Secured Debt

By now everyone knows that Chesapeake is a slow motion trainwreck: whether it is internal management issues, which eventually will culminate with the long overdue termination of the company's head (something the company had much control over and could avoid, but didn't, and should result in the sacking of the entire board for gross negligence), or plunging gas prices (something it had far less control over, but could have hedged properly, yet didn't), what is absolutely certain is that the firm's cash flow just isn't what it used to be. In fact, according to some, it is quite, quite negative. What, however, people do not know is that under ZIRP, when every basis point of debt return over 0% is praised, and an epic scramble ensues among hedge for any yielding paper no matter how worthless, the balance sheets of companies just do not matter. In other words, for companies that have massive leverage, high interest rates, negative cash flow, which all were corporate death knells as recently as 2008, the capitalization structure is completely irrelevant. We said this a month ago when we cautioned, precisely about Chesapeake, that "to all those scrambling to short the company: beware. CHK has a history of being able to fund itself with HY bonds and other unsecured debt come hell or high water. If and when the stock tanks, the short interest will surge on expectations of a funding shortfall. Alas, courtesy of the Fed's malevolent capital misallocation enabling, we are more than confident that the firm will be able to issue as much HY debt (unsustainably at 10%+, but that is irrelevant for the short-term) as it needs, crushing all short theses. What this means, simply, is that anyone who believes traditional fundamental analysis will and should work in the CHK case is likely to get burned." Sure enough, we were again proven right: Chesapeake just announced, following today's epic drubbing, that it is refinancing its secured debt facility (with its numerous restrictive covenants) with $3 billion in brand new Libor+7.00% unsecured paper (courtesy of Goldman and Jefferies). In doing so, CHK just got at least a one year reprieve.

About two years ago the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund did something truly remarkable: it invested for infinity: "Norway, which has amassed the world’s second-biggest sovereign wealth fund, says Greece won’t default on its debts. The Nordic nation’s $450 billion Government Pension Fund Global has stocked up on Greek debt, as well as bonds of Spain, Italy and Portugal. Finance Minister Sigbjoern Johnsen says he backs the strategy, which contributed to a 3.4 percent loss on European fixed income in the second quarter, compared with gains on bonds in Asia and the Americas. Norway says its long-term perspective will protect it from losses. “One could say we are investing for infinity,” Johnsen said." Well, we all know how the experiment ended: "Norway Sovereign Wealth Fund Purges All Insolvent Eurozone Debt Holdings." So much for infinity. But that has not stopped others to boldly catch falling knives where so many other have tried to catch falling knives before, and failed. Enter Greylock Capital and various other hedge funds who are positive they have rediscovered the wheel.

Greece was the first country to defect from the non-default game theory regime of the European Union (a move which ultimately will be in its great benefit, as it is forced, very shortly, to default higher and higher into the 177% of GDP secured debt, until finally even the Troika's DIP loan is impaired). It has also become the first country to demonstrate that people can, contrary to apocalyptic claims otherwise by the global banker consortium which realizes oh too well it will be its death if people stop playing by the broken rules, exist under a barter regime. The video below shows how the Greek town of Volos develops its own bartering system without the aid of the euro. Yes - it can be done, especially since one is forced to produce in order to consume, and borrowing infinitely from the future becomes impossible.

• BARROSO SAYS TOTAL GREEK AID EQUAL TO 177% OF GREEK GDP

When discussing the Greek vote to pass a request for cash which is based on nothing substantial but merely more pledges to fix its economy in exchange for fresh billions in secured debt (aka bailouts) which will prime at least 136% of the country's GDP with a direct lien, we said all that matters is Germany's response. In which case ths following statement from German FinMin Schauble is likely indicative that this time around Greece will need to literally move mountains to convince Europe it will comply. From Reuters: "Greek promises on austerity measures are no longer good enough because so many vows have been broken and the country that has been a "bottomless pit" has to dramatically change its ways, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said. In a hard-hitting interview with the Welt am Sonntag newspaper, Schaeuble also said it is up to Greece whether the country can stay in the euro zone as part of its efforts to restore its competitiveness. "The promises from Greece aren't enough for us anymore," Schaeuble said. "With a new austerity programme they are going to first have to implement parts of the old programme and save." Yet one wonders just how will Greece first implement the measures from the first one if Europe has to vote tomorrow (or Wednesday, it is all a blur now), on ratifying the second bailout. Or was this weekend's entire Greek exercise merely one of complete irrelevance. In other news, we are fairly confident that February budget revenues are going to come in well below projections, and make the already disappointing January numbers seem like gangbusters.

Some of our German readers may be laboring under the impression that following the €110 billion first Greek bailout agreed upon and executed in May 2010, the second Greek bailout would cost a "mere" €130 billion. Alas we have news for you - as of this morning, the formal cost of rescuing Greece for the adjusted adjusted adjusted second time has just risen to €145 billion, €175 billion, a whopping €210 billion, bringing the total explicit cost of all Greek bailout funds to date (and many more in store) to €320 billion. Which incidentally is a little more than Greek GDP (which however is declining rapidly) at 310 billion, only in dollars. So as of today, merely the ratio of the Greek DIP loan (Debtor In Possession, because Greece is after all broke) has reached a whopping ratio of 136% Debt to GDP. This excludes any standing debt which is for all intents and purposes worthless. This is secured debt, which means that if every dollar in assets generating one dollar in GDP were to be liquidated and Greece sold off entirely in part or whole to Goldman Sachs et al, there would still be a 36% shortfall to the Troika, EFSF, ECB and whoever else funds the DIP loan (i.e., European and US taxpayers)! Another way of putting this disturbing fact is that global bankers now have a priming lien on 136% of Greek GDP - the entire country and then some now officially belongs to the world banking syndicate. Consider that when evaluating Greek promises of reducing total debt to GDP to 120% in 2020, as it would mean wiping all existing "pre-petition debt" and paying off some of the DIP. Also keep in mind that Greece has roughly €240 billion in existing pre-petition debt, of which much will remain untouched as it is not held in Private hands (this is the debt which will see a major "haircut" - or not: all depends on the holdout lawsuits, the local vs non-local bonds and various other nuances discussed here). If you said this is beyond idiotic, you are right. It is not the impairment on the Greek "pre-petition' debt that the market should be worried about - that clearly is 100% wiped out. It is how much the Troika DIP will have to charge off when the Greek 363 asset sale finally comes. This is also what Angela Merkel will say tomorrow when Greece shows up on its doorstep with the latest "revised" agreement from its parliament to take Europe's money ahead of the March 20 D-Day. Because finally, after months (and to think we did the math for Die Frau back in July) Germany has done the math, and has reached the conclusion that letting Greece go is now the cheaper option.

When we discussed the slow motion trainwreck that is the implosion of Netflix back on October 11, our only outstanding question was "when is the inevitable follow on equity offering coming?" We have the answer, and it is now. Netflix just announced in an 8-K filing that it has raised $200 million in convertible notes. The conversion price is a laughable $85.80 or just 16% above the closing price translating into 2.3 million shares of additional dilution, confirming that this is nothing short of an equity raise in sheep's clothing (on the buyer's terms at that), and indicates that the firm may have well entered a liquidity death spiral courtesy of a business model that still has to generate any substantial free cash flow. Naturally, the second investors realize this they will dump the stock in droves, which is horrendous news for Whitney Tilson, but amazing news for everyone long the Anti-Tilson ETF. In other news, it may just be time for Tilson to call it a career.

That the US postal service is on the verge of bankruptcy is well-known by now and was discussed by Zero Hedge long before it became mainstream news. Furthermore, as we previously noted, the key sticking point in cost reduction negotiations is the labor force compensation (80% of all costs), which is paid an average of $41.15 an hour, and which is over 60% unionized. As of today, we finally welcome the USPS to reality which has announced that, in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy, it is now seeking to reduce its total overhead by 20%, or a whopping 120,000 workers (a number which would amount to roughly an increase of 0.1% in the national unemployment rate). Ah yes, but this is prohibited by existing union contracts. Furthermore, WaPo writes that "SPS also wants to withdraw its employees from the health and retirement plans that cover federal staffers and create its own benefit programs for postal employees." Good luck trying to convince a labor union that cutting an ungodly amount of jobs is for the greater good. Alas, what happened in Greece (and what is about to happen in Italy) will be nothing compared to what will happen when the entire post office goes, well, postal.

Is it ethical for the American homeowner whose mortgage has been securitized to default, even If they are not financially distressed? First, consider it is unlikely that marketable, fee simple, insurable title can be obtained as a result of fulfilling the obligations of the related promissory note. On the contrary the titles to some 60 million homes in America are badly clouded. Secondly, encouraging investment in an asset class that has been artificially inflated, then deliberately destroying the price of the asset, as part of a separate profit making scheme is unethical, and any agreement based on this type of fraud is grounds to consider the original debt instrument used in the agreement null and void. Fortunately these grounds are unnecessary, as increasingly US courts are ruling that these mortgages are already invalid for numerous other reasons.

You might think the banks have all the leverage in the world, the big secret is it's actually the opposite. Who do you think has more leverage, those who make payment on 7 trillion in securitized mortgage debt, or those who collect the payments? Who do you think is more worried? You probably make your income from a wage, they make their income from an investment, you wouldn't believe how quickly investors can become insecure, that's why your servicer doesn't want you talking to them directly, their brokers, and make a handsome living at it. Our thinking is the guy who writes the check has the leverage. After all, if you owe the bank $100,000 dollars you've got a creditor, If you owe them 7,000,000,000,000.00 we're pretty sure you've got a partner. Stop making rental payments on the home your supposed to own, then just sit back and feel the love.

• Australia business confidence falls to lowest in 14 months on higher rates.
• British July same-store sales rise 0.5%: British Retail Consortium.
• China to close factories in energy drive; move affects 2,000 industrial companies.
• China’s July trade surplus surged to $28.73B, helped by 38.14% jump in exports.
• Mkts await outcome of Fed meeting; risky assets rise in anticipation of easing measures.
• Oil falls to below $81 as traders look to Fed for possible stimulus.
• Ambac's Q2 loss narrows to $57.6M from year-ago's loss of $2.37B.

The downgrade reflects the region's sharp budgetary deterioration in the last two years. As a result, we presume that the region's tax-supported debt, which includes public sector debt, will reach about 170% of operating revenues at year-end 2010, well above the 'AA-' median of comparable European peers. The downgrade is also due to the recessionary economic environment, which has been more acute than for most of its Spanish and, particularly, European peers. - S&P

The Rating Outlook revision to Negative incorporates recent legal developments and ongoing regulatory challenges that could adversely impact Goldman's reputation and revenue generating capacity. Goldman's franchise and market position are potentially vulnerable to scrutiny by stakeholders, and like peers, may be affected by the industry's regulatory evolution.

A quick preliminary read of the Simon proposal to acquire GGP for $10 billion, via Bank of America, indicates a cap rate of 8% "assuming growth of 3.5% on top of the annualized NOI stream." The offer values GGP at $9/share, including $3 for the land business. As readers will recall there has been a difference in opinions between Hovde and Ackman on GGP's value, the first of which gets an "implied equity value of $5.73 per share at a 7.5% cap rate and negative $5.03 per share at an 8.5% cap rate which after incorporating the conversion of the unsecured debt into equity at price of $6 per share, the implied equity value is $5.94 per share at a 7.5% cap rate and $3.62 per share at an 8.5% cap rate," while Ackman is a tad more ambitious: "based on cash NOI (not adjusted for lease termination fees, tenant allowances, maintenance capital expenditure) for LTM ending Sep 2009, Ackman values GGP at $23.7, $32.0 and $41.6 per share at cap rate of 7.21%, 6.71% and 6.21%, respectively." Seems like Hovde is just a little bit closer in his valuation (assuming no overbid). The OCC supports the Simon offer as they get taken out at par.

Here is a quick look at the Ackman short, O's covenant risk and a comparison to the cash shortage at American Campus Communities. ACC's issues are more imminent!