Gold futures saw a massive $1.5 billion liquidation in one minute yesterday which had all the hallmarks of a "non profit" liquidation - a large seller trying to manipulate gold futures lower rather than maximise profits.
One does not have to be financial wizard to to know that a firm which has to borrow more than it can generate from core operations is not a sustainable business model, and yet today's CFOs, pundits and central bankers do not. But more are starting to pay attention as the corporate debt pile hits epic proportions. As Bloomberg writes this morning, when it also issued a stark warning about the next source of credit contagion, while "consumers were the Achilles’ heel of the U.S. economy in the run-up to the last recession. This time, companies may play that role."
Sell paper and digital gold, maybe but not physical gold coins and bars. Rather both physical gold and silver bullion should be owned as financial insurance and hedges against currency debasement, bail ins, systemic and counter party risks and the myriad other risks today.
Witness true research that reveals true facts, that unlocks true alpha, aka VALUE! Banco Popular is walking down the same path as Bear Stearns. We should know, we called out Bear in January 2008, and we called out BP months ago.
Behind the scenes, the legally aggressive stance of Noble Group Ltd is rapidly becoming known in the financial analysts’ community as analysts and media organizations are threatened one after another by the troubled SGX-listed trader. The censorship and its lawyers used to claim full control of the situation with the hope that its critics and the market would be “reset”—akin to being lobotomized. The company has left us with its cliffhanger: even the most egregious comments made by Iceberg on the trader happened to be entirely correct.
Nuclear power is not commercially viable but has become a state-sponsored technology. There is nothing wrong with state supported technology. But we could save a lot of time and money by not pretending that it is something else.
Yesterday the Federal Reserve released a 19-page letter that it and the FDIC had issued to Jamie Dimon, the Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, on April 12 as a result of its failure to present a credible plan for winding itself down if the bank failed. The letter carried frightening passages and large blocks of redacted material in critical areas, instilling in any careful reader a sense of panic about the U.S. financial system. The Federal regulators didn’t say JPMorgan could pose a threat to its shareholders or Wall Street or the markets. It said the potential threat was to “the financial stability of the United States.”
When judged against the BoJ, the ECB probably still has a ways to go before hitting the limits of central banker insanity and so, we think it's entirely possible that Draghi moves into HY next. But the reasons to believe the ECB will take the plunge into non-IG corporate credit go beyond the “MOAR is always better” line. As BofAML’s Barnaby Martin explains, the EU corporate sector’s penchant for bond buybacks may ultimately force Draghi further down the ratings ladder lest the ECB should end up entangled in tender offers or else find itself without enough debt to monetize.
The top economist for Moody’s (one of the largest rating agencies in the world) said yesterday, as he unleahed the latest jobs guess, that there are absolutely zero signs of recession. These sameguys were so drunk on their own Kool-Aid that in October 2007, Moody’s announced that “the economy is not going to slide away into recession.” Everyone assumed that the good times would last forever. This is what virtually assures negative interest rates in America.
It is likely just a coincidence that just a month after we reported that China's real debt/GDP was far greater than the 280% or so accepted conventionally, and was really up to 350% if not higher after the recent record loan issuance surge, moments ago Moody's officially downgraded its outlook of China's credit rating from stable to negative, citing three key risks: 1) The ongoing and prospective weakening of fiscal metrics, as reflected in rising government debt and in large and rising contingent liabilities on the government balance sheet; 2) A continuing fall in reserve buffers due to capital outflows, which highlight policy, currency and growth risks; 3) Uncertainty about the authorities' capacity to implement reforms - given the scale of reform challenges - to address imbalances in the economy.
"we have received requests to post approximately $220 million in collateral, of which we have posted approximately $92 million. We have posted the required collateral, primarily in the form of letters of credit and cash, or are otherwise complying with these contractual requests for collateral. We may be requested or required by other counterparties to post additional collateral in an aggregate amount of approximately $698 million."
"Far from making the world safer, then, there is a risk that the post-crisis policy mix has simply suppressed problems, making markets stickier, and may even have added to them, by driving the global credit cycle far ahead of the current interest rate cycle. Recent market dislocations are a sign that that stickiness may be reaching breaking point. At this point we may start to question whether it can provide a similar solution this time round, not just because of the zero lower bound, but because the entire premise on which it has been based – inducing credit expansion and risk-taking in some other part of the global economy – seems to be reaching its limits."