Real estate

Here we go again. Back in July 2011 we wrote an article entitled "The Real Banking Crisis" where we discussed the increasing instability of the Eurozone banks suffering from depositor bank runs. Since that time (and two LTRO infusions and numerous bailouts later), Eurozone banks, as represented by the Euro Stoxx Banks Index, have fallen more than 50% from their July 2011 levels and are now in the midst of yet another breakdown led by the abysmal situation currently unfolding in Greece and Spain.... Although the last eight months have not played out the way we would have expected for gold, they have played out the way we envisioned for the banks. The question now is how long this can go on for, and how long gold can remain under pressure in a banking crisis that has the potential to spread beyond Greece and Spain? So much now rests on the policy responses fashioned by the US Fed and ECB, and just as much also rests on what's left of European citizens' confidence in their local banking institutions. Neither of these things can be precisely measured or predicted, but we continue to firmly believe that depositors in Greece and Spain will choose gold over drachmas or pesetas if they have the foresight and are given the freedom to act accordingly. The number one reason we have always believed gold should be owned, and why we believe it will go higher, is people's growing distrust of the banking system - and we are now there. We will wait and see how the summer develops, and keep our attention firmly focused of the second phase of the bank run now spreading across southern Europe.

The global monetary system which has evolved and morphed over the past century but always in the direction of easier, cheaper and more abundant credit, may have reached a point at which it can no longer operate efficiently and equitably to promote economic growth and the fair distribution of its benefits. Future changes, which lie on a visible horizon, may not be so beneficial for our ocean’s oversized creatures. Both the lower quality and lower yields of previously sacrosanct debt therefore represent a potential breaking point in our now 40-year-old global monetary system. Neither condition was considered feasible as recently as five years ago. Now, however, with even the United States suffering a credit downgrade to AA+ and offering negative 200 basis point real policy rates for the privilege of investing in Treasury bills, the willingness of creditor whales – as opposed to debtors – to support the existing system may soon descend. Such a transition occurs because lenders either perceive too much risk or refuse to accept near zero-based returns on their investments. “There she blows,” screamed Captain Ahab and similarly intentioned debt holders may soon follow suit, presenting the possibility of a new global monetary system in future years, or if not, one which is stagnant, dysfunctional and ill-equipped to facilitate the process of productive investment.

Last time we looked at Denmark it it was in the context of Luxor Capital which had some very ugly things to say about the Scandinavian country in "Rotten Contagion To Make Landfall In Denmark: CDS Set To Soar As Hedge Funds Target Country." Now, 6 months later, Moody's has finally gotten the memo: "Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the ratings for nine Danish financial institutions and for one foreign subsidiary of a Danish group by one to three notches. The short-term ratings declined by one notch for six of these institutions. The rating outlooks for five banks affected by today's rating actions are stable, whereas the rating outlooks for two banks and for all three specialised lenders affected by today's rating actions are negative  The magnitude of some of today's downgrades reflects a range of concerns, including the risk that some institutions' concentrated loan books deteriorate amidst difficult domestic and European conditions, with adverse consequences on their ability to refinance maturing debt. The latter concern is exacerbated by structural changes in the terms of Danish covered bonds and the mix of underlying assets that lead to increased refinancing risk. While Moody's central scenario remains that financial institutions show some resilience to what will likely be a prolonged difficult environment - and the revised rating levels for most Danish financial institutions continue to reflect low risks to creditors - today's rating actions reflect the view that these risks have increased."

Three weeks ago, when the hit campaign on Chesapeake was in full swing, we made a simple prediction: hate the company for whatever reasons but not because of the balance sheet. We explained that "under ZIRP, when every basis point of debt return over 0% is praised, and an epic scramble ensues among hedge for any yielding paper no matter how worthless, the balance sheets of companies just do not matter. In other words, for companies that have massive leverage, high interest rates, negative cash flow, which all were corporate death knells as recently as 2008, the capitalization structure is completely irrelevant." Alternatively, some other, far bigger, company with a pristine balance sheet and lower quality assets could swoop in and do a full management purge, removing the Mclendon overhang, firing the disgraced Board and commingling liabilities while boosting the quality of its assets. Think the TBTF putches from September 2008. Because at the end of the day, it is all about the quality of the assets. And the reality is that CHK has some quality assets, which, however, are burdened by many legacy issues. There is of course the issue of near all time record gas prices. But there in lies the rub: the prices are already at near all time lows. They could continue sliding, or in a world in which hard assets (and even gaseous) are becoming more and more precious by the day, they could go up. In which case CHK would be a very interesting bet. Needless to say, two weeks after our preliminary CHK assessment, Carl Icahn put his money, or rather $775 million of it to be precise, to essentially confirm what we had said previously. Which brings us to the next question: is CHK really worth more? Well, in keeping with the tradition of keeping it simple, we have decided to present one delightfully simple chart from Bloomberg, which shows where the biggest downside in the stock comes from - it's well-known leverage - as well as where the upside is hiding - its asset base - which has the lowest valuation of its peers.

Long-time euro-skeptic and President of the Swiss National Bank unloads

You know the something is really, really wrong when the best rapper is a white guy, the best golfer is a black guy, the tallest guy in the NBA is Chinese, the Swiss hold the America's Cup, the Pope is German, Europe's central banker is Italian, France is accusing the U.S. of arrogance and Germany doesn't want to go to war.

Is there a bottom in housing? It is entirely possible. However, for all the reasons stated herein, both financial, economic and psycholgoical, the "calls" for a housing recovery may be a bit premature. This is particularly true if our estimation of an economic recession in the next 18 months comes to fruition. The strains on the housing market caused by a recession will cause a secondary decline in housing. The reality of a recession is not a question of "if" — it is only a question of "when" and how bad will it be?

Experienced investors try to avoid the "confirmation bias" trap by asking what supports the other side of the trade. Confirmation bias is our instinct to find data to support our position once it is taken. To counter this bias, we must attempt to build a plausible case against our position. If the effort is sincere, we gain a fuller understanding of the market we are playing (or perhaps avoiding). That the global economy is going to heck in a handbasket is self-evident. If you over-weight anecdotal "on the ground" evidence and fade the ginned-up official statistics, it is obvious the global slowdown is picking up speed in Europe and China, two of the world's largest "linchpin" economies.

First it was the CEO of Bankia whose departure via Golden parachute seems incredible in its absolute lack of shame; and now, as Bloomberg reports, Miguel "Mafo" Ordonez - the Governor of the Bank Of Spain - has resigned - with 2 weeks notice.

BANK OF SPAIN GOVERNOR TO LEAVE ROLE ONE MONTH EARLY
ORDONEZ TO LEAVE ON JUNE 10

Did he maybe find some unmissable Costa Del Sol real estate opportunities forcing him to get out of dodge just that much earlier? If so, could he maybe spread the love and give everyone else the hot tip (aside from Spanish taxpayers of course)?

One of the problems with the Hispanic Pandora's box unleashed by a now insolvent Bankia, which as we noted some time ago, is merely the Canary in the Coalmine, is that once the case study "example" of rewarding terminal failure is in the open, everyone else who happens to be insolvent also wants to give it a try. And in the case of Spain it quite literally may be "everyone else." But before we get there, we just get a rude awakening from The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard that just as the bailout party is getting started, Spain is officially out of bailout money: "where is the €23.5 billion for the Bankia rescue going to come from? The state's Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) is down to €5.3 billion."...  And in an indication of just how surreal the modern financial world has become, none other than Bloomberg has just come out with an article titled "Spain Delays and Prays That Zombies Repay Debt." We can only surmise there was some rhetorical humor in this headline, because as the past weekend demonstrated, the best zombies are capable of, especially those high on Zombie Dust, or its functional equivalent in the modern financial system: monetary methadone, as first penned here in March 2009, is to bite someone else's face off with tragic consequences for all involved.  What Bloomberg is certainly not joking about is that the financial zombies in Spain are now everywhere.

All you need to read.

I want a farm subsidy too!

• This is the solution? - Germany Writing Six-Point Plan for Europe Growth, Spiegel Says (Bloomberg)
• JPMorgan Gave Risk Oversight to Museum Head Who Sat on AIG Board (Bloomberg)
• Vatican bank president Gotti Tedeschi ousted -statement (Reuters)
• Bribery, crime and stupidity pays. From this: SEC Staff Ends Probe of Lehman Without Finding Fraud (Bloomberg)
• To this: Lehman to buy remaining Archstone stake for $1.58 billion (Reuters)
• Governments must restore faith in debt sustainability: ECB's Praet (Reuters) - by issuing more debt
• IMF Helping EU Explore Alternatives to Euro Bonds (WSJ)... such as US-funded bailout bonds?
• China Banks May Miss Loan Target for 2012, Officials Say (Bloomberg)
• Facebook market makers' losses total at least $100 million (Reuters)
• World Bank’s Sri Mulyani Says Asean Is Resilient to Europe Woes (Bloomberg)
• Time to flip "The Scream" - Tiffany Cuts Full-Year Profit Forecast (Bloomberg)
• Definitely Maybe: Italy's Monti says Greece will probably keep euro (Reuters)

All yu need to read.

Note the following sequence of events, bolded numbers, and dates:

• Bank Of Spain Formally Nationalizes Bankia, Says Insolvent Bank Is "Solvent", Adds There Is No Cause For Concern, Zero Hedge, May 9
• Spain is taking over Bankia by converting its 4.5 billion euros of preferred shares in the group’s parent company into ordinary shares, BusinessWeek, May 21
• Spain said on Wednesday its rescue of problem lender Bankia would cost at least 9 billion euros ($11 billion), as the government tries to clean up a banking system that threatens  to drag the country deeper into the euro zone crisis, Reuters, May 23   
• Bankia SA will have to ask the Spanish government for more than 15 billion euros as part of its effort to restore its financial health, state-owned news agency EFE reported Thursday, citing financial sources, Dow Jones, May 24

Hopefully we aren't the only ones to notice how the bailout cost has oddly doubled almost on a daily basis.