recovery

The rhetoric coming out of Greece has reached a fever pitch. Papademos and Samaras are both out their creating dire images of a post apocalyptic Greek state if a default occurs. Maybe it is a good time to remember what Papademos’ job is. He wasn’t elected. He doesn’t represent the Greek people in a fashion that we are used to – running for election and winning the election. He was foisted on the Greek people by the EU – the very people he is going through the motions of negotiating with. His JOB was to get the Greeks to accept what the EU wants. If he isn’t the most conflicted politician of all time, he is right up there. Samaras may believe it, or may have decided this is his best route to power when the vote is passed and the Greek people decide to kick Papademos out (remember, he was never voted in). Either of them would be more credible if they made any attempt to explain why it would be so disastrous. So far, not one basic fact to support the chaos theory has been given. I will admit that if Greece defaults without any preparation, it would be extremely ugly, but there is no reason not to be prepared. So, if I was the Greek Finance Minister (I would probably have a longer last name, with more vowels) here is an outline of how I would prepare for default.

Heading into the North American open, EU equity indices are trading lower following reports that Eurozone Finance Ministers have dismissed as incomplete a budget presented to them by the Greek party leaders. In addition to that, EU lawmakers have warned Greece of more intensive involvement in the Greek economy to improve tax collection and accelerate the sale of state-owned assets. The Greek Finance Minister Venizelos said that Greece must make a “final, strategic” decision Greek membership in the Eurozone over the next six days as it decides on new austerity and reform measures or faces leaving the single currency. However, according to sources, German finance minister told MPs, Greek reform plans would bring debt to 136% of GDP by 2020, instead of targeted 120%. So it remains to be seen as to whether Greece will be able to meet the looming redemptions in March. Of note, analysts at Fitch said that the ongoing Greece talks stating that the country must secure an agreement to cut its debt burden in the next few days to prevent a “disorderly” default.

• Eurozone dismisses Greek budget deal (FT)
• Germany Says Greece Missing Debt Targets in Aid Rebuff (Bloomberg)
• Germans concerned over Draghi liquidity offer (FT)
• Azumi Says Japan Won’t Be Shy About Unilateral Intervention (Bloomberg)
• Schaeuble Signals Germany Is Flexible on Revising Terms of Portuguese Aid (Bloomberg) - food euphemism for "next on the bailout wagon"
• Venizelos Tells Greek Lawmakers to Back Budget Cuts or Risk Exiting Euro (Bloomberg)
• Putin May Dissolve Ruling Party After Vote (Bloomberg)
• HK Bubble pops? Hong Kong Sells Tuen Mun Site to Kerry for HK$2.7 Billion, Government Says (Bloomberg)
• Gross Buys Treasuries as Buffett Says Bonds Are ‘Dangerous’ (Bloomberg)

Remember last year when the tiniest snowfall was reason for everyone and their grandmother to miss every possible estimate, always blaming it on the weather? Or rainfall in the spring? Or warm weather during the summer? Oddly enough one never hears about the opposite: the beneficial, and one-time, impact to trendline due to countertrend weather, such as the fact that we just had April weather in January. Granted, nobody in the programmed MSM will touch this topic, which is why we go to the most trustworthy filter of real economic data - David Rosenberg. "...Be careful in assessing the seasonally adjusted data when January weather feels like April. It was four to five degrees warmer than usual and the third fewest snowflakes to hit the ground in the past 50 years. On top of that, let's not lose sight of what real GDP did in Q4 — considerably below consensus view from last summer and sub-1% at an annual rate once inventories are stripped out. The only variable preventing real GDP from stagnating completely was the fact the price deflator collapsed to just 0.4% at an annual rate. If it had averaged to what it was in the previous three quarters, real GDP growth would have come in close to a 0.7% annual rate. Strip out the inventory build-up and real sales would have contracted at a 1.3% annual rate and recession would be dripping off everybody's tongue right now."

Rising consumer credit means more consumption which leads to stronger economic growth.  Let me explain.  Individuals go to work to produce a good or service for which they are paid a finite amount of money for.  With that income they pay taxes which leaves them with discretionary income from which to live on.  Pay the rent, utilities, insurance and healthcare, food, clothes and put gas in the car and that pretty much consumes the majority of the paycheck.  Today, the situation is quite different and a harbinger of potentially bigger problems ahead.  The consumer is no longer turning to credit to leverage UP consumption - they are turning to credit to maintain their current living needs. Take a look at the chart of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) versus total consumer credit.  Notice in the past year as consumer credit rose you saw an increase in PCE.  In the last two months consumer credit has exploded higher but there has been virtually NO increase in PCE levels on a month over month basis.  Retail sales during the Christmas shopping season we disappointing and this was even with a large decrease in gasoline prices. This situation becomes even more apparent when we begin to look at the longer term trends of real disposable incomes, consumer credit and personal saving rates.

The idea that the very same economic forces that are currently plaguing Greece, et al., are somehow not relevant to the United States' circumstances does not hold water.  As goes the rest of the world, so goes the US. When we back up far enough, it is clear that money and debt are there to reflect and be in service to the production of real things by real people, not the other way around. With too much debt relative to production, it is the debt that will suffer. The same is true of money. Neither are magical substances; they are merely markers for real things. When they get out of balance with reality, they lose value, and sometimes even their entire meaning. This report lays out the case that the US is irretrievably down the rabbit hole of deficits and debt, and that, even if there were endless natural resources of increasing quality available at this point, servicing the debt loads and liabilities of the nation will require both austerity and a pretty serious fall in living standards for most people.

While hardly new to anyone who actually has been reading between the lines, and/or Zero Hedge, in the past few months, the Greek endspiel is here, and as a note by Goldman's Themistoklis Fiotakis overnight, the Greek timeline, or what little is left of it, "allows little room for error." Furthermore, "Due to the low NPV of the restructuring offer it is likely that part of this investor segment may be tempted to hold out (particularly owners of front-end bonds). How the holdouts are treated will be key. Paying them out in full would probably send a bullish signal to markets, yet it would be contradictory to prior policy statements about the desirability of high participation both in practical terms as well as in terms of signalling. On the other hand, forcing holdouts into the Greek PSI in an involuntary way would likely cause broad market volatility in the near term, but could be digested in the long run as long as it happens in a non-disruptive way (as we have written in the past, avoiding triggering CDS or giving the ECB’s holdings preferential treatment following an involuntary credit event could cause much deeper and longer-lived market damage)." Once again - nothing new, and merely proof that despite headlines from the IIF, the true news will come in 2-3 weeks when the exchange offer is formally closed, only for the world to find that 20-40% of bondholders have declined the deal and killed the transaction! But of course, by then the idiot market, which apparently has never opened a Restructuring 101 textbook will take the EURUSD to 1.5000, only for it to plunge to sub-parity after. More importantly, with Greek bonds set to define a 15 cent real cash recovery, one can see why absent the ECB's buying, Portugese bonds would be trading in their 30s: "Portugal will be crucial in determining the market’s view on the probability of default outside Greece... Given the significance of such a decision, markets will likely reflect concerns about the relevant risks ahead of time." Don't for a second assume Europe is fixed. The fun is only just beginning...

• Greek Premier to Seek Bailout Consensus Amid Political Quarrels (Bloomberg)
• Merkel makes case for painful reform (FT)
• Bernanke Cites Risks to Progress of Recovery (WSJ)
• Proposed settlement with banks over foreclosure practices dealt a setback (WaPo)
• Merkel Approval in Germany Climbs to Highest Level Since 2009 Re-Election (Bloomberg)
• Francois Hollande will spark next euro crisis (MarketWatch)
• China’s Central Bank Pledges Support for Housing Market (Bloomberg)
• Italy Pushes for Europe Growth Policy (Bloomberg)
• Santorum bounces back in Republican race (FT)
• China 'Big Four' Banks Issued CNY320 Billion New Yuan Loans In Jan (WSJ)
• Gasoline and diesel prices raised (China Daily)

Perhaps after today's budget miss in the Hellenic Republic it is time that the focus shift from the reality of a pending #fail for the voluntary PSI (for all the reasons we have at length discussed no matter how many headlines the markets tries to rally on) to a post-restructuring real economy reality in Greece. Whether self-imposed by devaluation or Teutonia-imposed by Troika, austerity is in the cards but there is a much more deep-seated problem at the heart of Greece - a total and utter lack of innovation and entrepreneurship. As Goldman's Hugo Scott-Gall focuses on in his fortnightly report this week "the competitive advantage of innovation is one that developed markets need to keep" and in the case of European nations that desperately need to find a way to grow somehow, it is critical. Unfortunately, Greece, center of the universe for a post-restructuring phoenix-like recovery expectation, scores 0 for 3 on the innovation front. Lowest overall patent grant rate, lowest corporate birth rate, and highest cost of starting a new business hardly endear them to direct investment or an entrepreneurial dynamism that could 'slow' capital flight. Perhaps it is this reality, one of a Greek people perpetually circling the drain of dis-innovation and un-growth, that Merkel is starting to feel comfortable 'letting go of'. Maybe some navel-gazing after seeing these three doom-ridden charts will force a political class to open the economy a little more, cut the red tape (after a drastic restructuring of course) and shift focus from Ouzo, Olive Oil, and The Olympics. We also suggest the rest of the PIIGS not be too quick to comment 'we are not Greece' when they see where they rank for innovation.

The other other John Taylor (not the FX trader, nor the guitar player, but the "Taylor Rule" discoverer, which is at the base of all Fed monetary decisions), spoke on Bloomberg TV, and his message was certainly a far less optimistic one than that conveyed by the man charged with putting his rule into practice. "We could get into a situation like Greece, quite frankly. People have to realize it is a precarious situation. The debt is going to explode if we don't make some changes." What changes does Taylor recommend? Why the same that Bill Gross warned about yesterday - that ZIRP4EVA means a liquidity trap pure and simple, and the Fed needs to start rising rates: "the Fed has bought so much of the debt that people don't know how they're going to undo that. They pledged to have interest rates at zero until 2014, but people are saying how can they possibly do that when the economy picks up. This uncertainty had lead people to sit on all this cash. I think if the Fed gets back to the policy that worked pretty well in the '80s and '90s, we would be in much better shape." Ah yes, but the one thing, and only one thing that matters, and that is not mentioned at all, is what happens to the stock market when the Fed officially sets off on a tightening path. Actually make that question even simpler - will the drop in the S&P will be 30%, 40%, or any other greater mulitple of 10% thereof, considering that as we noted previously, the Fed and the other two central banks alone have injected over $2 trillion in just over a year. And about $10 trillion in the past 5. Calculate what the removal of this liquifity would do to stocks...

Remember when back in September 2010, David Tepper moved the market by nearly 2% when he told a stunned world that he is "balls to the wall" stocks because no matter what happens, stocks can only go higher (a ludicrous proposition in any other universe except perhaps for this one where the "Greenspan Put" has since been replaced with the "Bernanke Guarantee"). He did out perform the market that year. The next year he lost over 3%. Why? Was it because the Fed did not go through with promises of LSAP (even though it did engage in QE3 curve shifting by ZIRPing the short end in perpetuity, and buying 91% of long-end issuance). Or because the master can only create alpha when the puppet is flooding the market with liquidity. Whatever the reason, the Pavlovian creature known as the market, has been salivating for LSAP version 2012 since the beginning of January, courtesy of bearish remarks by the Chairman. And yet Tepper has yet to make a guest appearance on CNBC to discuss why the "balls" may make a repeat appearance next to the "wall." Because, as Morgan Stanley's Mike Wilson explains, instead of focusing on the means, investors should consider the end: "I think QE3 will end just as badly as QE2" and "I would feel better if earnings and economic growth were accelerating like during QE2. But they aren’t." Sure enough, one glance at the chart below explains not only why this time QE will be different actually applies, but also why when it comes to comparisons to Japan, the US may be lucky if ends up in the same condition as Japan, when the probability is one of a far worse outcome...

In all the excitement over the December 21 LTRO, Europe forgot one small thing: since it is the functional equivalent of banks using the Discount Window (and at 3 years at that, not overnight), it implies that a recipient bank is in a near-death condition. As such, the incentive for good banks to dump on bad ones is huge, which means that everyone must agree to be stigmatized equally, or else a split occurs whereby the market praises the "good banks" and punishes the "bad ones" (think Lehman). As a reminder, this is what Hank Paulson did back in 2008 when he forced all recently converted Bank Holding Companies to accept bail outs, whether they needed them or not, something that Jamie Dimon takes every opportunity to remind us of nowadays saying he never needed the money but that it was shoved down his throat. Be that as it may, the reason why there has been no borrowings on the Fed's discount window in years, in addition to the $1.6 trillion in excess fungible reserves floating in the system, is that banks know that even the faintest hint they are resorting to Fed largesse is equivalent to signing one's death sentence, and in many ways is the reason why the Fed keeps pumping cash into the system via QE instead of overnight borrowings. Yet what happened in Europe, when a few hundred banks borrowed just shy of €500 billion is in no way different than a mass bailout via a discount window. Still, over the past month, Europe which was on the edge equally and ratably, and in which every bank was known to be insolvent, has managed to stage a modest recovery, and now we are back to that most precarious of states - where there is explicit stigma associated with bailout fund usage. And unfortunately, it could not have come at a worse time for the struggling continent: with a new "firewall" LTRO on deck in three weeks, one which may be trillions of euros in size, ostensibly merely to shore up bank capital ahead of a Greek default, suddenly the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent is back with a vengeance, as the precarious Nash equilibrium of the past month collapses, and suddenly a two-tier banking system forms - the banks which the market will not short, and those which it will go after with a vengeance.

• Please - we beg you, help us - IMF Urges Beijing to Prepare Stimulus (WSJ)
• Stalemate in talks on Greek austerity measures (Telegraph)
• U.S. Sets Money-Market Plan (WSJ)
• Forty States Sign On to Foreclosure ‘Robo’ Settlement (Diana Olick)
• Greece bail-out funds could be split (FT)
• Japan Adopts Stealth Intervention as Yen Gains Hurts Growth (Bloomberg)
• Papademos to Meet Greek Party Chiefs as ‘Great Sacrifices’ Loom (Bloomberg)
• Glencore-Xstrata deal meets shareholder opposition (Reuters)
• Romney campaign takes aim at rival Santorum (Reuters)

The mainstream view uniting the entire political spectrum is that all our financial problems can be fixed by what amounts to top-down, centralized policy tweaks and regulation: for example, tweaking policies to "tax the rich," limit the size of "too big to fail" financial institutions, regulate credit default swaps, lower the cost of healthcare (a.k.a. sickcare), limit the abuses of student loans to pay for online diploma mills, and on and on and on. But what if the rot is already beyond the reach of more top-down policy tweaks? Consider the recent healthcare legislation: thousands of pages of obtuse regulations that require a veritable army of regulators staffing a sprawling fiefdom with the net result of uncertain savings based on a board somewhere in the labyrinth establishing "best practices" that will magically cut costs in a system that expands by 9% a year, each and every year, a system so bloated with fraud, embezzlement and waste that the total sum squandered is incalculable, but estimated at around 40%, minimum....The painful truth is that we are far beyond the point where policy/legalist regulatory tweaks will actually fix what's wrong with America. The rot isn't just financial or political; those are real enough, but they are mere reflections of a profound social, cultural, yes, spiritual rot. This is the great illusion: that our financial and political crises can be resolved with top-down, centralized financial reforms of one ideological flavor or another. It is abundantly clear that our crises extend far beyond a lack of regulation or policy tweaks. We cling to this illusion because it is easy and comforting; the problems can all be solved without any work or sacrifice on our part.

While the EURUSD's recovery post Europe's close seemed to modestly support stocks, the USD is still up from Friday's close as ES (the e-mini S&P 500 futures contract) closes marginally in the green against the direction of FX carry, Treasuries, commodities broadly, and credit. The volumeless (and gravitationally unchallenged) push from post-Europe dip lows this afternoon were generally ignored by VIX, investment grade, and high-yield credit markets, after the morning was a relatively significant amount of selling pressure in HYG (the increasingly significant high-yield bond ETF) to pre-NFP levels only be bough all the way back and some more into the close. Average trade size and deltas had a decidedly negative feel on every algo-driven push higher from VWAP to unchanged but the divergence between Brent and WTI dragged the Energy sector over 1% higher (as every other sector lost ground with Financials and Materials underperforming. Treasuries rallied well from the Europe close and closed just off low yields of the day as commodities all ended lower from Friday's close with Copper and WTI underperforming and Silver just edging Gold as they hovered around USD's beta for the day. VIX dropped modestly after the cash close but ended higher on the day with a notably low volatility of vol from mid-morning onwards (and the late-day vol compression seemed index-driven as implied correlation also fell commensurately). A quiet day in European sovereign and financials along with the disastrously low volume day in ES and on the NYSE really don't feel like signs of broad participation as Greek events slowly but surely unfold along the path of known resistance.