Volatility

Here we go:

A refresh on Rule 48:

"Rule 48 is intended to be invoked only in those situations where
the potential for extreme market volatility would likely impair
Floor-wide operations at the Exchange by impeding the fair and orderly
opening of securities."

Implied volatility for the big banks is down across the board, just about where it was before the system went into convulsions. This implies the coast is clear, as do the share prices of many banks.
Hard core forensic and fundamental analysis implies otherwise. So does the Fed's actions, which still incorporates ZIRP policy, as well as the waffling at FASB. We will either have smooth sailing from this point on out or there is a nasty surprise waiting (on and off balance sheet) for bank investors in the near future. I invite readers to weigh in with their opinions.

In his piece today, Rosenberg analyzes the increasing lumpiness of volatility in the secular market, observing an increasing performance variation as the duration of major market moves is reduced, while the delta from the flatline keeps growing. Ironically this is happening even as implied correlation drifts lower over time. And even as all eagerly await to see just what the financial regulation overhaul will look like, Rosie observes that the market is now experiencing "intense volatility that has been and continues to be nurtured by government policy." As we shift to a market which is backstopped by taxpayers holdings of assets on which even the FASB encouraged informational opacity, one wonders just what is the real value of information that prices now convey?

As the VIX languishes in the doldrums of teen spirit, lulling market participants to sleep before volatility comes screaming back to life, the CME & CBOE have announced a partnership that will create futures (and options on futures) for volatility indexes across a variety of asset classes. [1] CME press release [2] Crude Oil, Gold & Euro Volatility Index charts [3] CBOE primer on just what the heck the VIX actually is

Today's perfect doji on the daily chart of El Paso (EP) illustrates a specific type of trade setup that we at Fibozachi scan for. The tenor of 'this' price action is symptomatic of short-term exhaustion, typically resulting in an immediate correction over the next few sessions (1-3). On this expected setup the pre-defined (anticipated) risk/reward ratio is over 4:1 ... which means that one need be 'correct' c. 25% of the time to break-even (save commissions + slippage). Trading is nothing if not a probabilistic endeavor and we like those odds.

Investors are growing more risk averse as they question the macroeconomic outlook as the government withdraws its support. Moreover, as last year’s sugar high continues to wear off, what we can expect to see is a return to what can only be described as heightened volatility in the markets, and the need to shift towards less cyclical and more defensive and income-oriented strategies that work well in a period of increased economic uncertainty. Overall, if the primary trend for the economy, credit and equity prices is down and 2009 was indeed a countertrend bounce, then the appropriate exercise is to consider ways to capitalize on the spectacular rally in risk assets off the lows last March and determine how we can all still make money in 2010 on a risk adjusted basis.- David Rosenberg

Now that sovereign CDS traders are about to reprise the role of Jason Bourne, and be hunted by international intelligence agencies just because under the not so wise advice of their prime brokers and preferred CDS salespeople, they dared to buy a minimum amount of $5 million in 5 year CDS of [Spain|Portugal|Greece], it is worthwhile to expose this sovereign CDS "thingy" once and for all. The following BofA research report will introduce not only the basics, but get into some of the more arcane concepts for those who feel that the need to roundhouse Spanish intelligence officers is about to reach boiling point (call it 30-bp spread induced synesthesia).

On a quiet day like today, everyone is screaming and complaining about a collapsing VIX and lack of volatility. However, look beneath the surface and you will find many battles being waged between Goldman Sachs and their biggest clients who have outsized positions in specific stocks. With insane volatility.

NYSE invokes Rule 48, last used the day Jamie Dimon acquired Bear Stearns for pocket change. Wishes everyone good luck in case the 33 Liberty Street trading desk is unable to hold the market together.

...Alas does not exist. Which begs the question how have iShares and Direxion not made a quintuple levered, dollar vol tracking index yet? Aside from another class action lawsuit in the making, it would provide the heatmappers with a whole new level of adrenaline now that habituation levels have set in with FAZ and BGZ.

Despite VIX on a steady decrease since late 2008, the market has seen a strong upsurge in rates vol over the summer.

The VIX is hell bent on demonstrating it can go back to under 10 even as bond vol keeps on calling its bluff. However, someone keeps selling vol in wholesale amounts and reraising all in (the 5th round has been, of course, with taxpayer money) on stable market bets despite all fundamental signs to the opposite.

The VIX - VXV relationship has dropped to a 2009 low, implying the 3M forward vol is abnormally high (projected volatility) relative to 1M (VIX), and extreme lows coincide with index turning points.

The VIX - VXV relationship has dropped to a 2009 low, implying the 3M forward vol is abnormally high (projected volatility) relative to 1M (VIX), and extreme lows coincide with index turning points.

Ever since the 30 year auction closed earlier, the market has been acting about as rationally as the Stalingrad Bourse back in 1939. Nowhere can this be seen better than the volatility in the 15 Year mortgage. Vol has moved from stocks, to CDS, to treasuries and is now roosting in mortgages. Rinse. Repeat?