted by either monetary anarchy creating major real economy inflation or by a deflationary credit collapse (if they run out of pumping "mandates"). The end game is incredibly binary in my view, but in between it is pretty much a random walk. Either way, "bonds are toast" in any secular timeframe (due either to huge inflationary pressures, or due to a deflationary credit collapse), which in turn means that asset bubbles in risky assets will get crushed on a secular basis.

Sprott strategist John Embry has never been a fan of the existing financial system. Today, he makes that once again quite clear in this interview with Egon von Grayerz' Matterhorn Asset Management in which he says: "I think that the current financial system, as we know it, will be totally destroyed, probably sooner rather than later. The next system will require gold backing to have any legitimacy. This has happened many times in history." Needless to say, he proceeds to explain why a monetary system based on gold, one in which one, gasp, lives according to one's means, is better. Logically, he also explains why the status quo, whose insolvent welfare world has nearly a third of a quadrillion in the form of unfunded future liabilities, will never let this happen. Much more inside.

A certain flavor of econometric model dominates conventional portfolio management and financial analysis. This model can be paraphrased thusly: seasonally adjusted economic data such as the unemployment rate and financially derived data such as forward earnings and price-earnings ratios are reliable guides to future economic growth and future stock prices....If this model is so accurate and reliable, why did it fail so completely in 2008 when a visibly imploding debt-bubble brought down the entire global economy and crashed stock valuations? Of the tens of thousands of fund managers and financial analysts who made their living off various iterations of this econometric model, how many correctly called the implosion in the economy and stock prices? How many articles in Barrons, BusinessWeek, The Economist or the Wall Street Journal correctly predicted the rollover of stocks and how low they would fall? Of the tens of thousands of managers and analysts, perhaps a few dozen got it right (and that is a guess--it may have been more like a handful). In any event, the number who got it right using any econometric model was statistical noise, i.e. random flecks of accuracy. The entire econometric model of relying on P-E ratios, forward earnings, the unemployment rate, etc. to predict future economic trends and future stock valuations was proven catastrophically inadequate. The problem is these models are detached from the actual drivers of growth and stock valuations.

In contrast with better news from macro data, the negotiations about the next Greek package intensified and this will likely remain the key focus in the upcoming week. On one hand, the present value reduction in a PSI has still not been formally agreed. On the other, the Greek Government still has to commit to more reforms in order for the Troika to agree to a new program. A key deadline for this commitment is on Monday at 11am local time in Athens. Eurogroup President Juncker has talked openly about the possibility of a default on Saturday in the German weekly Der Spiegel. Beyond the ongoing focus on Greece, the week sees a relatively heavy concentration in central bank meetings, including the RBA, ECB, BOE, Poland, Indonesia and a few others. On the data side, the focus is likely on the December IP numbers due in a number of countries, including in some key Eurozone countries (Germany, Italy, France).

While Europe's financial services sector equity prices have retraced almost half of their May11 to Oct11 losses as we are told incessantly not to underestimate the impact of the LTRO, Morgan Stanley points out the other side of the balance sheet will continue to sag. While short-term liquidity (at least EUR-based liquidity as USD FX Swap lines are back at record highs this week) may have seen some of its risk culled, the real tail risk of the 'Great Deleveraging' has only just begun. As MS notes, we may have avoided a credit crunch but European banks could delever between EUR1.5 and EUR2 Trillion over the next 18 months as the unwind is far from over. History suggests that over a longer time-frame, around five to six years - the deleveraging could reach EUR4.5 Trillion assuming zero deposit growth and the LTRO will slow but not stop the process. As we discussed last night, this deleveraging will inevitably lead to continued contraction in European lending to the real economy (no matter how much liquidity is force-fed to the banking system) which will most explicitly impact Southern and Peripheral Europe and the Emerging Markets of Central and Eastern Europe. In the meantime, we assume the Central Banks of the world will do the only thing they know, print and funnel liquidity to these increasingly zombified financial institutions; and while Dicky Fisher was calming us all down this evening on our QE3 expectations (given Gold and Silver's recent price action), it seems perhaps even the Fed is getting nervous at just how little surprise factor they have left given such a ravenously hungry deleveraging and insatiable need to maintain the market/economy's nominally positive appearances.

Did the first (of many) European LTRO buy just one month of marginal improvement? According to a compilation of analyst views by Bloomberg, who looked at today's mixed Spanish auction results when the country sold €4.56 billion of three-, four- and five-year government bonds, the easy money may have been made. Because while average yields fell for all three lines at the auctions, maintaining the trend at Spanish debt sales so far this year, it was the internals that showed weakness and could indicate that the marginal benefit from the first LTRO is now ending, even as the real task - the longer-dated bonds 10 years and great - still have to see much if any carry trade benefit at auction. Lastly, anyone hoping for a full carry flush from the European banks has to give up all hope: ECB announced its deposit facility usage rose to €486.4 billion, up €14 billion overnight. And with that we now know what the LTRO half-life is.

While Silver had a better week than Gold (+5.4% vs 4.3%), Gold managed its biggest gain in three months as the Fed's QE-ness seemed to separate the precious metals from other asset classes. Oil underperformed relative to the USD's weakness (-2% on the week in DXY) managing only a 1.3% gain (and ending below $100). Silver and Gold have no managed four weeks in a row of gains as the latter has more than retraced half of the all-time high sell-off range. With 5 minutes to go, NYSE volume was -32% from yesterday, by the close of the cash markets it was only down 2.5% leaving the week -10% from last week (so 32% of the day's NYSE volume was done in the last 1.3% of the day). In credit, HYG underperformed stocks, HY credit stayed synced with stocks and IG outperformed (touching 100bps as we closed). Treasuries ended the day (and week) at their low yields with 5s to 10s all lower by around 14bps on the week and 30Y rallying to -4bps on the week by the close. FX markets were a little odd as EURUSD squeezed higher and higher all day (largely ignored until a late ramp) by stocks as JPY's strength kept EURJPY (carry driver) relatively flat. EURUSD ended at 1.3227 (up around 300pips on the week) at its highest in 7 weeks as CFTC net shorts rose once again to new record highs at 171k. Broadly speaking risk assets and ES (the e-mini S&P 500 futures contract) have been highly correlated all week. This afternoon saw CONTEXT pull ES higher (mainly on EURJPY strength, and Oil stability versus TSY/Curve compression) but after the cash market close, ES limped back down to its VWAP to end its worst-performing week of the year (+0.15%) though not down (which we are sure would scare investors away) as stocks handily underperformed credit on the week as high beta starts to unwind.

"Reach for yield" is a phrase that never gets old, does it? Whether it's the "why hold Treasuries when a stock has a great dividend?" or "if this bond yields 3% then why not grab the 7% yield bond - it's a bond, right?" argument, we constantly struggle with the 100% focus on return (yield not capital appreciation) and almost complete lack of comprehension of risk - loss of capital (or why the yield/risk premium is high). Arguing over high-yield valuations is at once a focus on idiosyncrasies (covenants, cash-flow, etc.), and technicals (flow-based demand and supply), as well as systemic and macro cycles, which play an increasingly critical part. Up until very recently, high yield bonds (based on our framework) offered considerably more upside (if you had a bullish bias) than stocks and indeed they outperformed (with HYG - the high-yield bond ETF - apparently soaking up more and more of that demand and outperformance as its shares outstanding surged). With stocks and high-yield credit now 'close' to each other in value, we note Barclay's excellent note today on both the seasonals (December/January are always big months for high yield excess return) and the low-rate, low-yield implications (negative convexity challenges) the asset-class faces going forward. The high-beta (asymmetric) nature of high-yield credit to systemic macro shocks, combined with the seasonality-downdraft and callability-drag suggests if you need to reach for yield then there will better entry points later in the year (for the surviving credits).

Not sure what to make of a market that traded relatively poorly on strong apple earnings but managed to rip higher on a relatively neutral fed statement.