Sovereign Debt

There is broad disagreement among European banks on whether they should (and whether they will) choose to access the LTRO. We have discussed the top-down perspective and the very granular bank-by-bank perspective, and we end with a more bottoms-up perspective on the bank's own views of the LTRO. As SocGen notes, the investment banks (and certain Swedish banks) are very skeptical (and rightly so given the 'LTRO Stigma') while the Italian and Spanish are open to taking whatever they can, whenever they can (is that really a good sign?). Bank management must weigh the transparency they will face at the end of the quarter when sovereign bond holdings are exposed and just as SocGen points out, banks with considerably higher exposure (implicitly through the carry trade) may well face much more negative market action (even if Basel III doesn't handicap that risk). As with LTRO 1, the ECB will only reveal aggregate data, leaving the individual banks themselves to reveal their own take-up - we suspect the investment banks will make a point of highlighting that they did not take the funds, while the Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish banks will promote the benefits of their government-reach-around self-immolating ECB life-line.

While the discipline of behavioral finance is relatively new, the performing art of magic has long exploited many of the same principles about human nature and decision-making.   While much is made of the smoke-and-mirrors market we exist in, Nic Colas, of ConvergEx Group, reviews the 'Basics' of this ancient form of entertainment, courtesy of a recent Smithsonian magazine article by Teller (the quiet half of Penn & Teller), and draws some analogies to the modern world of investing and economic analysis.  The seven crossover points include pattern recognition, overconfidence, and the illusion of free choice. It seems to us that investors can benefit from reminding themselves that their own powers of perception are severely limited.   As Nic points out, if we can be regularly fooled by a Las Vegas magic act, then many of the same flaws in our thinking must be at play when we watch the screens at work.  We seek out patterns that don’t really exist.  We confuse choice with freedom. We grow emotional and limit our ability to process information.  Watching a show, this is amusing.  Making investment decisions, not so much.

So far there are no dramatic consequences of the Greek default.  The ECB did say they couldn’t accept it as collateral, but national central banks (including Greece’s somehow solvent NCB) can, so no real change.  We will likely get a Credit Event prior to March 20th once CAC’s are used to get the deal fully done.  Will the market respond much to that?  Probably not, though there is a higher risk of unforeseen consequences from that, than there was from the S&P downgrade. It just strikes us that Europe wasted a year or more, and has created a less stable system than it had before. Tomorrow’s LTRO is definitely interesting.  It seems like every outcome is now bullish – big take up is bullish because of the “carry” trade.  Low take up is bullish because “banks are okay”. Any weak bank looking to borrow from the LTRO to buy sovereign debt would be insane to buy bonds longer than 3 years and take the roll risk, but on the other hand, the weakest and most insolvent, got there by doing insane things in the first place.

Yep! If you push that sausauge too far in an attempt to hide it, it's bound to start hurting someone... somewhere... 

Could Sweden or Finland be the scene of the next European financial crisis? It is actually far likelier than most people realize. While the world has been laser-focused on the woes of the heavily-indebted PIIGS nations for the last couple of years, property markets in Northern and Western European countries have been bubbling up to dizzying new heights in a repeat performance of the very property bubbles that caused the global financial crisis in the first place. Nordic and Western European countries such as Norway and Switzerland have attracted strong investment inflows due to their perceived economic safe-haven statuses, serving to further inflate these countries’ preexisting property bubbles that had expanded from the mid-1990s until 2008. With their overheated economies and ballooning property bubbles, today’s safe-haven European countries may very well be tomorrow’s Greeces and Italys.

From S&P: "We lowered our sovereign credit ratings on Greece to 'SD' following the Greek government's retroactive insertion of collective action clauses (CACs) in the documentation of certain series of its sovereign debt on Feb. 23, 2012....We do not generally view CACs (to the extent that they are included in an original issuance) as changing a government's incentive to pay its obligations in full and on time. However, we believe that the retroactive insertion of CACs will diminish bondholders' bargaining power in an upcoming debt exchange. Indeed, Greece launched such an exchange offer on Feb. 24, 2012." Translation: Greece better have that PSI in the bag or else the "Selective" goes away and "Greece would face an imminent outright payment default." Our question for former Goldmanite and current ECB head Mario Dragi: does the ECB allow defaulted bonds to be pledged as collateral within the Euro System?

The “Placebo Effect” is fascinating. In a typical drug testing trial, one group of patients will receive the actual drug being tested, and a “control” group will be given an “inert” medicine (or “sugar pill”) that shouldn’t do anything for the patient, but the patient doesn’t know that. So much of what I find wrong about “economics” is that it masquerades as far more of a science than it actually is. It doesn’t have theories that can be “tested” in a real world, where 2 similar situations are treated differently to see which “treatment” works better. Each economy and each situation is so different that it is IMPOSSIBLE to determine why policies failed or what should have been done differently. It is possible to come up with reasonable ideas and theories of what could have been done or should have been done, but they are only theories. The systems are so complex that finding situations with similar starting conditions with similarly motivated entities involved is simply impossible to find. The fact that so much of our policy seems to be based on research into what should have been done in the Great Depression and what has been seen in Japan is frankly scary. There is no way to “know” how the Great Depression would have turned out with a different set of policies. We can make conjectures, but that is all they are – conjectures. The LTRO was designed to support the market, the market is up, so the LTRO must be working. That at least is the logic many investors are applying. They see the improvement in sovereign debt yields, the avalanche of “positive” (if unfounded) headlines, and the relentless march higher of the stock market. So the plan is working? Not so fast.

Yes, Greece had a smaller, shakier economy and doesn't have a central bank to print its own currency at will like Japan or the US. But even those countries with a printing press learn that, after a certain point, expanding the money supply only complicates the problem of too much debt by inflating key economic input costs and dangerously weakening the currency. The cold hard fact Greece is facing is that it's now at the point where extraordinary losses need to be taken. The problem is, no one wants to take them. And all the sturm und drang being exhibited by Brussels, the ECB, sovereign debt holders, and other world leaders is nothing more than a frantic game of hot potato. The one thing we can be confident of is that at some point, these losses will be taken. The market will eventually force it. And the second thing we can predict is: we don't know what will happen when they are. There is so much complexity in the counterparty exposure to Greece debt - as well as the much larger derivative exposure tied to this debt - that anything between "not much" and "worldwide financial conflagration" could be possible. And that's just Greece. As other larger countries begin to sink under the weight of their sovereign debts, the risks to the global financial system increasingly escalates. Which is why Ben Davies has a hard time finding a good home for investment capital other than gold.

And it was brutal. No more diplomatic niceties.

When even the bullshitters get tired of the bullshit! Financial contagion tale of Greece, the need for Grease & what happens to those without it, featuring the "Bad Ass" interview...

Consider that when we include the rest of the PIIGS countries, Deutsche Bank’s “actual” exposure (as downplayed as it might be) is still 35 BILLION Euros, an amount equal to 60% of the banks’ total equity.

As the banks in Europe report out earnings; or the lack thereof in most cases, it becomes clear that the LTRO is helping with liquidity but not with solvency past some very short term point. This is always the case of course but it is beginning to hit home. The balance sheets for many European banks have now swelled on the liability side with more and more debt piling up courtesy of the ECB while their assets decrease due to the Basel III mandates so that the financials of these banks begin to deteriorate. It is not just the losses from their Greek debt holdings that are coming into play but also their potential future losses from sovereign debt write downs markedly for Portugal soon I think but also perhaps for Spain and Italy in the near term as the recession in Europe brings new problems to the fore which will further reduce the value of sovereign and bank credits in Europe.

Greece has been the most pillaged country in Europe this Depression, among other reasons, because no one in any leadership position seems to have learned lessons from the 1930s. Plus, banks have more power now than they did then to call the shots. Despite no signs of the first bailout working – certainly not in growing the Greek economy or helping its population - but not even in being sufficient to cover speculative losses, Euro elites finalized another 130 billion Euro, ($170 billion) bailout today. This is ostensibly to avoid banks’ and credit default swap players’ wrath over the possibility of Greece defaulting on 14.5 billion Euros in bonds. Bailout promoters seem to believe (or pretend) that: bank bailout debt + more bank bailout debt + selling national assets at discount prices + oppressive unemployment = economic health. They fail to grasp that severe austerity hasn’t, and won’t, turn Greece (or any country) around. Banks, of course, just  want to protect their bets and not wait around for Greece to really stabilize for repayment.

2012 is proving to be the 'Year of the Central Bank'. It is an exciting celebration of all the wonderful maneuvers central banks can employ to keep the system from falling apart. Western central banks have gone into complete overdrive since last November, convening, colluding and printing their way out of the mess that is the Eurozone. The scale and frequency of their maneuvering seems to increase with every passing week, and speaks to the desperate fragility that continues to define much of the financial system today.... All of this pervasive intervention most likely explains more than 90 percent of the market's positive performance this past January. Had the G6 NOT convened on swaps, had the ECB NOT launched the LTRO programs, and had Bernanke NOT expressed a continuation of zero interest rates, one wonders where the equity indices would trade today. One also wonders if the European banking system would have made it through December. Thank goodness for "coordinated action". It does work in the short-term.... But what about the long-term? What are the unintended consequences of repeatedly juicing the system? What are the repercussions of all this money printing? We can think of a few.

The financial world is awash with theories as to how significant the Second Greek Bailout is. I’m far less concerned with this (the Bailout accomplishes nothing of import and only puts off the coming Greek default by a short period). Instead, I think it much more important to ascertain the true exposure to Greek sovereign debt. And what better place to start than the banking system of the one country that is playing hardball with Greece during this latest round of negotiations: Germany.