Sovereign Default

While all eyes this morning are on Chinese CDS (with about an 18 month delay: about par for a centrally planned market), which has finally blown out, the shifting of attention has done nothing to fix the situation in Europe, where CDS is once again wider across the board.

While the merits of its conclusion are at best questionable, and at worst, completely worthless, the IMF study presented earlier provides one statistical curiosity vis-a-vis sovereign defaults. Specifically, in "Default in Today's Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely" the author Carlo Cottarelli presents an observation which could be classified as a "Hindenburg Omen" type of signal for sovereign default. Unlike the real H.O. observation (which incidentally has now been experienced 5 times in the past three weeks) for stocks, the one relevant for sovereign bankruptcy has a much simpler gating threshold: 1,000 bps spread in credit risk. And just like in the Hindenburg Omen, this is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a crash: only in this case it is not the market that collapses, but a country's solvency. Cottarelli finds that since the first Brady deals in 1991-92 there are 36 instances in which a country’s spreads rose above 1,000 basis points. "Of those instances, seven eventually resulted in default; in the remaining 29 cases, however, the spreads stayed high for a few months and eventually fell back well below 1,000 basis points, with no default." The 1,000 is logically an inverse gating factor: no single country defaulted with spreads being below the 1,000 threshold. In other words, once a country passes 1,000 bps, it has a one in five chance of defaulting, roughly in line with the crash expectations of the traditional Hindenburg Omen.

Following up on our earlier observations on the Spiegel article about Germany change in posture vis-a-vis the European Stability Fund, here are some additional summary thoughts from Thermidor.

From the unthinkable, to the possible, the unavoidable, the actual and finally, the patently obvious

"I kept thinking about prior sovereign events I lived and invested through, and how the “unthinkable” eventually became the “possible”, the “unavoidable”, the “actual” and finally, the “patently obvious”. This week's Sovereign Default Time Capsule shows what people were thinking and saying in real time as sovereign debt and currency crises played out. This is not meant to say that Greece is Argentina; there’s a big difference between Mercosur and the European Union, and it looks like the First Act of the EMU drama will be a bailout for Greece. But it’s instructive to remember how politicians, markets, investors and analysts can underestimate the depths of a problem". - Michael Cembalest, CIO, JP Morgan, Global Wealth Management

Spanish National Intelligence Agency (CNI) is investigating whether the Spanish economy and the euro have fallen victim to a concerted attack by speculators and foreign media (El Pais)

Wall Street helped mask debts shaking Europe (NYT)

Γερμανογαλλικ? εγγ?ηση στα ελληνικ? ομ?λογα – Πως θα κινηθε? το ΧΑ - Here's to hope for another €5 billion Greek bond deal - the question: will it be guaranteed by Germany/France (B(T)ankingNews.gr)

Majority of Germans want Greece expelled from the euro zone(Reuters)

Dubai stocks plunge after disclosure Dubai World to pay 60 cents on dollar (Bloomberg)

European finance ministers meet to discuss week ahead (Economist)

Greek FinMin unveils tax reform, wage policy, outlawing of cash: "From 1. Jan. 2011, every transaction above 1,500 euros
between natural persons and businesses, or between businesses,
will not be considered legal if it is done in cash. Transactions
will have to be done through debit or credit cards" (Reuters)

Greek Britain? (BBC)

Greek saga won't kill the euro but the end may begin here (Telegraph)

When psychologists evaluate human behavior, one of the most prevalent observations regarding any activity is the all too often flawed basis of perceived versus realistic outcomes that dictates our every action. As imperfect creatures, we tend to construct theories that conform with our worldview, which are subsequently reinforced by our confidence (or lack thereof) in the future. This is true in any discipline: finance, politics, gambling, mating, etc. There is hardly a better example of this than the very basis of modern economic theory where assumptions about the validity of fiat currencies determine the actions of central banks, which in turn spill over into every aspect of modern society . Yet what if the very basis of core assumptions is wrong? What if every activity exhibited by humans in the post gold-standard world has a flawed assumption at its core? Austrian economists have, of course, claimed this for ages, usually seeing their efforts conclude with a dead-end as the attempt to change the status quo hits the brick wall of quadrillions of (arguably worthless) pieces of paper which dictate the status quo. However, with the recent turn for the worse, courtesy of sovereign bail outs (as confused as they may be) could the day of reckoning be fast approaching? With each passing the day an affirmative answer seems closer at hand. Today SocGen's Dylan Grice shares his perspectives on popular delusions, and why these may soon be coming to an abrupt end.

In a CNBC interview on Feb. 10, Marc Faber went out on a limb saying ALL governments will eventually default, including the United States. From all indications, this is a fairly plausible scenario.

Contagion is here. Portugal and Greece default risks are now racing whose CDS can hit 500 first... Then 1,000... Forget the bond vigilantes: the sovereign default vigilantes just called Almunia's bluff. At last check SovX was flirting with the record century mark, Greece was almost back to record wides with some bids of 410 bps floating around, while Portugal, which is today's whipping boy, exploded to 215 bps. We eagerly await to see which other country will join the CDS ballet. Almunia is now openly waging a two-front war, which will soon become multi. The last time this happened to a European, the results were not that good.